PATTERNS OF POWER

Soviet Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania

The Complete Study

1939 — 1949 — 1991

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with Claude (Anthropic)

Held as tested, not revealed.

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PREFACE AND OUTLINE

Front matter · how this study was made, the disciplines it holds itself to, and a map of its fourteen parts

The collaboration

This is a case study in the Patterns of Power series, applying the series' framework to the Soviet acquisition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, from the secret protocol of 23 August 1939 to the Soviet recognition of the three restored states on 6 September 1991. The framework is a lens for reading how any order of power is founded, dressed and held: the floor of force beneath every order, the robe of doctrine laid over the floor to make the force cheap, the settlement that divides the spoils, the cost column in which each subject prices defection, the seam that manages the belief on which the whole depends, the default by which an elite coordinates without instruction, and — running through all of it — position logic, the proposition that rulers in like positions converge on like solutions because a position poses a problem with only a few good answers.

The three republics were taken as one case rather than three, because they were acquired by one protocol, on one timetable, under one set of instructions, and differ enough among themselves to serve as an internal control on a single conqueror. They were chosen for three reasons, and each turned out to do work the collection could not have got elsewhere.

The first is that this is the case where the strongest defence of the whole Soviet acquisition — that the alternative on offer was another empire, and a worse one — has the least ground to stand on. These were literate, industrialised, sovereign European states with functioning institutions and per capita output above the Soviet Union's own. Nothing that could be said about tutelage, backwardness or the absence of a nation was available here to anybody.

The second is that the series' Central Asian study left a question it could not answer on its own terrain. It had found the purest formula-without-a-forum in

the collection: a written constitutional right of secession and no institution anywhere obliged to hear a man invoke it, tested by absence across seven decades. The Baltic is where somebody invoked it anyway, in March 1990, and where the answer arrived twenty-three days later in the form of a procedure law. That sequence exists nowhere else.

The third is that with two acquisitions by one order on ground about as unlike as the union contained — the Fergana valley and the Gulf of Finland — the collection can for the first time separate what a doctrine does from what a terrain does. That sort is set out in the final module and is worth more than either study taken alone.

The study was built the way the series is built, one module at a time. The author brought the framework, the direction and the judgement of the whole, and held the collaboration to its disciplines; Claude, Anthropic's model, did the research — verifying every load-bearing quotation, date and figure by search against a source reproducing the primary text before any module was written — and produced the drafts, applying the framework module by module, each presented and confirmed before the next was begun. The framework's concepts are the series'; the Baltic application, and the refinements it yielded, are the work of the collaboration.

Its engine throughout is the method of information asymmetry: setting the exact public words beside the exact words of the ground and letting the distance speak. Molotov telling the Supreme Soviet on 31 October 1939 that talk of Sovietising the Baltic countries served only the common enemies of both — beside the ultimatums of the following June. The Latvian ballot paper of July 1940 instructing the voter that only one list must be deposited and that it must be deposited without any changes — beside the Supreme Soviet's resolution three weeks later to satisfy the request of the assembly that ballot elected. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, granted in the same sentence that names the purpose it must serve — beside a national literature classified top secret so that it could be said not to exist. And a decision of the Council of Ministers fixing the number of families to be removed from each republic in January 1949 — beside the maps drawn for the operation, a metre by two, marked with the railway stations and the number to be despatched from each.

Two limitations are structural and are stated here rather than buried. Most of the specialist literature on which this study depends was reached through published abstracts, reviews, reporting and reference accounts rather than in the

monographs themselves, and the points where that matters most are flagged in the modules that rely on them. And every constitutional and statutory text quoted here has been read in English translation; where a phrase is load-bearing, the module says so and marks it for collation against the Russian, Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian original.

A third limitation belongs to the archive rather than to the study. This order documented its own operations in extraordinary detail — the quotas, the orders, the arms issued, the wagons, the maps — while the households it removed left letters and memory. Nearly every precise figure in this study is therefore the apparatus's own, and a count weighted by surviving paper is a count taken from inside the operation.

The disciplines

Five rules govern every module.

Quotation. Public-domain primary sources — laws, decrees, treaties, constitutional articles, official statements and government publications — are quoted exactly, at the length the argument needs, because in a legal fiction the precise wording is the evidence. Modern copyrighted scholarship is paraphrased, briefly, and credited.

No fabrication. No quotation, date, attribution or figure is ever invented or reconstructed from memory. What cannot be verified is dropped or flagged, never guessed; contested figures are given as ranges, and this case has a great many — the deportation totals, the partisan and Soviet casualties, the balance of budgetary flows, the literacy rates of 1897, and every number over which the successor states, the Russian Federation and the Western scholarship hold present positions.

Gravity without partisanship. Suffering is held with gravity, and the study refuses both flattery and demonisation — it names the legal fiction as fiction and explains the order's logic without excusing it. Its recurring watchword is *legibility is not pardon*.

Contribution. Every module returns a refinement to the framework, stated plainly in its closing section, rather than merely applying the framework to the case.

Held as tested, not revealed. The pattern is treated as something discovered and tested against the evidence, not handed down as doctrine — a lens laid over the record, a tendency and never a law.

What the Baltic added to the framework

Because this is the collection's second Soviet case and its first on terrain richer and more literate than the metropole that took it, it was able to name features the other cases obscure. Chief among the refinements the study contributed: that the settlement's conversion runs in either direction and the direction is the diagnostic, so that relations become things where an elite is to be bought and things become relations where none is and the object is to hold the cultivator directly; that classification belongs on the list of settlement fictions beside vacancy, recognition and divisibility, because it performs the identical operation of converting a decision about a person into a fact about him, and differs only in attaching to a man rather than to land, and therefore in being revocable, backdatable and heritable; that a robe is addressed to whoever the order's own legitimating claim makes indispensable, so that a doctrine of self-determination promotes the conquered from a population that need not believe anything into the one party whose visible consent the edifice requires; that the revealed-preference test can be read for denomination and not merely for amount, since the currency a payment is made in identifies its audience directly; that a substitution programme's achievement is a function of the deficit it finds rather than of the conviction behind it; that attacking a formation converts it into a flag only where the formation was already the nation's own, and that where it belonged to an earlier foreign elite the attack completes a job the nation's own intellectuals had begun; that a formation can be funded in form and hollowed by catchment, leaving rising expenditure in the education file and a changed population in the classrooms; that circumscription can be manufactured where the geography declines to supply it, and that the legislation which manufactures it is the most honest document an order will ever produce about its own standing with its people; that a removal demonstrated once at scale holds the middle of a population while the apparatus polices only the margin, so that an apparatus too small for the quiet it produces is evidence of a past demonstration rather than of belief; that an outside power can hold up somebody else's floor by declining to act, since non-recognition without enforcement keeps a moral

claim alive and an operational hope dead; that a showcase cannot be held at subsistence, so that where an extractor needs a population's condition seen by a third party the floor rises for reasons unconnected with that population's own leverage; that extraction of position is a third prong beside extraction as rate and extraction as dispossession, and that where a conquest extracts position the bill is presented in demography; that in a planned economy the direction of extraction is not readable from the accounts at all, because the accounts are denominated in units the extractor set, so that the comparator must replace the ledger; that the size of a censorship apparatus measures the revisability of an order's governing claim rather than the severity of its conduct; that annulment aims at sayability rather than at knowledge and doubles as a detection instrument, since a fact ruled not to exist identifies everyone who says it aloud; that appointment is a seventh answer to the elite problem, binding not by conferring but by ensuring nothing else exists to confer, and being for that reason the most reliable arrangement on the menu while the centre is solvent and the least durable the moment it stops; that the instrument which produces a reliable elite is the instrument that forecloses liberty, and that they are one instrument and not two; that a base is necessary and not sufficient for liberty's residue, because the state must also be unable to destroy the faction's members; that where no domestic faction exists a base can be borrowed from abroad, but only in an order that needs somebody's recognition; that a forum supplied late by the order itself is a final defence rather than a remedy, because crossing its threshold validates the premise it was built to protect; that a mass movement in a foreclosed order is not the author of change but the price mechanism through which the fight inside the hierarchy is settled; that a floor fails at the level of the men who must carry it out, and fails when the centre publicly declines to own the order; that a formation programme producing more qualified claimants than the hierarchy has seats is a slow fracture with a long fuse; that metabolic debt is called in only where the coordination destroyed is the coordination the population's numbers depended on; and that where the food system survives the note is presented in a currency no body count records — the arrest of the mortality decline every comparable society was experiencing, which can be seen only against a comparator because against its own past it reads as success.

The arc

A landscape opening and twelve modules, each with a framework function and its own evocative title.

Landscape — the orders on the eve of 1940. *Stud. Cam., Latweetis.* A student's visiting card at Dorpat in the 1850s, on which declaring oneself a Latvian was the act; a seven-century German landholding order so naturalised that the word for a gentleman was the name of a nation; a duchy that had been an empire and lost its own nobility to Poland; twenty years in which three small republics abolished by statute the exact class the incoming doctrine required; and the conquering caste of 1201 sailing away by agreement in three weeks in October 1939.

1 — The Floor of Force. *The Number at Each Station.* Three sovereign states taken in four days at a combat cost of one defender at Raua Street and five people at a border post; and then a second floor applied by category to numbers fixed in Moscow before anyone in the three countries had been assessed, with maps drawn showing the railway stations and the quantity to be despatched from each.

2 — The Settlement. *Outside Labour and a Tractor.* A declaration that proclaimed rather than expropriated; a thirty-hectare ceiling applied to the beneficiaries of a land reform completed twenty years earlier; registered freehold converted into a permission to work a field; and a class the doctrine required, found by combing the population through records and censuses until enough households could be entered on a list.

3 — The Robe. *To Satisfy the Request.* A conquest recorded as a petition granted; a foreign minister who had audited his rivals' empires in public and thereby spent the only vocabulary in which his own could be described; and a city of a quarter of a million handed to Lithuania against the ethnographic argument, on the stated ground of what the place meant to Lithuanians.

4 — Formation. *Suggestions for Secular Traditional Events.* A literacy campaign arriving at a country already literate; a commission convened at Tartu in 1959 to draft the rites of a life; and one assault on one institution by one apparatus over one half-century, producing among the least religious populations on earth in two countries and eighty-one issues of a clandestine Catholic journal in the third.

5 — The Cost Column. *A Notation in the Passport.* A door that stood open for three weeks in 1944 and through which a tenth of the Estonian population went; a coast legislated into a permitted zone within two years; a threat demonstrated twice and then held for thirty-five years at almost no running cost; and a line to the West operated by the service it was meant to escape.

6 — Extraction. *A Post Office Box in Narva.* An instrument with no rate; two archival ledgers of the same forty-four years that disagree by sixteen billion roubles and in sign; a uranium plant whose ore proved worthless and which ran for four decades anyway, because the asset was never the ore; and the mine that was never dug, where the arrangement began to come apart.

7 — Information and Suppression. *As If It Did Not Exist at All.* The collection's standing finding about colonial censorship failing in every particular; a national literature classified top secret while it circulated hand to hand; a fifty-year argument over whether one document existed; and a television mast at Espoo that no apparatus could switch off.

8 — Elite Coordination and the Default. *Governor-General.* An elite that owned nothing, inherited nothing and could be removed by a telephone call, and was for exactly that reason the most reliable in the collection; four chains of command laid across one another, one of which the Baltic invented for the rest of the union; and the private word the ruling class of Soviet Lithuania used for the men Moscow set over it.

9 — Plurality or Foreclosure. *In Accordance with the Interests of the People.* A guarantee of free speech whose qualifying clause comes before the word *guaranteed*; three monopolies in one hand for fifty years; the one institution in three countries with a base the state did not own, and the seventeen years of clandestine publication and no rights whatever that grew on it; and a right of secession invoked at last, and a forum built in twenty-three days to receive it that could not be entered without conceding the case.

10 — Change and Collapse. *Mõtleme veel.* The largest mass movement in Baltic history, proposed on a state television talk show by the head of a department of the state planning committee; force used three times in the union and de-escalating each time; and a floor that failed at the level of the men who had to carry it out, two years earlier and in another republic.

11 — The Grim Accounting. *Sixty-Four Point Four One.* A metabolic note never called as famine because there was no coordination-dependent surplus to lose; the debt presented instead in a currency no body count records; twelve

million tonnes of tailings left on a shoreline for a different political order to settle; and the counter-column priced against the only comparator that means anything.

12 — Convergence and Divergence. *Possessing Equal Rights.* Twelve instruments and what each returned; nine real differences from the colonial pattern, named at full strength, which turn out to have one property in common; two Soviet cases sorted into what a doctrine does and what a terrain does; and the three strongest arguments against the whole exercise, set out in the terms their holders actually use.

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A note on sources. This front matter is descriptive and makes no primary-source claims of its own; every factual assertion about the case is established, with its sources and with its limits marked, in the module it summarises. The framework it describes is the series'; the disciplines it lists are the ones the modules hold themselves to and document in their own closing notes.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

STUD. CAM., LATWEETIS

Landscape · the orders the conqueror of 1940 found — a seven-century German conquest that had become the world and then dissolved itself by agreement in three weeks; a duchy that had been an empire and lost its own nobility to Poland; twenty years in which three small states abolished by statute the exact class the incoming doctrine required; and the precise state that came for them

The card on the door

Some time in the middle 1850s a student at the Imperial University of Dorpat pinned a visiting card to the door of the room he rented. His friend Krišjānis Barons remembered the text, and the card itself survives in photograph in the Estonian national archives. It read: *C. Woldemar. Stud. cam. Latweetis.* Christian Woldemar. Student of cameralistics. A Latvian.

The first two lines were unremarkable; the third was the act. In the Baltic provinces of the Russian Empire an educated man was not a Latvian, because education was conducted in German, awarded by German institutions, and led into German society — and a peasant's son who climbed the ladder arrived at the top having become something else. There was a word for the ones caught in transit. Estonians called them *kadakasaksad*, juniper Germans: cottagers and small tradesmen and manor servants who spoke a mangled German, washed their teeth, and were mocked from both directions, by the peasants they had left and the gentry they had not yet reached. The Estonian lexicographers think the word came in from the German *Katensasse*, a man in a hut, and was then reheard by Estonian ears as *kadakas* — juniper, the scrub that grows on poor ground — joined to *saks*, which is what an Estonian called a gentleman. *Saks* is *Sachse*. Saxon. The word for a lord and the word for a nation were the same word, and had been for six hundred years.

That is the fact this landscape has to establish first, because everything the conqueror of 1940 met had been shaped by it. Barons noted that what struck

him about Valdemārs was that he had found a Latvian who was not an ashamed one. And the juniper Germans themselves, on the account of the Estonian scholarship, generally completed the passage: by the third generation the family had merged into the upper stratum, and its German origin had become self-evident.

One word for master, in three countries

No conqueror meets an aboriginal order. He meets an earlier conquest that has had time to become the world, and the Baltic case allows that proposition to be dated almost to the year.

In 1201 Albert of Buxhoeveden, third bishop of the Livonian mission, founded Riga as his see and his base. The following year he chartered a standing military order, the Brothers of the Militia of Christ — the Swordbrothers — because crusaders who sailed home each autumn could not hold ground. The campaigns ran up the rivers and then east and north into the Estonian counties, and the chronicle written by the priest Henry of Livonia carries them year by year to the middle 1220s. What the conquest installed was not a garrison but a landholding class: German knights and their descendants, seated on manors, over a peasantry that spoke Estonian in the north and Latvian in the south and did not, for the next seven centuries, supply a single member of the class above it.

The class organised itself into corporations — the *Ritterschaften* of Estland, Livland, Kurland and Ösel, the Estonian one documented from 1252 — each keeping a matriculation register of the families entitled to sit, each meeting in its own *Landtag*, each electing a marshal to speak for it. Sovereigns came and went above them: the Order, the Danes, the Poles, the Swedes, the Russians. The corporations did not go. They negotiated with each new overlord in turn and each new overlord confirmed them, which is a fact about the corporations' usefulness rather than about anybody's generosity.

By the nineteenth century the arrangement had reached the pole every durable order is trying to reach, where the arrangement no longer requires argument because it has stopped looking like an arrangement. It was simply the case that the manor was German and the field was Estonian; the pastor preached in the peasant's language and thought in his own; and a Latvian who wanted a career acquired one by ceasing, in the socially relevant sense, to be a

Latvian. It is worth saying plainly that this was not a fraud and the people living inside it were not dupes. A built thing that becomes real is more durable than a lie, and by 1850 the Baltic order was authentically the world of everybody in it — of the baron who believed his family's stewardship of the province was a duty, and of the tenant who thought the world had lords in it the way it had weather. Naming its origin in a thirteenth-century armed mission is a description of how it got there, not a demotion of what it became.

Lithuania is the control that sits inside the case, and it works by running the same mechanism with different materials. The Lithuanians were never conquered by the Order. Protected by forest and marsh, they consolidated instead into a state that expanded east across the lands of Rus until ethnic Lithuanians were a minority in their own grand duchy, whose administrative language was Ruthenian and whose rulers held out as the last pagan sovereigns in Europe until the conversion of 1387. That is a conquering order, not a conquered one — and the point of interest is that it produced the identical social outcome by a different route. Through the dynastic union with Poland and then the real union of 1569, the Lithuanian nobility Polonised; and by the nineteenth century a Lithuanian speaker was, again, by definition a peasant, and the man who owned his land spoke the language of a foreign nation. Estonia and Latvia had a foreign upper class imposed by a crusade. Lithuania grew one out of its own, by marriage and fashion and the pull of a larger court. The word for master was still the name of somebody else.

A hundred and sixty-seven years, and then the tsar changed his mind

The Russian conquest of the Baltic provinces is a case of a conqueror finding a coordinating class already in place, already organised, already collecting, and deciding to buy it rather than replace it — which cost him almost nothing, because what the class wanted was the arrangement it already had.

Estonia and Livonia capitulated during the Great Northern War in the summer and autumn of 1710, and the terms are the whole of the story. The nobles and the towns kept their privileges, their courts, their Lutheran establishment, their German administration and their German law, with the instruments referring back explicitly to the charter granted under Polish rule in 1561; and the Swedish crown's land reduction, which had begun converting

serfs into subjects of the crown, was reversed. Sweden accepted the arrangement in the Treaty of Nystad in 1721. Courland followed at the third partition of Poland in 1795. Succeeding emperors — Alexander I, Nicholas I, Alexander II — reconfirmed the privileges in turn, and the reason is not mysterious: the *Ritterschaften* supplied the empire with officers, ministers and provincial governors in numbers wildly out of proportion to their size, and in exchange the empire let them run the provinces in a language it did not use.

For a hundred and sixty-seven years the administration, the courts and the schools of the Baltic provinces were conducted in German inside a Russian empire. That is the cheapest hold in the whole northern record, and it was bought with a signature.

Two things then happened to it, in the wrong order.

The first was emancipation, and it came early — Estland in 1816, Kurland in 1817, Livland in 1819, four decades before the empire's interior. It was also the emancipation the landholding class itself had proposed and the *Landtage* had voted, and it freed the peasant's person while leaving the soil where it was. The legal literature uses the word the period used: the peasant became *vogelfrei*, free as a bird, which in German carries at once the sense of unencumbered and of having nothing and nobody. He could now leave, in principle; he could not take a field with him, because the field was the manor's. What the reform produced over the following century was therefore not a yeomanry but a large and mobile landless class, and the Latvian statistics put a number on it: at the imperial census of 1897, 61.2 per cent of the rural population of Latvia held no land.

The second was that the empire, having leased the provinces to their German elite for six generations, changed its mind about the lease. From the 1880s the tsarist administration set about dismantling the intermediary it had bought. An imperial *ukaz* of 14 September 1885 made Russian obligatory for officials in the Baltic governorates and was extended in 1889 to the proceedings of the municipalities; laws of 1888 and 1889 took the police and the manorial justice out of the nobility's hands and gave them to officers of the central government; the courts moved to Russian between 1889 and 1892; Russian became the language of instruction in the schools across roughly 1887 to 1892, with supplementary regulations of 1887 permitting Estonian and Latvian only in the first two years of elementary school; and in 1893 the German university at Dorpat was reconstituted as the Russian University of Yuriev.

The measures were aimed at the barons. They landed on the barons. And the effect on the population underneath the barons was to remove, in one decade, the class that had stood between it and the state, at exactly the moment that population had begun to produce its own newspapers, its own choirs and its own account of itself. An empire that spends a decade breaking the intermediary it had been renting is not thereby liberating anybody, and nothing in the record suggests it meant to; but it had made the space it needed to fill much larger than the apparatus it had brought to fill it.

In Lithuania the same government did something structurally opposite and got a comparable result. There the empire faced no German caste to break and a Polish-speaking nobility it regarded as the enemy of the 1863 rising, so it went at the peasants' language directly. Alexander II approved the programme on 22 May 1864; Governor-General Muravyov's order of 5 June 1864 forbade the printing of Lithuanian schoolbooks in what the administration called Polish characters; his successor Kaufman turned that into a comprehensive ban on all Latin-script Lithuanian publications on 6 September 1865, confirmed by the Minister of the Interior in September of the same year and extended across the empire. Some fifty-five Lithuanian titles were printed in Cyrillic in the four decades that followed. What actually circulated was smuggled: printed in East Prussia and the United States and carried across the border in sacks by the *knygnešiai*, the book-carriers, at an estimated thirty to forty thousand items a year by the late 1890s, of which perhaps a third was confiscated, taught in secret village schools by unlicensed teachers called *daraktoriai*, and punished with fines, imprisonment and exile. The ban was lifted in 1904, having produced the thing it was designed to prevent: a literate peasant nation for whom possessing a book in its own alphabet had been, within living memory, a criminal act.

The fiftieth year of their freedom

The counter-formation that grew in the north grew in a building the conquerors had put up.

The Lutheran establishment the Germans installed had, over three centuries, done what Lutheran establishments do: it had taught the peasantry to read, because a Lutheran is supposed to read. By the imperial census of 1897 the reading rates of the Baltic provinces stood at roughly three times the all-Russian average, and — the more unusual finding — with very little of the gap between

town and country or between men and women that the empire showed everywhere else. The figures for the Estonian and Latvian populations specifically are given in the literature between about eighty and ninety-six per cent depending on the age cohort and the measure of literacy used, against an all-empire figure usually quoted at twenty-one to twenty-eight per cent; some tabulations using stricter definitions return considerably lower Baltic numbers, and the divergence should be held rather than resolved. What is not in dispute is the rank order: the two poorest-owned peoples in the empire were among its most literate.

In June 1869 a journalist named Johann Voldemar Jannsen, who had been born a serf, assembled the choirs at Tartu for three days of singing. The accounts give eight hundred and twenty-two singers and fifty-six brass players, or in the round figures of the period something between eight hundred and a thousand performers before an audience of about fifteen thousand. The occasion had a stated pretext, and it is the pretext that repays attention: the festival was held as a thanksgiving for the fiftieth anniversary of the release of Livonia from serfdom. Fifty years earlier the peasant had been made *vogelfrei*; the choirs assembled to give thanks for it; and what they were actually assembling was the first mass occasion in which the Estonian language was the medium and Estonians the subject. Latvians held their first at Riga in 1873. By 1896 the Estonian festival counted some five and a half thousand performers and an audience above fifty thousand.

Contemporary radicals complained that the whole thing was a German song festival with Estonian words, and they were not wrong about the music. The observation belongs in the record precisely because it is the mechanism: a formation installed for one purpose had been captured for another, and the instrument was not modified in the capture. The pastors had taught them to read so they could read the catechism. They read the catechism, and then they read Jakobson's *Sakala*, and then they wrote down the folk songs, and then they filled a field.

What the twenty years did

The three states that declared independence in 1918 and held it through the wars that followed did one thing above all others in their first four years, and it is the thing the conqueror of 1940 would run into.

The Estonian Land Act of 10 October 1919 expropriated the manors. The standard figures in the Estonian literature give one thousand and sixty-five estates taken, amounting to 96.6 per cent of the large landowners, and something over 2.34 million hectares — around fifty-eight per cent of the country's agricultural land — with the manorial industries going too: the accounts itemise two hundred and twenty-five distilleries, three hundred and forty-four mills, seventy-four sawmills, sixty-four stone and clay works, eighteen dairies and seven breweries. Compensation was not paid at the time; a law of 1926 provided it in state bonds at reduced valuations. Between 1919 and 1926 the land went out to some fifty-three thousand settlers, with priority to men who had fought the war of independence, and by 1939 Estonia held on the order of a hundred and twenty-five thousand small family farms.

Latvia legislated in stages from 16 September 1920 and completed the work in 1922. Before the war, two per cent of landowners had held fifty-three per cent of the land in Kurzeme and Vidzeme and thirty-eight per cent in Latgale. The reform left owners fifty hectares each and distributed the rest without payment. The landless share of the rural population fell from 61.2 per cent in 1897 to eighteen per cent by 1936. When the Baltic German representatives demanded twelve hundred million gold francs for what had been taken and brought six members of parliament to press it, the Saeima rejected the claim on 30 April 1924, and the League of Nations rejected the appeal that followed. Lithuania passed its own law on 29 March 1922.

Set the three together and the shape is exact. Between 1919 and 1922, by statute, in their own parliaments, in their own languages, three small republics dissolved the landholding settlement that a crusade had installed seven hundred years earlier and four empires had confirmed. They did it to the class that had ruled them, and they did it to create smallholders, and it was the single most popular act any of the three governments ever performed.

They were not, on the evidence, rich afterwards. All three had lost the Russian market their industry had been built to serve, and Latvia and Estonia partially deindustrialised in consequence; the project of turning into Denmark by way of butter and bacon was pursued seriously and was nowhere near complete in twenty years. The cliometric estimates are genuinely contested — Valge for Estonia, Roses and Wolf for Latvia, Norkus and Markevičiūtė revising both, Vaskela taking a more pessimistic view of Lithuania — and they disagree by wide margins. What they broadly agree on is that per capita output in all

three exceeded the Soviet level by 1938, with Lithuania the possible exception, and that per capita growth over 1924 to 1938 ran fastest in Lithuania at around 4.3 per cent a year, with Finland at 3.5, Latvia at 3.2 and Estonia at 1.9. Estonia's population at the census of 1934 was 1,126,413, of whom 88.1 per cent were Estonians, with 92,600 Russians, 16,300 Germans, 7,600 Swedes, 5,400 Latvians and 4,400 Jews. Latvia counted about 1.95 million in 1935, some three-quarters of them Latvians. Lithuania held about 2.5 million, with roughly 150,000 to 160,000 Jews at about seven per cent — a proportion that rose to about a quarter of a million and roughly a tenth of the population when Vilnius came back in October 1939.

The men who governed the twenty years

The counterfactual has to be stated as it was and not as it would be convenient for it to have been, because a reader who finds the flattering version will discard everything built on it.

Estonia in 1925 passed a law of cultural autonomy for national minorities that let any group above three thousand persons constitute its own self-governing cultural body, and it was among the most generous minority settlements in interwar Europe. That is real and belongs in the count.

So does this. On 17 December 1926 officers associated with the Nationalist Union overthrew the elected government of Lithuania and installed Antanas Smetona, who ruled for fourteen years under standing martial law, banned the remaining parties by the middle 1930s, and promulgated constitutions in 1928 and 1938 providing a head of state elected for seven years by an electoral college. On 12 March 1934 the Estonian prime minister Konstantin Päts, using powers in the constitution adopted the year before, declared a state of emergency against the Vaps veterans' movement, which was expected to win the coming elections; some four hundred of its members were arrested, the veterans' organisations were shut, all organised political activity was outlawed, and when the parliament objected to the postponement of the elections it was not dissolved but sent home, which is why the six years that followed are called in Estonian the *vaikiv ajastu*, the era of silence. Päts banned the parties, founded a single Fatherland Union in 1935 and set up fifteen occupational chambers in place of politics. On the night of 15 to 16 May 1934 the Latvian prime minister Kārlis Ulmanis, with the war minister and the *Aizsargi* militia, took the

government buildings and the telephone exchange, suspended the constitution, dissolved the Saeima and every political party, declared himself *Vadonis*, and on 11 April 1936 combined the presidency with his own premiership.

Three coups, three leaders, three sets of banned parties. Every one of the three states the Soviet Union took in 1940 had been governed for at least six years by a man who had abolished its parliament, and in the case of Lithuania for fourteen. What each of them had, and what none of them had, is a question this study will have to keep answering rather than settle here; but nothing is gained by pretending the alternative on offer in 1940 was a functioning democracy, and the precision matters more, not less, to anyone who wants to weigh what replaced it.

The barons sailed in October

On 23 August 1939 the foreign ministers of Germany and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression treaty in Moscow, and appended to it a protocol that was not published for nine years. Its first article ran: *In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R.* Lithuania lay south of that line and was therefore Germany's; the treaty of 28 September moved it across, in exchange for territory in Poland.

The demands followed at once. Estonia signed a mutual assistance treaty on 28 September permitting twenty-five thousand Soviet troops at bases on its territory; Latvia signed on 5 October for thirty thousand; Lithuania signed on 10 October for twenty thousand, and received in the same instrument the city of Vilnius, which Poland had held since 1920 and which Lithuania had never stopped claiming as its capital. More than twenty-one thousand Red Army soldiers crossed into Estonia on 18 and 19 October. The transfer of Vilnius was completed on 27 October and celebrated as an act of historical justice.

And in the same three weeks the Baltic Germans left.

Hitler announced it in the Reichstag on 6 October. The German legations at Tallinn and Riga were instructed on 5 October to inform the two governments that the German population had been placed under the special protection of the Reich; the first transports arrived on 7 October, escorted by warships, and both governments insisted on a proper agreement before letting their own

citizens go. Then, in about three weeks, the families renounced their citizenship, signed their property over to designated German institutions, and boarded with what luggage they could carry. The German schools closed in October, and the German churches, and the newspapers stopped one by one. Something on the order of thirteen to fourteen thousand people left Estonia in that first movement and upwards of fifty thousand left Latvia; a further eighteen thousand or so followed from the two countries in 1940 and early 1941 under a supplementary agreement, among them at least four thousand Estonians who established German descent and used it to get out; roughly three thousand Germans stayed in Estonia and were counted by Berlin as disloyal. Lithuania's Germans, more than fifty thousand of them, went in the winter of 1941, after the country had already been annexed.

The Estonian foreign minister, asked by the American chargé what Germany was doing, gave two reasons: that Berlin wanted its people out before the Soviet garrisons arrived, and that Berlin appeared to believe a war with the Soviet Union might be unavoidable, in which case it did not wish to leave them where they were.

Seven hundred and thirty-eight years after Albert of Buxhoeveden laid out Riga, the class that had come with him packed in three weeks and sailed, by agreement, at the summons of a different German state, on the strength of a protocol signed in Moscow. Twenty years earlier the parliaments of Estonia and Latvia had taken its land. Now it took itself away.

So the arithmetic available to anybody arriving in the summer of 1940 was this. There was no landlord class, because it had been expropriated by statute in 1919 and 1920 and had then physically departed in 1939. There was a countryside of smallholders, most of whom held their ground by grant of the republics, and a very large number of whom had received it as veterans of the wars fought against the Red Army in 1918 to 1920.

The state that came for them

A territory taken in 1920 by a state fighting for its life, a territory taken in 1939 by secret protocol, and a territory taken in 1945 by an army that had just won a war of annihilation are three different conquerors under one name, and this one has to be dated precisely.

The Soviet Union of June 1940 was eleven years past the beginning of collectivisation and seven past the famines it produced. It was two years past the end of the mass operations of 1937 and 1938. And it was three years past an episode that bears directly on how it would proceed here, because it is the clearest surviving instance of what this particular state did when it obtained information it had not expected.

On 6 January 1937 the government ran the first all-union census since 1926. Its fifth question asked about religious belief, inserted at Stalin's own instruction and framed as a question about present conviction. The answers came back: 55,277,049 believers, being 56.7 per cent of those over sixteen who answered the question, in a state whose governing theory held that religion was a reflex of material conditions and would dissolve when the conditions were removed. The population total came back at about 162 million, against the 168 million Stalin had given the Seventeenth Party Congress for the end of 1933 and projections that had run past 170. Within days the census was annulled — not suppressed as a secret but voided as a mistake, on the ground that it had been conducted incorrectly and unprofessionally and in serious violation of the basic foundations of statistical science. The head of the statistical administration, Ivan Kraval, was arrested and shot in September 1937; Olimpii Kvitkin, who had run the census, died in custody; others were shot or sent to camps. The replacement count of 1939 published 170,557,000 and did not ask about religion.

Then, in the winter before the Baltic annexations, the same government ran an experiment in manufactured consent and watched it fail in public. It invaded Finland on 30 November 1939. On 1 December it announced from the border village of Terijoki a Finnish People's Government under Otto Wille Kuusinen, a Finnish communist resident in Moscow since 1918; on 2 December Molotov signed a treaty of mutual assistance and friendship with it in Moscow; and the Soviet position for the following three months was that this body, and not the government in Helsinki, was the lawful government of Finland and had invited the Red Army in. Finnish workers did not rise. The declaration was ridiculed. And on 12 March 1940 the Soviet Union made peace with the government it had spent a hundred days saying did not exist, and the Finnish People's Government was folded quietly into a Soviet republic.

What was done in the Baltic states three months later differed from Terijoki in precisely the respects Terijoki had failed. There was no government

proclaimed on a beach. There were governments formed inside each capital, of men who lived there, appointed through the existing constitutional offices, holding elections under the existing electoral law, producing assemblies that then petitioned to join. Whether the second procedure was chosen because the first had just collapsed is a causal claim this landscape cannot make on the evidence assembled here; what can be recorded is the sequence, and that the sequence is tight, and that the question of who was seen to be asking is the question the whole subsequent apparatus was built around.

The Baltic governments could see the same things. They had watched Poland partitioned in September, Finland invaded in November, the puppet declared in December, and the Finnish army hold a border for a hundred days at a cost that was very widely reported and then lose the ground anyway. In June 1940 the option of fighting was in the field of every man who had to decide, along with its price, and all three governments looked at it and did not take it.

Reading the Baltic landscape against the framework

The corpus's standing instruction for a landscape is to establish that what the conqueror found was itself a former conquest that had reached the pole where an order runs on its subjects' own conviction and costs almost nothing to hold. The Baltic case supplies that in unusually clean form and then breaks the second half of it, and the break is what this landscape contributes.

The conquest is dated and documented: a bishop's charter of 1201, a standing military order in 1202, a landholding caste that outlasted the Order, the Danes, the Poles, the Swedes and four Russian emperors by being useful to each, and a naturalisation so complete that the words for *lord* and *German* were one word in Estonian and the promotion of a Latvian into the educated class was socially the same event as his becoming a German. The tsarist hold over it is the cheapest arrangement in the northern record and was bought in 1710 with a confirmation of privileges rather than with a garrison — but it is worth noting exactly what was confirmed, because it was not an office. There was no seat a stranger could occupy. What Peter bought into was a set of corporate bodies with matriculation registers and elected marshals, which a newcomer could recognise, subsidise and employ, but could not enter and could not personally hold; and when a later emperor wanted the provinces run in Russian, he found

he could not take the chair, only break the corporation, which is what he spent the 1880s doing.

The break is that by 1940 this order was no longer standing. It had been dismantled twice over, from two directions, within twenty-one years. The republics took its land by their own statutes between 1919 and 1922, converting the largest concentration of manorial property in northern Europe into a hundred and twenty-five thousand smallholdings and reducing Latvia's landless rural majority to under a fifth in a generation. Then the class itself was removed physically, in 1939, by an agreement between two states neither of which was Baltic. So the arriving power in June 1940 faced neither a self-running native order it could rent nor a landed elite it could co-opt or expropriate. It faced a countryside of small proprietors holding by grant of the state it was in the act of abolishing — which is to say that the exploiting class its governing theory required to be there had already been abolished, by somebody else, and the men now on the land were the people who had received it.

Three further observations the landscape returns, which later modules will have to test rather than assume.

The first is about formation. This corpus's colonial cases have generally found formation withheld from the conquered majority, on the reasoning that to form a subject is to begin admitting him. The Baltic provinces show the other failure mode: formation given generously, for a purpose, by an order that then discovered the purpose was not the only use of the instrument. Lutheran parish schooling was installed to produce a peasant who could read scripture and it produced, three centuries later, the most literate subject population in the Russian Empire, a printing trade, six thousand singers on a field at Tartu, and a student who wrote his nationality on a card. Withholding formation and granting it are not the only two options on the board; granting it for one end and losing control of it is a third, and it is the one that operated here.

The second is about what happens when an empire attacks its own intermediary. The Russification of the 1880s was aimed at the German corporations and largely hit them, transferring their police, their courts, their schools and their university to the central administration within a decade. The population underneath had spent thirty years acquiring newspapers, choirs, a written epic and a name for itself. Removing the caste that stood between that population and the state did not produce a Russian province; it produced a much larger vacancy than the empire had brought anything to fill. The general

form of the observation is that the interpreter's seat cannot be emptied, only re-tenanted — and that a power which clears it should be expected to like the next tenant less than the last.

The third is the sharpest and the least comfortable. The twenty-year interval is not a gap between the real periods of this case. It is the operative fact, and it is where the counterfactual lives, because it is the only stretch on the record in which the people of these three countries governed themselves and can be observed doing it. What they did with it was abolish a seven-hundred-year landholding settlement, build the highest literacy in the region into a national school system, run competitive politics for six to eight years — and then, in every one of the three, hand the state to a man who closed the parliament. The record contains both halves and this study will carry both. A landscape that reported only the land reform would have written a paradise; one that reported only the coups would have written the incoming order's own brief.

A note on sources. The exact words quoted here are public-domain primary material given as the record reproduces it. The visiting card — *"C. Woldemar. Stud. cam. Latweetis"* — is quoted from the Latvian scholarly literature reproducing Krišjānis Barons's memoir of Valdemārs's Dorpat years, with the photograph of the card held in the Estonian national archives; the Germanised spelling of the surname varies between *Woldemar* and *Waldemar* across the sources reproducing it, and the act is conventionally dated to the mid-1850s rather than to a known day. The first article of the secret additional protocol of 23 August 1939 is quoted from the text published by the United States Department of State in 1948 from the captured German records, which is the version in general circulation; the German and Russian originals should be consulted before the wording is relied on further. The Estonian foreign minister's reading of German motives in October 1939 is paraphrased from the telegram of the American chargé at Tallinn printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, a United States government publication. The wording of the 1937 census annulment is given here in the English rendering the collection has previously used and is flagged, as it was there, as needing checking against the Russian text; the substance of the charge — a defect of statistical method rather than a political offence — is consistent across the sources consulted and is what the argument rests on. The census figures themselves (55,277,049 believers, 56.7 per cent of those over sixteen answering; roughly 162 million total against Stalin's publicly stated 168 million for 1933; the arrests and executions of Kraval and Kvitkin; the published 170,557,000 of 1939) are carried from the collection's own earlier work on the 1937 census, which draws them from the literature summarising the archival work of Poliakov and Zhiromskaya, from Merridale, from Corley and from Harrison.

Everything else is paraphrased from the reference and scholarly record and credited here rather than in the text. The medieval conquest — Albert of

Buxhoeveden's foundation of Riga in 1201, the chartering of the Livonian Brothers of the Sword in 1202, the campaigns into the Estonian counties to the middle 1220s, and Henry of Livonia's chronicle as the principal contemporary account — follows the standard accounts of the Northern Crusades. The *Ritterschaften*, their matriculation registers and *Landtage*, the capitulations of 1710 with their reference to the *Privilegium Sigismundi Augusti* of 1561, the confirmation at Nystad in 1721, the annexation of Courland in 1795, and the figure of a hundred and sixty-seven years of German-language administration before the laws of 1888 and 1889 are from the general reference literature on the Baltic governorates. The emancipation acts of 1816, 1817 and 1819 and the *vogelfrei* characterisation are from the Baltic legal-history literature (Luts-Sootak and Siimets-Gross; Zemītis), which also records that the historiography of the reforms' effects is contested. The Russification measures — the *ukaz* of 14 September 1885 and its extension in 1889, the transfers of police and manorial justice in 1888–89, the judicial and educational changes of 1887–92 including the supplementary regulations of 1887, and the reconstitution of Dorpat as Yuriev in 1893 — are from the standard reference accounts and the specialist literature on language policy in Livland. The Lithuanian press ban follows the specialist accounts: Alexander II's approval of 22 May 1864, Muravyov's order of 5 June 1864, Kaufman's comprehensive ban of 6 September 1865, the ministerial confirmation of the same month, the roughly fifty-five Cyrillic printings, the estimate of thirty to forty thousand items smuggled annually by the late 1890s with about a third confiscated, and the lifting in 1904.

Literacy is the most contested figure in this module and is given as a range for that reason. Toivo Raun's study of the 1897 census establishes the Baltic provinces at roughly triple the all-Russian reading rate with unusual urban–rural and gender parity; figures for the Estonian and Latvian populations are variously given between about eighty and ninety-six per cent depending on cohort and definition, against an all-empire figure usually quoted at twenty-one to twenty-eight per cent, while some comparative tabulations using stricter measures return substantially lower Baltic numbers. The song festivals follow the Estonian and Latvian festival literature: Tartu in June 1869 under Jannsen, given at 822 singers and 56 brass players or in round terms eight hundred to a thousand performers before about fifteen thousand people, held as a thanksgiving for the fiftieth anniversary of Livonia's emancipation; Riga in

1873; and roughly 5,520 performers with an audience above fifty thousand by 1896, a figure that traces to Raun. The *kadakasaks* etymology and social trajectory follow the Estonian lexicographic literature, principally Huno Rätsep's work on folk etymology.

The land reforms are given as the national literatures give them, and the Estonian figures in particular (1,065 manors, 96.6 per cent of large landowners, over 2.34 million hectares or about 58 per cent of agricultural land, the itemised manorial industries, some 53,000 settlers, compensation in bonds from 1926, and over 125,000 farms by 1939) rest on reference-level sources rather than on the archival monographs and should be treated as orders of magnitude. The Latvian series — two per cent of owners holding 53 per cent of the land in Kurzeme and Vidzeme and 38 per cent in Latgale before the war, the fifty-hectare retention, the fall in the landless share from 61.2 per cent in 1897 to 18 per cent in 1936, and the rejection of the Baltic German compensation claim on 30 April 1924 — is from the Latvian reform literature. The Lithuanian law is dated 29 March 1922. The interwar output estimates are explicitly disputed and are attributed in the text to Valge, Roses and Wolf, Norkus and Markevičiūtė, and Vaskela; the growth rates given (Lithuania about 4.3 per cent, Finland 3.5, Latvia 3.2, Estonia 1.9 per capita per year for 1924–1938) are from the Norkus comparison and are contested by the more pessimistic Lithuanian estimates. Population and ethnic figures are from the national censuses of 1934 (Estonia) and 1935 (Latvia) and from the standard accounts for Lithuania, where the Jewish population is given at 150,000–160,000 before the acquisition of Vilnius and at roughly a quarter of a million after, on the YIVO and Holocaust-encyclopaedia figures. The coups follow the standard accounts and the specialist article on the Vaps movement. The 1939 sequence — the treaty of 28 September moving Lithuania, the base treaties of 28 September, 5 and 10 October with their troop ceilings, the entry of over 21,000 men into Estonia on 18–19 October, the completion of the Vilnius transfer on 27 October, Hitler's Reichstag announcement of 6 October, the instruction to the legations on 5 October, the arrival of the first transports on 7 October, and the resettlement totals — is from the reference chronologies and the specialist literature on the *Umsiedlung*, with the totals given as ranges because the sources differ on whether the 1940 and 1941 supplementary movements are counted in.

Two limitations are declared here rather than buried. This landscape reads the interwar republics substantially through their successor states'

historiography, which holds a present position on the legality of what followed; and it reads the Soviet side through a literature in which the Russian Federation, the successor states and several scholarly traditions each hold present positions. Where a claim bears on any of those, the competing readings are reported as each side states them and are not adjudicated here.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE ONE

THE NUMBER AT EACH STATION

Module 1 · The floor of force — an annexation whose whole combat cost was one man in a Tallinn street and five people at a border post; a second floor applied by category to numbers fixed in Moscow before anyone in the three countries had been assessed; and a ten-year war that ran alongside it and was not the same operation

The cheapest conquest in the collection

The Soviet Union delivered its ultimatum to Lithuania in Moscow shortly before midnight on 14 June 1940. It cited violations of the mutual assistance treaty of the previous October, and it demanded two things: a new government able to observe that treaty, and the admission of an unspecified number of Soviet troops. President Antanas Smetona argued for armed resistance and was outvoted by his own cabinet, which accepted unconditionally; he crossed into Germany the next day so that he could not be used to sign anything. The Red Army entered on 15 June, with orders to take Vilnius, Kaunas, Raseiniai, Panevėžys and Šiauliai; the Lithuanian army was ordered not to resist and to greet the incoming columns in a friendly manner, and its air force was ordered to remain on the ground. Nearly identical ultimatums went to Latvia and Estonia on 16 June, with eight hours to answer. By 18 June the military operation was complete in all three countries.

Set against that the entire combat.

At about half past two on the morning of 15 June, NKVD troops crossed the border into the Abrene district of Latvia and attacked two border posts, Masļenki and Šmaiļi, cutting the telephone lines first. A third attack, at Žuguri, was called off when a guard spotted the men crossing the river and fired a flare. Three Latvian border guards were killed — Kārlis Beizaks, twenty-five; Jānis Mācītis, twenty-seven; Pēteris Cimoška, twenty-six — and two civilians, Hermīne Puriņa, forty-four, the wife of a guard, and her son Voldemārs,

fourteen, who died of his wounds in hospital at Rēzekne the following day. Thirty-seven people were taken across the border as hostages, ten of them guards and the rest civilians including small children; thirty-six were returned on 7 July. The investigation the Latvian authorities opened was interrupted by the occupation and was not resumed until 1991.

In Tallinn on 21 June the Independent Signal Battalion, alone among the Estonian units, refused to disarm, and fought in Raua Street through the afternoon against Soviet troops reinforced with six armoured vehicles. One Estonian was killed and several wounded; about ten Soviet soldiers were killed and more wounded. The battalion then negotiated, surrendered and was disarmed.

That is the whole of it. Three sovereign states, some five and a half million people, three standing armies, an air force each and a border fortified since 1920, taken in four days at a cost in combat of one defender killed, five people shot at a border post, and about ten of the attacking force.

It is worth being exact about why, because the framework's proposition that a threat restrains only where the person believes he will actually be made to pay is doing all the work here and can be dated. The garrisons were already inside: twenty-five thousand Soviet troops in Estonia by the treaty of 28 September 1939, thirty thousand in Latvia by that of 5 October, twenty thousand in Lithuania by that of 10 October, and neither Estonia nor Latvia had any means of verifying that the actual numbers matched the treaties. And three months before the ultimatums, the same government had spent a hundred days demonstrating in public what it would do to a small northern state that said no. Every man in the three cabinets that met in June 1940 had read the Winter War in his own newspapers.

So the floor here cost almost nothing to lay, and the reason it cost almost nothing is that it had been paid for somewhere else, in another country, the previous winter, by somebody else's dead. The expenditure and the effect are separated by a border and a season, and a study that measured this floor by what was spent on it in June 1940 would report the cheapest conquest in the collection and would have measured the wrong thing.

The men in the buildings

On 17 June three men arrived from Moscow to convert the military fact into a jurisdiction: Vladimir Dekanozov to Kaunas, Andrei Vyshinsky to Riga, Andrei Zhdanov to Tallinn. What they supervised was not a proclamation from a captured village. It was a sequence conducted through the existing constitutional offices of each country, and the care taken over that is the most informative feature of the whole operation.

In Lithuania the prime minister, Antanas Merkys, declared that Smetona's departure amounted to a resignation, assumed presidential powers he did not have under the constitution, and on 17 June appointed as prime minister Justas Paleckis, a left-wing journalist selected by Dekanozov. The new cabinets in all three capitals then issued decrees which, on the account of the contemporary diplomatic record, originated in the Soviet legations and were released to the public by the sovereign governments concerned. New electoral laws were promulgated in Latvia and Lithuania on 5 and 6 July and in Estonia on 5 July; their common effect was to remove judicial supervision of the count and place the electoral authorities under the government.

On 11 and 12 July, before the voting, leading figures of the previous Lithuanian administrations were arrested and some were removed to the interior of the Soviet Union — while Lithuania was still, in form, an independent state.

Elections were held in all three countries on 14 and 15 July. One list was permitted in each: the Estonian Working People's Union, the Latvian Working People's Bloc, the Union of the Working People of Lithuania. In Latvia seventeen other lists were submitted and refused. One candidate stood for each seat. Several Lithuanian candidates afterwards said that they had not consented and had not been told they were on the ballot; one name was printed as Jonas Abakonis instead of A. Bakonis, and when the man did not appear at the parliament the authorities neither corrected the error nor explained it. Voters had their passports stamped. The Latvian ballot paper carried its own instruction: *Only the list of the Latvian Working People's Bloc must be deposited in the ballot box. The ballot must be deposited without any changes.*

The published results gave the single lists 92.8 per cent in Estonia, 97.6 in Latvia and 99.19 in Lithuania. The TASS correspondent in London released

the results on 15 July, while the polls were still open; the Latvian figures appeared in Moscow some twelve hours before the count closed. The Estonian figures were re-examined under the German occupation and the turnout revised down from 84.1 per cent to 80.1 and the list's share from 92.8 to 91.6, the discrepancy arising from officials reducing the register, counting invalid ballots as valid, and assigning one candidate's votes to the front.

The three new parliaments convened on 21 July. Each declared a Soviet republic and applied for admission to the Union; the Supreme Soviet admitted Lithuania on 3 August, Latvia on 5 August and Estonia on 6 August. The Latvian constitution required a two-thirds plebiscite for a change of that kind, and there was none.

The substance of that procedure — what was claimed, to whom, and why the forms mattered so much to a power that had already won — belongs to the settlement and the doctrine and will be taken up there. It belongs in this module for one reason only: it is the instrument by which a military occupation became, on paper, a domestic jurisdiction, and everything counted below was thereafter done by a state to its own citizens.

The count that was fixed before the counting

Now count the floor a second time, because the second count is where this conquest actually falls.

On 14 May 1941 the Central Committee of the Party and the Council of People's Commissars adopted secret decree No. 1299-526, on the expulsion of socially alien elements from the Baltic republics, western Ukraine, western Belarus and Moldova. On 11 June the NKVD's operational plan set the arithmetic for the whole area: 46,557 families, 4,159 criminal offenders and 794 prostitutes, being 74,395 persons. Procedure was set out in an undated top-secret document signed by Ivan Serov, deputy people's commissar for state security, on the manner of carrying out the deportation of anti-Soviet elements from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia: families to be taken quietly and quickly, one hundred kilograms of belongings each, heads of household separated from the rest at the collection point. The provenance of that document has been questioned — it is undated, it reached the West by an irregular route, and it should be relied on with that flagged — but the argument here does not need it, because the decree and the operational plan carry the point on their own.

The operation ran on the nights of 13 and 14 June 1941. The figures are contested in every direction and are given here as ranges: roughly ten thousand people from Estonia; about fifteen thousand from Latvia, with one widely used count at 15,171 and another at 15,500, of whom some 2,400 were children under ten; and about seventeen and a half thousand deported from Lithuania, with figures up to thirty-four thousand where arrests are counted alongside deportations. The total across the three states in that week is generally given at forty to forty-five thousand. In Estonia more than a quarter of those taken were under sixteen.

The categories were categories. Former ministers, officials, army officers, policemen, landowners, factory owners, members of dissolved parties and organisations — and, in each case, their households. A man was not taken for what he had done in the year since the annexation. He was taken for the entry against his name, and his wife and children were taken with him.

Eight days later, on 22 June 1941, Germany invaded the Soviet Union.

That sequence disposes of the standard defence before it can be offered. In June 1941 there was no insurgency in the Baltic states. There were no forest brothers; there had been no armed resistance since one battalion in a Tallinn street eleven months earlier. The plan was drawn in Moscow a month in advance with the numbers already in it, and the people were then found to match the numbers. Whatever else the first mass deportation was, it was not a response to anything happening on the ground.

Three years in between

The interregnum has to be entered here, briefly and without softening, because it determines what the floor met when it came back.

The retreat of June 1941 was itself violent. NKVD units killed prisoners they could not evacuate: at Rainiai in Lithuania on the night of 24–25 June some seventy-six men were tortured and killed; there were killings at Tartu prison and along the evacuation column from Červene. In Lithuania an uprising seized Kaunas and Vilnius ahead of the German arrival and declared a provisional government, which the Germans dissolved within six weeks.

Then, under the German occupation, the Jewish populations of all three countries were murdered almost in their entirety — something in the order of a hundred and ninety to two hundred and twenty thousand people in Lithuania,

roughly seventy thousand in Latvia, and in Estonia a community small enough that the occupation authorities reported the territory cleared of Jews at the Wannsee conference. Local auxiliary units took part in all three countries. This is not the subject of this study and its arithmetic belongs to the accounting that comes later; but it cannot be left out of the floor module, because both of the standing claims about 1944 — that the Red Army returned as a liberator, and that it returned to a population that had welcomed the Germans — are built on it, and neither survives contact with it whole.

In September 1944, as the Germans withdrew from Estonia, the acting head of state Jüri Uluots appointed a government under Otto Tief, which declared the Republic of Estonia restored on the basis of legal continuity and its neutrality in the war. The Estonian tricolour flew from Pikk Hermann on 21 and 22 September. The Red Army took Tallinn on 22 September and the flag came down. Tief was arrested on 10 October 1944 and sentenced to ten years in the camps. Precision is owed here too: Uluots had earlier supported German conscription of Estonians and had sought German permission to form a government, and the flag on the tower went up by arrangement with the departing German command rather than against it. The episode is not a clean one. What it establishes is narrow and sufficient — that when the ground was briefly held by nobody, what appeared on it was the republic.

The second laying, and the war that ran beside it

The reconquest of 1944 and 1945 was a campaign of the eastern front and its casualties are war casualties. What followed it was not.

From 1944 men went into the forests in all three countries, in numbers the historians put at around thirty thousand in Lithuania — with higher estimates to fifty thousand fighters and a hundred thousand supporters — and between ten and fifteen thousand each in Latvia and Estonia. In Lithuania they were uniformed, organised in a chain of command, and controlled substantial stretches of countryside into 1949; on 16 February 1949, the anniversary of the 1918 declaration, their leaders issued a joint declaration naming the restoration of the independent Lithuanian state as their object and constituting themselves its supreme political authority.

The apparatus that fought them was largely local. Villagers were appointed to administrative posts and organised into armed squads — *istrebiteli* in

Russian, *stribai* in Lithuanian, destruction battalions in the official terminology, some five thousand three hundred men in Estonia — who fought the partisans, infiltrated them, and killed their activists. The characteristic tactic of the counter-insurgency was the display of the dead: partisan corpses, frequently mutilated, laid out in market squares, in schoolyards, outside police stations and in front of churches. Partisans carried a grenade against capture, and men who used it often destroyed their own faces first, so that their families could not be identified and deported.

The casualty figures diverge badly and should be given as ranges with the divergence named. Soviet record-based counts give around twenty thousand three hundred Lithuanian partisans killed and about twenty thousand captured; the national historiographies more commonly give twenty to thirty thousand killed including supporters, with about half of those dying in the first two years. Latvian and Estonian partisan dead are counted in the low thousands. Soviet losses in Lithuania are given at 12,921 on the archival count; figures of a hundred thousand Soviet dead circulate in the popular literature and are not supported by anything in the records and should not be used.

This was counter-insurgency, and it should be counted as such. The next operation was something else, and the case allows the two to be separated because they ran on the same ground in the same years.

The number at each station

On 18 January 1949 the first secretaries of the three Baltic parties were summoned to Moscow to report to Stalin. The Politburo took its decision the same day. On 29 January the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union adopted top-secret decision No. 390-138ss, approving the deportation of kulaks, nationalists, bandits, their supporters and their families from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia — and specifying the quantity, by republic, in advance:

Lithuania, 8,500 families, being 25,500 people. Latvia, 13,000 families, 39,000 people. Estonia, 7,500 families, 22,500 people. Twenty-nine thousand families; eighty-seven thousand persons.

Only then were the lists made. The decision provided that each republic would compile its own register of kulaks to be deported and that each republic's council of ministers would approve it. The number was not derived from the lists; the lists were made to reach the number. The Estonian research on the

operation notes how the figure was arrived at: it corresponded roughly to the count of household heads already on file, multiplied by three for family size.

On 28 February the minister of state security, Viktor Abakumov, signed MGB order No. 0068 for the preparation and execution of the operation, to be carried out by the MGB interior troops under Lieutenant-General Pyotr Burmak, who established his headquarters at Riga. Five thousand and twenty-five submachine guns and nineteen hundred rifles were brought in to arm the operative teams. Thirty-one trains of freight wagons were assembled. And in the Russian state military archives there survive the maps drawn for it: one for each of the three countries, about a metre by two, marked with the railway stations from which people were to be despatched, with the number to be taken from each station written against it, and red arrows showing the districts from which the special settlers were to be collected.

The maps were drawn before the names existed.

The operation ran from 25 to 28 March 1949. The totals given are between ninety and ninety-five thousand people, with one archival count at 94,779; something above seventy per cent were women and children under sixteen; deaths in transit and in the settlements are counted in the thousands, with 4,123 attributed directly to the operation on one count and mortality of about fifteen per cent given on another for the journey and its aftermath. Unlike 1941, families were not separated.

It worked. By the end of 1949, ninety-three per cent of farms in Latvia and eighty per cent in Estonia had been collectivised. Lithuania proved slower and a further operation followed in the autumn of 1951.

Set the two counts side by side, which is what this module exists to do. The first floor, laid in June 1940 against three armies and a fortified frontier, killed something under twenty people. The second floor, applied by category to households in two operations eight years apart, moved between a hundred and thirty and a hundred and forty thousand people out of a combined population of about six million, and the associated arrests, sentences and lesser operations across 1944 to 1953 raise the figure substantially further. In this case the second count is larger than the first by four orders of magnitude.

Reading the floor against the framework

Three things this module returns, of which the first is the one to carry forward and the other two are corrections to how the corpus has been measuring.

A floor applied by category generates its own demand. The framework has always distinguished the founding violence from the running cost of suppression, and has counted the founding violence in combat. That instrument returns almost nothing here and would report the Baltic annexation as the cheapest conquest in the collection. The instrument to use instead is the sequence in the paperwork, and the sequence is unambiguous in both operations: the decree came before the assessment. In May 1941 the numbers were in the plan a month before the operation and there was no resistance in the country to respond to. In January 1949 the quota was fixed in Moscow by republic and the lists were compiled afterwards to fill it. That ordering is not incidental to how such a floor works; it is the mechanism. Where the number precedes the names, the local apparatus is not exercising judgement about persons but discharging an obligation to produce a quantity, and it will go on producing until the quantity is met — which means the category cannot run out, because a shortfall is a failure of the officials rather than evidence that the class was smaller than the doctrine said. This is the same operation, in the register of population rather than of measurement, that the corpus has already found in a state that annulled its own census when the answer was wrong: a finding that contradicts a governing claim is converted into a defect in the people who produced it. Here the finding would have been *there are fewer enemies than the plan requires*, and the conversion is that somebody must have failed to find them.

Separate the counter-insurgency from the categorical removal, and let the dating settle which is primary. The two ran together on the same ground and the standard accounts on both sides tend to merge them — the Soviet account by presenting the deportations as a response to banditry, the national accounts by presenting the insurgency as a response to the deportations. The Baltic case can separate them because the first mass deportation happened when there was nothing whatever to respond to. The June 1941 operation was planned in advance of any armed resistance and executed against categories, and the March 1949 operation, though genuinely aimed in part at an insurgency

that by then was real and organised, was quota-driven and delivered collectivisation as its measurable result. The removal by category is the primary instrument and the counter-insurgency is layered onto it, not the other way round.

And the cost of a floor need not be paid where the floor is laid. The framework holds that a threat restrains only where it is credible, and treats the credibility as something the conqueror buys locally, by demonstration. This case separates the two. The Soviet Union laid a floor over three countries in four days at a cost of about a dozen dead because the credibility had been established the previous winter in a fourth country that had refused the same terms, at a price of tens of thousands of Soviet dead and a hundred days of world attention. The three Baltic cabinets read that correctly and priced their own resistance accordingly. **A conquest's cheapness can therefore be a measure of somebody else's expenditure**, and a study that reads only the local ledger will mistake an accomplished deterrent for consent, or for weakness, or for the absence of a floor at all.

The complication in that finding has to be stated in the same breath, because it is the sharpest single objection to everything in this study and it will return at the end. Finland fought and lost eleven per cent of its territory and something over twenty-five thousand dead, and kept its state, its army, its parliament and its independence. The Baltic states did not fight, and lost all four, and then lost the men in the deportation lists as well. Whether that comparison establishes what it appears to establish depends on facts about geography, terrain, population and great-power interest that this module has not examined and the accounting later will have to, and it would be dishonest to close it here. It is entered now as an open item rather than saved for a rhetorical moment.

Two limits on the evidence. The Serov instructions are undated and their provenance contested, and nothing here rests on them. And the general problem of this archive is acute in this module: the apparatus recorded its own operations in extraordinary detail — the quotas, the orders, the arms issued, the wagons, the maps with the numbers at the stations — while the households it removed left letters and memory. A count weighted by surviving paper will always be a count taken from inside the operation, and the figures given above are the operation's own figures wherever they are precise.

A note on sources. The exact words quoted here are the ballot instruction printed on the Latvian paper of July 1940 — *"Only the list of the Latvian Working People's Bloc must be deposited in the ballot box. The ballot must be deposited without any changes"* — given as reproduced in the standard account of the Latvian occupation; and the titles of the Soviet instruments named, given as the archival literature renders them in English. Where an instrument's number is cited it is given as the sources give it: secret decree No. 1299-526 of 14 May 1941, on the expulsion of socially alien elements from the Baltic republics, western Ukraine, western Belarus and Moldova; USSR Council of Ministers decision No. 390-138ss of 29 January 1949 (rendered No. 390-1388ss in one source, and the discrepancy is noted rather than resolved); and MGB order No. 0068 of 28 February 1949.

The June 1940 sequence — the ultimatum before midnight on 14 June, Smetona's departure, the entry on 15 June, the near-identical ultimatums of 16 June with eight hours to reply, the arrival of Dekanozov, Vyshinsky and Zhdanov on 17 June, Merkys's assumption of presidential powers and appointment of Paleckis, and the completion of operations by 18 June — follows the standard reference accounts and the specialist literature on the ultimatums. The Masļenki incident is given from the Latvian research of Andrejs Edvīns Feldmanis as reproduced in the reference and museum literature, including the names and ages of the five killed, the thirty-seven taken and the return of thirty-six on 7 July; the Raua Street engagement in Tallinn, with one Estonian and about ten Soviet dead, is from the standard Estonian accounts. The electoral procedure — the new electoral laws of 5 and 6 July, the single lists, the seventeen refused Latvian lists, the arrests of 11 and 12 July, the passport stamps, the Abakonis misprint, the published percentages of 92.8, 97.6 and 99.19, the premature TASS release on 15 July and the Moscow publication of the Latvian figures twelve hours before the close, and the German-occupation re-examination of the Estonian numbers — is drawn from the reference accounts and from the émigré documentary compilations of the occupation, which have a declared position and are used here for the documentary particulars rather than for their characterisations.

The June 1941 deportation figures are contested and are given as ranges: roughly 10,000 from Estonia, about 15,000 from Latvia (15,171 and 15,500 both in circulation, with 2,400 children under ten), and about 17,500 deported from Lithuania with figures to 34,000 where arrests are included; 40,000–45,000 across the three in that week. The NKVD operational plan of 11 June 1941 with its 46,557 families, 4,159 criminals and 794 prostitutes totalling

74,395 persons covers the whole area of the decree and not the Baltic states alone, and is quoted here for the ordering it demonstrates rather than as a Baltic figure. Operation Priboi follows the specialist literature and the reference accounts: the summons of 18 January 1949, the quotas of 29 January, Abakumov's order of 28 February, Burmak's command and Riga headquarters, the 5,025 submachine guns and 1,900 rifles, the thirty-one trains, the totals of 90,000–95,000 with 94,779 on one archival count, the proportion above seventy per cent women and children under sixteen, the mortality figures of 4,123 and of about fifteen per cent, and the collectivisation shares of 93 per cent in Latvia and 80 per cent in Estonia by the end of 1949. The description of the operational maps in the Russian state military archives — one per country, approximately one metre by two, marked with the stations, the numbers to be despatched from each, and red arrows for the collection districts — is from the published re-assessment of the 1949 deportations working from those archives, paraphrased.

The insurgency figures diverge by wide margins and are given accordingly: Misiunas and Taagepera give 30,000 fighters in Lithuania, 10,000–15,000 in Latvia and 10,000 in Estonia; Strods, working from NKVD reports, gives 8,916 partisans killed in Lithuania in 1945 alone against 715 in Latvia and 270 in Estonia; Soviet record-based counts give 20,323 Lithuanian partisans killed and about 20,000 captured against 12,921 Soviet dead, while the national accounts more commonly give 20,000–30,000 Lithuanian dead including supporters. The figure of 100,000 Soviet dead that appears in the popular literature is not supported by the archival counts and is not used. The *stribai* and the display of partisan corpses in public places follow the Lithuanian scholarship (Gailius; Jurkutė; Pocius as cited in the recent survey of partisan memory), paraphrased. The Rainiai killings of 24–25 June 1941 are given at about seventy-six victims on the standard accounts. Holocaust figures for the three countries are given as approximate ranges from the standard reference sources and are entered here only to establish what the returning floor met; they are not this study's subject and their accounting belongs to a later module. The Otto Tief government of 18–22 September 1944 follows the Estonian official and reference accounts, including the qualifications noted in the text about Uluots's earlier conduct and about the arrangement under which the flag was raised.

Three limitations are declared. The Serov instructions are undated and contested and nothing here rests on them. The casualty and deportation figures

in this field are politically live in every country concerned, and where the successor states, the Russian Federation and the Western scholarship differ, the competing figures are given rather than reconciled. And the documentary balance runs heavily toward the apparatus, whose own records supply nearly every precise number above; the correction for that is deliberate and incomplete.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE TWO

OUTSIDE LABOUR AND A TRACTOR

Module 2 · The settlement — a conquest that abolished ownership instead of dividing it, so that the land was handed to the landless and taken back from them within eight years; a fiction of restoration applied to a country that had already restored; and a division made not in acres but in categories, where the entry against a man's name decided what he could hold, earn, study and become

What the instrument found

Every settlement has to be read against the thing it was applied to, because the conversion it performs cannot be seen unless the prior form is on the page. In most conquests the prior form is a relation between persons — a man's standing with his king, his clan, his tribe, expressed in access to soil and therefore unsaleable, because selling it would be selling the standing. That is why so many colonial settlements begin by turning the relation into a thing.

Here the prior form was already a thing, and an unusually well-documented one.

By 1939 Estonia held something near a hundred and forty thousand farms of more than a hectare, where before the interwar reform there had been about fifty thousand. Latvia's landless rural majority had fallen from 61.2 per cent in 1897 to about eighteen per cent by 1936. The holdings were individual farmsteads standing apart from one another — in Latvian *viensētas*, and the Estonian pattern is the same, houses set far across the fields rather than gathered into a village street. They were registered, they were taxed, they could be mortgaged, and they were bought and sold in a functioning market whose prices tracked the qualities of particular sites, alongside a lower administered price for land allocated to landless applicants.

They had also come from somewhere, and from somewhere very recent. Most of these titles were twenty years old and had been issued by the state that was abolished in the summer of 1940, out of the manors it had expropriated in

1919 and 1920, to men many of whom had received them for having fought the Red Army in 1919.

So the conqueror of 1940 arrived at a countryside of registered freeholders, holding parcels of a size his own doctrine described as the property of the labouring peasantry, obtained from a land reform his own doctrine would have had to call progressive, and containing almost nothing that answered to the description of a rural exploiting class. What he did about that is the whole of this module.

The declaration

On 21 July 1940, the day the three assemblies convened, each declared a Soviet republic. On 22 July the Lithuanian People's Seimas adopted a declaration on proclaiming all the land of Lithuania national property. The following day it adopted a declaration on the nationalisation of banks and large-scale industry. On 23 July the Estonian chamber of deputies declared the land nationalised; the Latvian assembly acted in the same days and followed with a land reform bill about a week later.

Attend to the verb. These instruments do not convey, transfer, expropriate or purchase. They *proclaim* and they *declare*. Grammatically they are not proposing a change in the world; they are reporting a condition of it — that the land is, and by implication has been, the property of the people. A seizure in the indicative mood is a very old device and the framework treats it as the plainest form of the legal fiction, but it is worth noting how far this version goes. A recognition fiction says that a man already owns what he is being given. A vacancy fiction says the ground is empty. This one says that everybody already owns everything, which has the elegant property of making the class of persons deprived by the instrument formally empty.

What followed had numbers in it. A ceiling of thirty hectares was set on any holding, in all three republics. In Lithuania the surplus above it went into a State Land Fund, and 608,000 hectares were taken into it; a State Land Committee was established under the ministry of agriculture to run the operation. In Estonia the reform was essentially complete by December 1940, with about four hundred thousand hectares distributed among more than fifty thousand landless and smallholding peasants, some forty thousand of whom also received long-term credits and had redemption debts cancelled. In Latvia

everything above thirty hectares was nationalised together with the property of enemies of the people and of those who had fled, and was redistributed in parcels — given in the literature at ten hectares and at fifteen — to about fifty thousand new farmers, with additions to some twenty-three thousand existing smallholders.

Industry and finance went in the same fortnight. In Lithuania a law of 26 July nationalised the banks and every enterprise employing more than twenty workers; a nationalisation commission was set up at the council of ministers on 30 July; more than a thousand industrial enterprises were taken, employing some forty thousand people and valued at over 413 million litas. Estonia legislated the machinery through a securities regulation act of 18 July and an organisation of nationalisation act of 1 August, both entered in the state gazette in the ordinary way, between the shipping notices and the appointments.

Things into relations

Now the operative clause, which is not the ceiling and not the fund.

Under the Lithuanian declaration the farmer became a holder of land rather than an owner of it. He might use it. He might not sell it, buy more of it, or mortgage it. The same principle governed the Estonian and Latvian instruments, and it is the substance of what was done: a registered freehold, alienable and heritable and bankable, was converted into a permission to work a particular field, granted by the state and exercised at its discretion.

That is the settlement's technology running backwards.

The colonial settlements this framework has examined begin by converting relations into things, and they do it because they need to *grant*. Office-land, lineage right, collective patrimony and communal allocation cannot be handed to anybody; so they are first turned into estates, parcels and shares, and only then can the conqueror bind a coordinating class by giving it title and re-sourcing that title through his own register and his own court. The device works because the recipient now holds something, and a man who holds something has an interest in the arrangement that issued it.

The Soviet settlement wanted the opposite result and used the same instrument in reverse. It was not buying an elite; it had no intention of leaving anybody with a defensible holding; and it did not need a market, because it was not going to sell anything. So it took a thing and made it a relation — between

the cultivator and the state — and a relation, unlike a thing, requires no purchase to extinguish. Nobody had to be bought out of a kolkhoz. There was no deed to cancel, no mortgage to discharge, no compensation to compute, and no court in which a title could be pleaded, because after July 1940 there were no titles. Within eight years the same households were inside collective farms, and not one of them had lost a lawsuit, because there had been nothing to sue about.

Set that beside what the same ground had seen twenty years earlier. The interwar reform performed the standard conversion: it took the manors, cut them into parcels, issued deeds, recorded them, and — from 1926 in Estonia, and in Latvia after a rejected claim for twelve hundred million gold francs — provided compensation in state bonds. It manufactured owners. It could afford to, because manufacturing owners was the point; the new smallholder was to be the republic's constituency, and he was.

Read the direction of the conversion and you have read what the order wants. An order converting relations into things means to distribute and to bind. An order converting things into relations means to hold, and expects to withdraw.

The fiction of restoration, in a country that had restored

The claim laid over all of this was restoration: that the land was being returned to those who worked it, and the labouring peasantry put back in possession of what an exploiting class had held.

It is a strong fiction in the abstract — stronger than recognition, because a restoration positions the incoming power as the righter of an old wrong rather than as the author of a new taking, and there is no obvious grammatical way to characterise the undoing of a theft as a theft. It was also, here, applied to the one terrain in Europe where it had the least to do.

The exploiting class had been expropriated in 1919 and 1920 by the parliaments of the countries concerned. The men holding land in 1940 were, in very large part, the beneficiaries of that expropriation, holding parcels well under the new ceiling, working them with their families. The warrant of the two reforms was the same warrant — that the land should belong to those who till it — and had been used, twenty-one years apart, by two governments, of

which the second was abolishing the first. What differed was not the principle. It was the ceiling, and what happened afterwards.

The order's own literature does not much bother with the restoration claim when it comes to describe the result. The standard Soviet reference account of the Estonian reform says what it was for in plain terms: that the reform changed the balance of class forces in the Estonian countryside, that capitalist farmers were eliminated and the number of kulaks dropped, and that the working peasantry gained ascendancy. That is not a description of a restoration. It is a description of a restructuring, stated as such, in the order's own encyclopaedia, for readers who were expected to approve.

Two further passages of the property record belong here and are usually left out of both national accounts.

The Baltic German estates had been expropriated in 1919 and what remained to the families was signed over to designated German institutions in the three weeks of the resettlement in October 1939, before either occupation. Nobody in 1940 was taking anything from a Baltic German, because there were almost none left to take from.

And the property of the Jewish population of the three countries, murdered almost in its entirety under the German occupation, was not restored to anybody after 1944. There was no restitution and, so far as the record shows, no accounting; the houses, shops and workshops of some two hundred and fifty to three hundred thousand people passed into the hands of the state or of whoever was living in them. The framework's instruction in this module is to say who got what, and the honest answer includes that. Its arithmetic belongs to the accounting later; its bearing here is narrow and exact: the restoration fiction was never once applied to the largest uncompensated expropriation that had actually occurred on this ground.

Outside labour and a tractor

The real settlement was not made in acres. It was made in categories, and the register was where a person's life was decided.

The doctrine required a rural exploiting class, and the all-Union definition of one had been fixed in 1929: a household was a kulak if it used hired labour; or owned a mill, a butter-making rig, other processing equipment, or a complex machine with a mechanical motor; or systematically rented out equipment or

facilities; or drew income from trade, money-lending, brokerage or other non-labour sources — with local executive committees empowered to add criteria to suit conditions.

Apply that to a Baltic farm. Taking on a hand at harvest was ordinary. Housing a relative who worked about the place was ordinary. Owning a separator or a threshing machine, or renting one to a neighbour, was ordinary and was what the interwar co-operatives had been built to encourage. On these criteria a very large share of the countryside was inside the class, and which part of it was inside on any given day was a decision taken in an office.

In September 1947 the farm where Rosalie and Jüri Lindal lived with their six children was declared a kulak household. The charge was two items: that they employed outside labour, and that they owned a tractor. Jüri appealed to the county executive committee in November, explaining that the man named in the charge sheet as hired labour was his nephew, who was living at the farm because of an injured hand. The lists were drawn up by municipal executive committees; an adverse decision could be appealed to the county committee, and from there to the council of ministers of the Estonian SSR, whose ruling was final.

The apparatus that produced those lists has been reconstructed in detail for Estonia, and the finding is the important one. The screening was bureaucratic rather than denunciatory — individual denunciations were not necessary — and it worked by combing the rural population through records, censuses and local knowledge in order to identify, or to invent, kulak families; in the Estonian files each household's conduct during the German occupation formed part of the screening too. The class was found by search, and where the search came up short the criteria supplied the shortfall.

What attached to the entry was a life. Kulak households paid higher taxes and carried heavier compulsory deliveries and received no state support. On 21 May 1947 the all-Union party adopted a resolution on the creation of kolkhozes in the Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian republics, and pressure to join began in earnest. By 1948 it had produced very little: between four and eight per cent of Baltic farmers were in collective farms.

Then the register was used for what registers are for. On 29 January 1949 Moscow fixed the quantity by republic. On 17 March the chairman of the Latvian council of ministers, Vilis Lācis, signed a top-secret decision sanctioning the removal of ten thousand kulak families to special settlements; his

counterparts in Vilnius and Tallinn are presumed to have signed comparable documents in the same days. The operation ran from 25 to 28 March. By the end of 1949, ninety-three per cent of farms in Latvia and eighty per cent in Estonia were collectivised.

And the entry travelled with the person to the other end of the country. In the special settlements the administration sorted its exiles into contingents graded by assessed loyalty and rationed opportunity accordingly; the Baltic contingents were classed among the less loyal, and were in practice excluded from employment in educational institutions that more favoured groups could enter. A man's social origin — the line on the form — governed what work he could be given four thousand kilometres from the field it referred to.

Who got what

The module's question has to be answered in both columns.

They got land. Between the summer of 1940 and the following spring, more than fifty thousand landless and near-landless households in Estonia alone received about four hundred thousand hectares, with credits attached and old debts written off, and comparable numbers in Latvia and Lithuania. This was not nothing and it was not fictitious. There was a real landless class in all three countries — the residue of an emancipation that had freed the person and kept the field — and for the year between the reform and the German invasion a large number of people were materially better off than they had been.

They got the reform twice, because the German occupation did not return the land either, having its own settlement plans for the ground, and the Soviet declaration of 1940 was reinstated on the return in 1944. And the second distribution ran into a datum worth recording: of the land expropriated in the continuation of the reform after the war, only about half could be given out as individual farms, because there were not enough people who wanted any.

They kept, in the end, about half a hectare and a few animals — the household plot permitted to a collective farm family, which on the record produced a remarkable share of the country's food.

They lost, in stages: everything above thirty hectares in 1940; the right to sell, buy or mortgage what remained, in the same instrument; the holding itself into a collective farm between 1947 and 1950; and, for those whose entry said kulak, the house and the family with it.

The framework asks a further question of every settlement, and it is the sharpest one in the module: what did the recipient owe in return? Elsewhere the answer is armed service, or tax collection, or political compliance, and whatever it is, the grant leaves the grantee holding something — an estate, a title, a salary — that he will defend because it is now what makes his position his. Here the answer is that the recipient owed nothing enforceable and received nothing defensible. No deed, no debt, no service, no retinue, no court. He was given the use of a field on the same terms as everybody else, which is to say on terms the giver could alter without notice, and eight years later it altered them.

Reading the settlement against the framework

Three findings, of which the first is the module's contribution and the others are consequences of it.

The settlement's conversion runs in either direction, and the direction is the diagnostic. The framework has held that a settlement's first act is to convert relations between persons into transferable things, because wealth that is a relation cannot be granted. That is right about conquests which need to grant. This one did not, and it ran the identical machinery backwards, converting registered freehold — a thing, with a deed, a price and a mortgage market — into a revocable permission to work a field. The generalisation to carry forward is that both operations are performed by the same instrument for the same underlying reason, which is that the conqueror wants the wealth in whatever legal form best suits what he intends to do with the people attached to it: **relations become things where an elite is to be bought, and things become relations where no elite is to be bought and the object is to hold the cultivator directly.** The direction of the conversion, read off the first statute, tells you in advance which kind of order is being built — and it told anyone reading the Lithuanian declaration of 22 July 1940 that no class of proprietors was going to be created, because the instrument had just abolished the category of proprietor.

Classification belongs on the list of settlement fictions, and it does the same job the land fictions do. The corpus has vacancy, which declares the ground empty and serves dispossession; recognition, which declares that the grantee already owned what he is given and serves the binding of an elite; divisibility, which declares a collective holding partible and manufactures a

market; and, from the Central Asian case, the norm and the surplus, which concedes the occupation and then quantifies it. This case supplies restoration, as expected — and then shows it doing almost no work, because the country had already carried out the redistribution the restoration claimed to be performing and every farmer in it knew so. The instrument that did the work was the classification, and it belongs in this family because it performs the identical operation: it converts a decision about a person into a fact about an object. Vacancy says the land is empty; recognition says he already owned it; divisibility says the collective was always partible; classification says *this man is a kulak*. In each case, once the proposition is entered, everything that follows is administration and can be carried out by clerks who need not decide anything. The difference — and it is why the addendum was right to insist the settlement here is a settlement of persons — is that the first four fictions attach to land and this one attaches to a man, and can therefore be revoked, back-dated, and inherited by his children.

And a settlement made in categories produces beneficiaries who cannot become defenders. The mechanism this framework relies on to explain why settlements hold for generations under men who privately resent them is that the grant re-sources the recipient's title: same ground, same neighbours, different source — and the recipient defends the arrangement because the arrangement is now what makes his holding his. That mechanism requires a holding. Here title was not re-sourced but abolished, and what the recipient of 1940 held afterwards was a permission indistinguishable from anyone else's. So the settlement created a large class of genuine beneficiaries and gave not one of them a stake he could have defended, which is why the collectivisation of 1947 to 1950 met resistance in the forests and none whatever in the courts. Whether that leaves the order's default stronger or weaker is not this module's question — an elite with nothing of its own is also an elite that cannot fund a dissent, and that argument runs the other way — but at the base of the hierarchy the finding is unambiguous: this settlement bought nobody.

The strongest thing to be said against the foregoing should be said here rather than saved. The landless class of 1919 was real, its grievance was real, and the interwar reforms had not abolished it; agricultural labourers and dwarf-holders remained a substantial part of all three populations in 1939, and the men who took a field in the autumn of 1940 were not, most of them, dupes or collaborators but people who had wanted land for a long time and were offered

some. Any account that treats the 1940 reform as pure theatre has to explain why so many took it, and the answer is that for a year it was not theatre. The finding is not that the grant was unreal. It is that it was made in a form that could be withdrawn without an act, and was.

What would break this reading: evidence that the kulak lists tracked actual holdings, hired labour and machinery closely enough to be a description rather than a search — that the class was found because it was there in the numbers the doctrine required. The Estonian archival work runs the other way, and the Latvian quota of ten thousand families signed before the lists were closed runs the other way, but the Lithuanian and Latvian screening files have not been worked over to the same depth and the finding should be held open until they are.

A note on sources. Instrument titles are given as the archival and constitutional-court literature renders them in English: the Lithuanian People's Seimas declaration of 22 July 1940 on proclaiming all the land of Lithuania national property, and the declaration on the nationalisation of banks and large-scale industry adopted the following day, both as cited in the rulings of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania; the declaration of the Estonian Riigivolikogu of 23 July 1940 nationalising land, as cited in the judgments of the Estonian Supreme Court on ownership reform; and the Estonian Securities Circulation Regulation Act of 18 July 1940 (RT 1940, 69, 678) and Organisation of Nationalisation Act of 1 August 1940 (RT 1940, 89, 870), cited from the state gazette references carried in the Principles of Ownership Reform Act of 1991. No wording of these instruments is quoted here; where the text is characterised — the use of *proclaim* and *declare*, and the provision that the cultivator might use but not sell, buy or mortgage — that characterisation follows the reference accounts and should be checked against the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian originals before any phrase is relied on as a quotation.

Figures are given as the sources give them and diverge in places. The interwar baseline (about 140,000 Estonian farms above one hectare against some 50,000 before the reform; the fall in Latvia's landless share from 61.2 per cent in 1897 to 18 per cent in 1936) is from the agricultural-history literature and the Latvian reform accounts. The 1940 reform figures — the thirty-hectare ceiling in all three republics; 608,000 hectares into the Lithuanian State Land Fund; about 400,000 hectares to more than 50,000 Estonian households with credits to some 40,000 and redemption debts cancelled, the reform essentially complete by December 1940; and in Latvia redistribution in parcels given variously at ten and at fifteen hectares to about 50,000 new farmers with additions to some 23,000 smallholders — come from the Soviet-era reference accounts, from

Strods as cited in the Latvian agrarian literature, and from the national histories, and the ten-versus-fifteen-hectare divergence is reported rather than resolved. The Lithuanian nationalisation of industry (26 July 1940; enterprises above twenty workers; over a thousand enterprises, about 40,000 employees, over 413 million litas) is from the Lithuanian documentation project. The all-Union kulak criteria are from the Sovnarkom resolution of 21 May 1929 on the characteristics of kulak farms, as reproduced in the standard Soviet documentary collection and in the secondary literature.

The Lindal case — the declaration of the household as kulak in September 1947, the two charges of employing outside labour and owning a tractor, the nephew with the injured hand, and the appeal route from municipal executive committee to county committee to the council of ministers of the Estonian SSR — is drawn from a recent Estonian student study reported in the Estonian public broadcaster's coverage, paraphrased. The characterisation of the screening process as bureaucratic rather than denunciatory, conducted through records, censuses and local knowledge in order to identify or invent kulak families, and incorporating each household's wartime record, follows Anu Mai Kõll's monograph on the anti-kulak campaign in Estonia, paraphrased from its published summary and the secondary literature; the phrase quoted in the text as the finding is Kõll's characterisation and is here reported rather than reproduced. The party resolution of 21 May 1947 on the creation of kolkhozes in the three republics, the collectivisation share of four to eight per cent by 1948, and the shares of 93 per cent in Latvia and 80 per cent in Estonia by the end of 1949 are from the agricultural and deportation literature. Vilis Lācis's decision of 17 March 1949 sanctioning the deportation of ten thousand kulak families, and the inference that his counterparts signed comparable documents, are from the published re-assessment of the 1949 deportations working from the Latvian and Russian archives, paraphrased with its own qualification retained. The grading of special-settlement contingents by assessed loyalty, and the practical exclusion of the Baltic contingents from employment in educational institutions, is from the published archival study of educational policy in the special settlements, paraphrased.

The Soviet reference characterisation of the 1940 Estonian reform — that it changed the balance of class forces in the countryside, that capitalist farmers were eliminated and the number of kulaks dropped — is quoted in substance from the Soviet encyclopaedia entry on the Estonian SSR as reproduced in

translation, and is used here as evidence of what the order said about itself rather than as an independent account of what happened. Figures for the Jewish populations murdered under the German occupation are given as approximate totals from the standard reference sources and are entered only to establish what was and was not restored; the absence of postwar restitution is stated on the basis of the general literature on Soviet property policy in the recovered territories and is an area where this study's reading is thinner than it should be and should be strengthened before the accounting module relies on it.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE THREE

TO SATISFY THE REQUEST

Module 3 · The robe — a conquest recorded as a petition granted; three claims cut for three audiences, of which the one addressed to the conquered was the largest and by far the most expensive; a doctrine that had spent the only word for what it was doing on its rivals; and the accounting of what an order paid for a legitimacy its force did not require

The grammar of the claim

On 3 August 1940 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed a law which the American chargé in Moscow reported to Washington the following morning. It resolved, in his rendering of the text, *to satisfy the request of the Seim of Lithuania and to admit the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as a constituent Soviet Socialist Republic possessing equal rights*. Latvia was admitted on 5 August and Estonia on 6 August in the same form.

Fifty-one years of argument turn on that sentence, so it is worth reading slowly. There is a request; the request is satisfied; and what is conferred is equality of rights within a union rather than subordination within an empire. There is no cession, no protectorate, no mandate, no trusteeship. There is no civilising mission and no vacancy, because the instrument is not describing a territory at all — it is describing an application.

Set that beside the instruments this collection has read elsewhere. A treaty of cession names a party giving and a party receiving. A protectorate names a power that will conduct the foreign relations of another. A mandate names a people not yet able to stand alone. Each of those forms concedes an asymmetry and then justifies it. This one concedes no asymmetry whatever, and therefore requires no justification — which is exactly why the whole apparatus that produced it had to be built. Somebody had to make the request.

The word that had been spent

The reason the request was necessary is not tactical. It is doctrinal, and it can be dated to a speech delivered eight months before the ultimatums, in the same session in which Molotov announced the basing treaties.

On 31 October 1939, addressing the Supreme Soviet, Molotov set out the character of the war then beginning in Europe, and his analysis was an audit of empires. Great Britain, he observed, had a population of forty-seven million and colonies with a population of four hundred and eighty million; France had forty-two million at home and seventy million in her colonies; and possession of these colonies, which made possible the exploitation of hundreds of millions of people, was the foundation of British and French world supremacy. The present war, he argued, had nothing to do with the rights of small nations and everything to do with the fear of losing that supremacy. Later in the same speech, replying to a message from President Roosevelt about Finland, he suggested that matters were in no better shape between the United States and the Philippines or Cuba, who had long been demanding freedom and independence and could not get them.

A state whose foreign minister has just conducted that audit in public cannot afterwards describe its own acquisition in the vocabulary he used. The words were not unavailable because someone had banned them. They had been spent. The Russian historian Nikita Petrov has put the mechanism about as compactly as it can be put: Soviet reference works described bourgeois diplomacy as operating by deceit, blackmail, ultimatums, military force and economic expansionism — after which admitting what had been done in 1939 was not something the order could survive doing.

So the foreclosures follow, and they are not a list of embarrassments but a single structural consequence. Occupation could not be said. Annexation could not be said. Colony could not be said, of a territory this order administered, ever, for half a century. And the instrument that had assigned the territory in the first place could not be admitted to exist.

That last concealment is worth its own paragraph, because it is the longest-held single fact in this collection. The Soviet prosecutor at Nuremberg described the secret protocol as a forgery. The United States published the captured German copy in 1948 and the denial continued. Andrei Gromyko,

foreign minister for twenty-eight years, called its existence a lie. Only after the demonstration of 23 August 1989, in which some two million people formed a chain across the three republics on the pact's fiftieth anniversary, did a commission under Alexander Yakovlev conclude that the protocol had existed; and the resolution of the Second Congress of People's Deputies on 24 December 1989, which condemned it and declared it void from the moment of signature, still recorded that the original had not been found. The document was declassified in 1992, after the state that signed it had ceased to exist.

Fifty years, three general secretaries, one piece of paper. The corpus's standing finding about colonial information — that the censor was unnecessary because nobody at home minded — does not survive contact with that, and the reason it does not is the subject of this module rather than an exception to it.

The robe addressed to the conquered

Here the framework's colonial prediction inverts, and the inversion is the module's main business.

A European colonial robe is cut for the metropole. It is addressed to the taxpayers who fund the conquest and the young men who enlist for it, and toward the conquered it says very little, because the conquered are held by force and are not asked to believe anything. This order did the opposite, at length, in public, and expensively.

The claim addressed to Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians was not that they were backward, or that they required tutelage, or that their land was empty. Those claims were unavailable and would also have been ridiculous: these were literate, industrialised, recently sovereign European states with per capita output above the Soviet Union's own. The claim was that they were being liberated from an empire, that the empire in question was the Tsar's, and that the Soviet Union was its opposite.

Molotov made it in the same October speech. The peace treaties of 1920 by which Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became independent states were, he said, the beginning of a friendly Soviet policy toward these newly created small states; and that policy reflected the radical difference between the Soviet government and the policy of Tsarist Russia, which had brutally oppressed the small nations, denied them every opportunity of independent national and political development, and left them with the most painful memories of itself.

Read that against the landscape. Estonian and Latvian national feeling had been assembled in the second half of the nineteenth century in the teeth of exactly the imperial machinery that sentence disowns — the ukaz making Russian obligatory in the Baltic administration in 1885, the transfer of the courts and the schools, the renaming of the German university at Dorpat as Yuriev in 1893. Lithuanian national feeling had been assembled around a forty-year ban on printing the language in its own alphabet. *We are not the Tsar* was, for those three audiences, close to the most meaningful sentence available in the language, and the order said it to them first and kept saying it.

And it paid.

Vilno

In October 1939, with twenty thousand troops already inside Lithuania under a treaty it had dictated, and with the Lithuanian army under orders it had effectively written, the Soviet Union handed Lithuania the city of Vilnius, taken from Poland the month before.

Molotov explained the transfer to the Supreme Soviet, and the explanation is the single most useful passage in the module. The Soviet government had agreed to the transfer, he said, *not because Vilno has a predominantly Lithuanian population. No, the majority of the inhabitants of Vilno are not Lithuanian.* It had agreed because the city was bound up with the historical past of the Lithuanian state and with the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people. He then noted, with satisfaction, that the foreign press had observed that there had never been a case in world history of a big country handing over of its own free will such a big city to a small state, and that this made the act all the more striking a demonstration of Soviet good will.

Now apply the sharpest diagnostic this framework owns. Force never pays for what it does not need. An apex that already holds uncontested force and nonetheless pays a real, avoidable cost for legitimacy has established, by the expenditure alone, that the legitimacy purchased was necessary to some audience whose compliance mattered — whatever the apex's stated reasons. The Soviet Union in October 1939 needed nothing from Lithuania that it could not have taken. It gave away a city of a quarter of a million people, added better than half a million to Lithuania's population, and stated in the same breath that the

ethnographic argument for doing so ran the other way and that it was doing it anyway because of what the city meant to Lithuanians.

That is the test firing, and it firing in a form the corpus has not previously seen. What the case adds is not that the payment happened but that its **denomination** is legible. The transfer was not made in roubles, or in trade terms, or in a security guarantee. It was made in the currency of Lithuanian nationalism, and the foreign minister named the currency out loud. Where an expenditure can be read for what it was denominated in, the audience it was addressed to can be identified exactly, and its recognised currency along with it.

The Lithuanian reading of the transaction was immediate and can be recovered in four words. The slogan that ran through the country that autumn was *Vilnius mūsų, Lietuva rusų* — Vilnius is ours, Lithuania is Russia's. The payment landed and the price was priced, in the same breath, by the people it was paid to.

The audience in London

The second robe was cut for a foreign public, and there is an unusually clean specimen of it, because in 1941 four of Molotov's speeches were published in London by Lawrence and Wishart for the Anglo-Russian News Bulletin, with a foreword by the barrister and Member of Parliament D. N. Pritt and connecting commentary by W. P. and Zelda Coates.

Pritt's foreword tells the English reader that Soviet foreign policy has been clear and consistent to an unusual degree, and that the clue to understanding Molotov's speeches is so simple that it seems almost to take an unfair advantage of our incredulity: *it is just that Mr Molotov says what he means and means what he says.*

The commentary introducing the speech of 1 August 1940 supplies the rest. It tells the reader that the three states had for centuries been part of the Russian Empire, of the utmost strategic and economic importance to it; that Germany and the Allies had for their own ends compelled their severance from Soviet Russia after 1917; that the capitalist regimes then established had developed into virtually fascist regimes; that between 17 and 21 June 1940 those governments fell and left-wing governments were set up; that the elections of 14 July were held by secret ballot with turnouts of 81.6, 94.7 and 95.5 per cent, higher than ever before; that the new parliaments applied for incorporation; and

that the accession secured the three peoples both against attack by any great power and in the free development of their national economy and national culture, as equal partners with an equal voice in the joint fatherland.

Every element of the robe is in that paragraph, arranged for a reader four hundred miles from any of it: prior belonging, foreign severance, fascism deposed, a secret ballot, a request, equality, and national culture guaranteed. It was published in London in 1941 and it was believed by people who were neither stupid nor bought.

Against it stood a counter-claim that this collection should record because it is the exception to the corpus's usual finding. On 23 July 1940, eleven days before the admissions, the American Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles issued a declaration refusing to recognise the results, characterising the process by which the governments had been replaced as devious, and applying to Europe the doctrine of non-recognition the United States had adopted over Manchuria in 1932. On 11 August Molotov sent a formal note requiring the American missions in Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn to complete the liquidation of their affairs by 25 August and the Baltic missions abroad to hand their archives and property to Soviet representatives. The missions in the Baltic capitals closed. The Baltic legations in Washington did not, and were still there in 1991.

So this metropolitan audience was neither indifferent nor deceived, and the order knew it, and went on answering it for half a century. That is the sharpest available contrast with the European colonial cases, where the facts travelled home unhindered and moved nothing.

The men who believed the national half

The third audience is the order's own coordinating class, and the Baltic case offers a test of sincerity that does not require reading anybody's mind. It requires only watching what happened to the people who took the robe's national clause literally.

On 28 June 1945 the Soviet authorities issued a decree on the restoration of the Academy of Sciences in Estonia, and on 5 April 1946 the chairman of the Estonian council of ministers signed the decree constituting it, with the historian Hans Kruus as its first president. The word in the decree is *restoration*; the Estonian Academy had in fact been founded in 1938; and the Soviet authorities declined to recognise the continuity of that body and dated the

institution from 1946 for the next four decades. A restored thing whose prior existence is not admitted is an unusually exact miniature of the whole robe.

In 1950 Kruus was dismissed and arrested.

The song festivals were kept, and expanded, and given a permanent stage. The festival of 1947 was the first after the war; its repertoire remained largely traditional; Gustav Ernesaks's setting of Lydia Koidula's *Mu isamaa on minu arm* — my fatherland is my love — was performed there for the first time, having been written in 1944 in evacuation in Russia. People were arrested on the festival grounds. In 1950 three of the festival's artistic directors, Alfred Karindi, Riho Päts and Tuudur Vetik, were among those repressed. From 1947 to 1985 the repertoire was required to include the anthems of the USSR and of the Estonian SSR, the Internationale, and songs glorifying the party and its leaders.

In Latvia the pattern ran a decade later and higher. A group of native communists around Eduards Berklavs, formed in the Komsomol apparatus of the late 1940s, reached the top of the republic's party by 1958 and set about limiting in-migration and requiring officials to learn Latvian. They were purged in 1959. Berklavs was expelled from the party in 1974 and became a Popular Front deputy in the late 1980s.

This is not hypocrisy caught out, and writing it as hypocrisy would produce a weaker finding than the record supports. It is the structural consequence of a claim that has to be *made* and must not be *acted upon*. The robe's national clause was real expenditure and genuinely intended as expenditure; what it was not was a policy. A man who read it as a policy had misread the instrument, and the apparatus removed him for a category of error the doctrine already had a name for.

What was paid, and what was governed

The addendum asks for this accounting explicitly, and it has to be run in both columns at the same length.

What was paid: a republic with a name, a flag, an anthem and a capital. Native-language schooling from the first year to the university. Academies of sciences in all three republics, publishing houses, theatres, an opera, a codified literary standard, national encyclopaedias. The song festivals continued and grew to twenty-five or thirty thousand singers on a purpose-built stage. A

written constitutional right of secession. Native first secretaries at the head of each republic's party for most of the period. No European colonial administration in this collection paid anything remotely comparable to any subject population, and a study that omitted it would be falsified by its own evidence.

What was governed: the content of every one of those things. The festival that kept the choirs required the party's anthems in the programme and lost its directors to the camps. The academy that was restored was denied its own founding date. The republic that had a flag had, by 1959 on the scholarship, more than half its urban school-age population being educated in Russian in schools where little or no Estonian was taught; and the proportion of Estonians in Estonia fell from 88 per cent in 1934 to 62 per cent in 1989.

The formulation that fits the evidence is not that the national institutions were a facade. They were not; they employed real scholars, printed real books and trained real musicians, and the people inside them were not performing. It is that **the form was funded and the direction was reserved.** The order paid for the vessel and kept the right to say what went in it, and it removed the natives who mistook the funding for a delegation.

Reading the robe against the framework

Three findings, and the first is the one the corpus needs.

A robe is addressed to whoever the order's own legitimating claim makes indispensable — and a doctrine of self-determination makes the conquered indispensable. The framework's colonial expectation is that the robe faces the metropole, because the metropole's belief is the cheap foundation the expensive apparatus rests on and the conquered's belief is not needed. That expectation is correct about its cases and wrong here, and the reason is neither generosity nor cynicism but the shape of the doctrine. A power whose case against its rivals is that they hold colonies has no vocabulary in which to hold one; the only form of acquisition its own creed will accept is accession by request; and a request has to be made by somebody. So the conquered are promoted, structurally and against the order's convenience, from a population that need not believe anything into the one party whose visible consent the whole edifice requires. That is why the electoral law had to be rewritten before the elections, why the parliaments had to convene and petition, why the

operative verb in the admitting statute is *satisfy*, and why in 1989 a chain of two million people holding hands was a constitutional event rather than a demonstration.

The revealed-preference test can be read for denomination, not merely for amount. The test as the framework holds it says that a costly, avoidable payment for legitimacy proves that some audience's recognition was needed. Vilnius sharpens it. The Soviet Union paid a city, and Molotov specified in the same speech that the ethnographic case ran the other way and that the ground of the transfer was what the place meant to Lithuanians. The payment was therefore denominated in Lithuanian nationalism, explicitly, on the record — and where the denomination of a payment can be recovered, it identifies the audience and its recognised currency directly, without any inference from the apex's stated motives at all. **Read what an order pays in, not only how much.**

And where a metropole's own account of itself is the load-bearing structure, the seam runs through the doctrine rather than across the sea. The corpus's general result is that colonial suppression faced inward at the conquered and that toward the metropole almost nothing was hidden, because nothing needed to be: the facts travelled and the public did not care. This case breaks that finding cleanly, and the break is not about distance. What was at risk here was not the reputation of a distant administration but the coherence of the doctrine the metropole itself ran on — and so a single sheet of paper signed in Moscow in August 1939 was denied by a prosecutor at Nuremberg, by a foreign minister across twenty-eight years in office, and by the state's whole historical apparatus, until December 1989, when it was conceded in a resolution that still recorded the original as missing. The measure of a concealment is what it would have cost to admit, and what admission would have cost here was not a colony.

The strongest thing that can be said against all of the foregoing should be said plainly, because it is largely true. The interwar governments really had been authoritarian, and Päts, Ulmanis and Smetona really had closed their parliaments. The Baltic German nobility really had been a conquering caste holding a peasantry down for seven centuries. The landless really had existed and had really wanted land. Tsarist Russification really had tried to break these languages, and the Soviet Union really did fund the academies, the schools and the choirs that the tsar's officials had worked to close. A reader who concludes that the robe contained a great deal that was true is right, and nothing in this module depends on its being false.

What the module establishes is narrower and does not need the robe to be a lie. It is that this particular claim, whatever proportion of it was true, made a specific set of descriptions unavailable — occupation, annexation, colony, protocol — and that the descriptions it made unavailable were the ones that would have been accurate about what was done in June 1940 and about what was done to the people counted in the previous module. A robe does not have to be false to foreclose. It only has to be load-bearing.

A note on sources. The four Molotov speeches used here — of 31 August 1939, 31 October 1939, 29 March 1940 and 1 August 1940 — are quoted and paraphrased from the English collection *Soviet Peace Policy*, published for the Anglo-Russian News Bulletin by Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1941, with a foreword by D. N. Pritt and connecting commentary by W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, as reproduced in the Marxists Internet Archive. The speeches are Soviet state documents; the translation and the editorial apparatus are the 1941 publisher's, and both are treated here as evidence of what was said and of how it was presented to a British readership. The passages relied on are the audit of British and French colonial populations (47 million against 480 million; 42 million against 70 million) and the account of what the war was really about; the remark about the Philippines and Cuba in reply to President Roosevelt's message; the statement that the friendly Soviet policy toward the three new small states reflected the radical difference between the Soviet government and Tsarist Russia, which had brutally oppressed the small nations; the declaration that talk of Sovietising the Baltic countries served only the common enemies of both; the statement of 29 March 1940 that the state and political independence of the three had not suffered in any way; and the explanation of the Vilnius transfer, including the admission that the majority of the city's inhabitants were not Lithuanian and the appeal to the historical past of the Lithuanian state and to the national aspirations of the Lithuanian people. Pritt's characterisation of Molotov, and the Coates commentary on the 1940 accession — prior imperial belonging, foreign severance, virtually fascist regimes, the secret ballot with turnouts of 81.6, 94.7 and 95.5 per cent, equality of partnership and free development of national culture — are quoted in short and paraphrased from the same volume.

The text of the Supreme Soviet's admitting law of 3 August 1940 is given as reported by the American chargé in Moscow in his telegram of 4 August 1940, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, a United States government publication; the same series carries the Soviet note of 11 August 1940 on the liquidation of the American missions at Kaunas, Riga and Tallinn by 25 August and the transfer of Baltic missions' archives and property. The Welles declaration of 23 July 1940 and its application of the non-recognition doctrine follow the standard accounts.

The chronology of the secret protocol's denial and concession — the Soviet prosecutor's characterisation of it as a forgery at Nuremberg, the United States publication of the captured German copy in 1948, Gromyko's denial, the Baltic Way of 23 August 1989, the Yakovlev commission, the resolution of the Second Congress of People's Deputies of 24 December 1989 condemning the protocol and declaring it void from signature while recording that the original had not been found, and the declassification of the document in 1992 — follows the reference chronologies and the specialist commentary; the observation that the resolution distinguished the treaty from the protocol and grounded the condemnation in a departure from Leninist principles is from the published analyses of the resolution. Nikita Petrov's formulation about the Soviet encyclopaedic characterisation of bourgeois diplomacy is paraphrased from an interview published by RFE/RL.

The Estonian Academy of Sciences material — the decree on the restoration of the Academy of 28 June 1945, the constituting decree of 5 April 1946 signed by Arnold Veimer, Hans Kruus as first president, the Soviet authorities' refusal to recognise the continuity of the 1938 Academy and their dating of the institution to 1946, and Kruus's dismissal and arrest in 1950 — is from the Estonian Academy of Sciences' own published history. The song festival material — Ernesaks's 1944 setting of Koidula's *Mu isamaa on minu arm* and its first performance in 1947, arrests at the festival grounds, the repression of Karindi, Päts and Vetik in 1950, and the compulsory inclusion of the Soviet and Estonian SSR anthems, the Internationale and songs glorifying the party and its leaders in every festival programme from 1947 to 1985 — is from the festival organisation's published history and the reference accounts. The Latvian national communists around Eduards Berklavs, their period in office in 1958–59, the purge of 1959, his expulsion from the party in 1974 and his later role in the Popular Front follow Prigge's monograph as summarised in its publisher's synopsis and in the secondary literature, paraphrased. The demographic figures — over half the urban school-age population of Estonia in Russian-language schooling by 1959 on David Smith's account, and the fall in the Estonian share of the population from 88 per cent in 1934 to 62 per cent in 1989 — are as those sources give them.

One limitation is declared. This module reads the robe substantially through published speeches, decrees and institutional histories, and not through the internal party correspondence in which the addendum's claim about the

identity of public and private language would properly be tested. That claim is therefore reported here as the addendum's finding and not as this study's, and the information module should return to it with better evidence or drop it.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

SUGGESTIONS FOR SECULAR TRADITIONAL EVENTS

Module 4 · Formation — a conqueror who arrived with a literacy campaign at a country already literate; a committee convened at Tartu in 1959 to draft the rites of a life; why the same assault on the same institution by the same apparatus produced, over the same half-century, one of the least religious populations on earth and one of the most Catholic; and the native cadre that believed the national clause and was removed for believing it

What there was to substitute for

The instruction this study carries into the module is that Soviet formation was maximised rather than withheld, and that the researcher must separate two operations which produce opposite results: *substitution*, the offer of a new formation in place of an old one, and *assault*, the attack on an existing formation without replacement. That distinction holds here and does most of the work below. What does not hold, and has to be reported rather than smoothed, is the expectation that goes with it — that substitution worked spectacularly because the doctrine's underlying prediction was correct: that people will take literacy if it is offered free.

They will. But you have to find them without it.

The three countries occupied in 1940 had the highest reading rates in the former empire and effectively universal literacy by the interwar period. They had compulsory schooling, national curricula, a university at Tartu founded in 1632 and one at Riga, a Lithuanian university at Kaunas, national academies, publishing houses, learned societies and a periodical press. There was no *likbez* to run because there were no illiterates to reach. The single most spectacular achievement the Soviet formation programme delivered anywhere — a population taken from near-nothing to near-universal reading inside two generations — was, in the Baltic, unavailable, because it had already happened,

under German pastors and then under national governments, and largely before the Bolsheviks existed.

So what substitution offered here was necessarily something else, and it was not nothing. It was the expansion of higher and technical education far beyond what three small republics had funded; industrial and scientific careers open to the children of farm labourers; women into professions and full employment; state medicine; and the vast increase in institutional scale that came with being a province of a great power rather than a state of two million people. Those were real, they were taken, and a study that leaves them out is falsified by its own evidence.

But the marginal gain has to be measured against what was there, and that produces the module's first finding, which is general rather than local. **The achievement column of a substitution programme is a function of the deficit it finds, not of the conviction or the effort behind it.** The identical policy, run by the identical ministries with the identical sincerity, transformed one terrain and marginally improved another — and the order claimed the transformation in both, because its doctrine described the policy and not the ground. This matters for the accounting later, because *they built the schools* is the strongest single item in the counter-position and it cannot be priced without a baseline. In Central Asia the baseline was near zero. Here it was among the highest in Europe.

The school that kept its language and lost its children

The expenditure that was made, and made generously, was native-language schooling all the way to the university. Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian remained languages of instruction, of scholarship, of publishing and of the doctorate for fifty years. No European colonial administration in this collection did anything comparable for any subject population, and the reason it was done is the reason set out in the previous module: an order whose whole claim was that the republics had joined freely as equals could not administer them in a language they did not speak.

The hollowing was done underneath the school rather than to it.

Two school systems ran in parallel: one in the republic's language, one in Russian. The second did not seriously teach the first. In 1956 the Latvian party leadership around Eduards Berklavs issued a regulation requiring officials in

Latvia to acquire Latvian within two years or face dismissal — an attempt to make the republic's language the working language of its own administration. Two years later Khrushchev's education reform proposed, in the article that became notorious across the union, that the language of instruction should be a matter of parental choice. In a republic with two school systems and a growing Russian-speaking in-migration, parental choice meant that the titular language could be opted out of entirely, and the Baltic republics understood this immediately. Estonia and Lithuania pressed for twelve years of schooling and for the retention of three-language teaching; Latvia pressed hardest and for the most autonomy; and in 1959 the Latvian leadership that had pressed was purged.

The measurable result arrived within a decade. By 1959, on the scholarship, more than half of the school-age urban population of Estonia were native Russian speakers being educated in Russian-language schools where little or no Estonian was taught. Over the period the Estonian share of Estonia's population fell from 88 per cent at the census of 1934 to 62 per cent in 1989.

The mechanism is worth naming because the corpus has not met it in this form. Elsewhere a conqueror suppresses a language, or declines to teach it, or replaces its script. Here the language was funded, taught, printed and examined in — and the catchment was altered underneath the institution, by industrial planning and migration, until the school kept its language and lost its share of the children. **A formation can be maintained in form and hollowed by catchment**, and the accounts of it will show rising expenditure throughout.

Suggestions for secular traditional events

The framework asks every formation module for two reconstructions: the portrait of the good subject, and the yearly calendar that rehearses the order. This case is unusual in that both were drafted by committee, and the minutes survive.

The problem the order faced was not that the population had no rites. It was that all of them belonged to somebody else — a church, or a nation, or a folk calendar older than either. And the doctrine forbade simply importing Russian ones, since the whole legitimating claim was that national forms flourished. So the order set out to manufacture a national liturgy that was not religious and

not nationalist, and it did so in the ordinary way of administrations, by convening a body.

In 1959 a Commission for the Preparation of New Family Rites was founded at Tartu. Its recommendations were published as a brochure of suggestions for secular traditional events and put into practice. The effort was explicitly competitive: the object was to outdo the church ceremonies. Old folk marriage customs were deliberately revived for the purpose; choirs and orchestras were to be recruited from the workplaces of the bride and groom, and where that failed the authorities looked for suitable music elsewhere. The first state funeral ceremony was held at Tartu in 1960.

The life cycle was covered end to end. In place of baptism there was a name-giving ceremony, and the Lithuanian version of it was regarded as a model on an all-union scale, written up from Moscow as late as 1985 alongside the Latvian and Estonian childhood festivals. In place of confirmation there were Summer Days of Youth in Estonia and a Coming-of-age Day in Latvia, and the Komsomol's own description of what it was looking for is the most candid sentence in the module: a ceremonial form for the Summer Days that would give the young people a good time and leave lasting memories while at the same time being a real school of communism.

The annual calendar was rebuilt around the union's dates. The national days went first: 18 November in Latvia, 24 February in Estonia and 16 February in Lithuania were struck from the calendar and their commemoration prohibited, and references to the interwar republics were purged from publications. In their place stood 1 May, 7 November, 9 May, and the July anniversary of each republic's own accession.

And then there were the solstice fires, where the policy could not make up its mind and the oscillation is more informative than a settled decision would have been. In Latvia, Jāņi was designated a public holiday in 1941, revoked in 1949 in the weeks after the March deportations, reinstated in 1954, and denounced in 1960 as a harmful relic. In Estonia the authorities never made a serious attempt to suppress jaanipäev at all, and it went on being celebrated throughout, in a country where a president had formerly lit the Victory Day fire from which the midsummer bonfires were kindled.

Read the oscillation for what it exposes. The order wanted the folk material — it revived folk wedding customs on purpose, it funded folklore institutes, it printed the song collections — because folk material was the only non-religious,

non-Russian stock available to build a national liturgy out of. And it could not locate the line between folklore and nationalism, because there was no line: this was precisely the material from which the nineteenth-century national movements had been assembled, by the same collectors, out of the same villages. A regime that pays for a folklore archive and then bans a bonfire has discovered too late that the two are the same asset.

The assault, and the two results

Now the other operation, and the sharpest measurement in this study.

The assault fell on the churches. Property was nationalised, seminaries capped, religious instruction of minors prohibited, clergy registered and surveilled, and the whole apparatus of a public confession dismantled. It was one policy, applied by one apparatus, to three adjacent countries over the same half-century.

The results diverge more widely than any other outcome measured anywhere in this case.

In Estonia the Lutheran church went from something on the order of three-quarters to four-fifths of the population before the war to about a tenth by the census of 2011, and Estonia is now among the least religious populations recorded anywhere on earth, with figures in the range of sixteen to eighteen per cent professing belief in God against a European average around half. In Latvia the Lutheran share fell to roughly a fifth and has since recovered toward a third. Part of the fall is a direct subtraction: after the war only about a quarter of the Lutheran clergy remained in Estonia, the rest having fled west or been deported.

In Lithuania the Catholic Church survived the same assault as the organising institution of the nation, and became the platform of the longest-running underground publication in the Soviet Union. The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania ran from 19 March 1972 to 19 March 1989 — eighty-one issues, produced by priests and nuns, typed at night in rural cabins with blankets over the windows because the thin walls of the Vilnius apartment blocks were too dangerous, passed by hand, retyped and passed again, and smuggled out to be broadcast back. Its founder and first editor, Father Sigitas Tamkevičius, was arrested in 1983; seventeen people connected with it were arrested between 1973 and 1983, among them two priests and four nuns; and on the accounts of those involved, none of them named anybody else.

The rule this study inherited is that attacking a formation converts it from custom into flag. That is exactly what happened in Lithuania and it is emphatically not what happened in Estonia. The difference is the module's second finding and it needs the landscape to explain it.

The Lutheran church in Estonia and Latvia was the previous conqueror's institution. It had been installed by a crusade, run for seven centuries by German pastors seated alongside German manors, and known in its own century as the *Herrenkirche* — the church of the lords. The nineteenth-century national awakening had partly defined itself against it, and the Soviet anti-religious campaign did not have to invent an argument: it had only to point at the violent Christianisation and at the pastorate that had represented the men who owned the estates. The Estonian church's own historians say so, and say the rest of it too — that in twenty years of independence Estonians had not been able to take complete ownership of the church, and that the ties could therefore be severed easily.

In Lithuania the Catholic Church had never been anybody else's. It was the institution through which the Lithuanian language had been written, printed and taught; the priests had run the secret schools during the forty-year press ban and Bishop Valančius had organised the smuggling; and by 1940 Catholicism and Lithuanian nationality were, for practical purposes, the same fact. An attack on it was an attack on the nation, and was correctly identified as such by everybody concerned.

So the rule needs its condition attached: attacking a formation converts it into a flag only where the formation was already the nation's own. Where it belonged to an earlier foreign elite, the attack completes a job the nation's own intellectuals had begun. And the conqueror cannot tell the two cases apart from outside, because in both cases what he is looking at is a church.

Three honest complications, all of which cut against the neatness of that finding and none of which destroys it. Estonian anticlericalism among the cultural elite predates 1940 and runs right through the interwar decades. Several leaders of the national awakening — Jakob Hurt among them — were themselves Lutheran pastors, so the church was not simply the enemy of the nation. And after 1918 Estonians and Latvians did take the leading positions in the theology faculties and the church hierarchies, and the Estonian church reconstituted itself as a free people's church in 1917 with a bishop consecrated by the Swedish archbishop. The claim here is not that the church was foreign in

1940. It is that it had been foreign within living memory, and that twenty years is not long enough to convert seven centuries of *Herrenkirche* into a national institution — and the difference between twenty years and seven centuries is what the assault found when it arrived.

A fourth complication is larger and cannot be resolved here. Finland, Sweden and Denmark secularised heavily over the same half-century without any Soviet assistance whatever, and any honest account of Estonia's collapse has to concede that some of it lay on a Nordic trajectory the country would have followed anyway. What the record supports is that Estonia went further than any of them, and that the Soviet contribution was therefore real and not total. The counterfactual is not zero and this study will not pretend it is.

What was built, and then decapitated

The third movement the addendum names is that the formation the order builds is later beheaded, and the Baltic dates are exact.

The order recruited natives into the apparatus, staffed the academies and universities with them, and put native first secretaries at the head of each republic's party. Then it removed the ones who took the national clause as a policy rather than as a claim.

Estonia went first, at the eighth plenum of the republic's central committee in March 1950. Nikolai Karotamm, first secretary since the reconquest, was removed; most of the leading positions went to Estonians from the Soviet Union and to party workers sent in from elsewhere; and Johannes Käbin — born in Estonia in 1905 but raised in Russia — took the post and held it for twenty-eight years. In the same year Hans Kruus, the historian installed four years earlier as first president of the restored Estonian Academy of Sciences, was dismissed and arrested; and three of the artistic directors of the 1947 song festival, Alfred Karindi, Riho Päts and Tuudur Vetik, were among those repressed.

Latvia went nine years later and from higher up. The national communists around Berklavs — men who had fought in the war, had lived in the interwar republic, and had reached the top of the republic's party by 1958 — had pushed the language regulation, resisted the education reform, and tried to limit in-migration. They were purged from July 1959 and the purge ran to 1962.

Berklavs was removed and sent out of the republic, expelled from the party in 1974, and re-emerged in the late 1980s as a Popular Front deputy.

The pattern is the one to carry forward, and it is not a pattern of opponents being crushed. **The men removed were the ones who had believed the promise.** They had been given a republic with a name, a language, an academy and a constitution, told that national forms would flourish, and had proceeded on that basis; and the apparatus removed them under a charge — bourgeois nationalism — that the doctrine already had ready for exactly this error.

There is a second-order consequence which the comparative record makes visible and which is easy to miss. Because Estonia's party was purged in 1950, nine years before Latvia's, its survivors spent the following decades knowing precisely where the line was. Käbin's very long tenure is legible as the lesson learned: room for Estonian language and institutions was obtainable, but only by manoeuvre that never made Moscow name the thing. Estonia consequently kept more of its schooling and its cultural apparatus than Latvia did. A formation policy of this kind, once decapitated, survives not by being defended but by being administered quietly by men who watched their predecessors go.

What the formation produced

The framework asks what the formed population actually did when the order's own authority was tested, because conduct is better evidence than any inference about belief. Two episodes stand in this module; the larger one belongs later.

On 14 May 1972 a nineteen-year-old named Romas Kalanta poured three litres of petrol over himself and set himself alight in the square beside Laisvės alėja in Kaunas, in front of the musical theatre. He died about fourteen hours later. He left a notebook on a bench with a note saying that only the regime was to blame for his death, and the contents of that note were not publicly known until 1990. Thousands of young people filled the avenue on 18 and 19 May; troops cleared it; some fifty people faced civil charges and ten criminal prosecution; and thirteen more people burned themselves in Lithuania that year.

The building he chose was the one in which, in July 1940, the People's Seimas had declared the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic and petitioned Moscow for admission.

The standard reading of the episode is national, and it should be qualified rather than repeated, because the specialist work argues otherwise: Amanda Swain's study of the demonstrations reads them substantially as a youth-counterculture event — long hair, rock music, and the ordinary friction of a generation against its authorities — and against the settled scholarly consensus that nationalism explains them. Both readings should be reported. What survives either is narrower and harder: this was produced by a cohort formed entirely inside Soviet schools, by the Pioneers and the Komsomol, in the republic where the substitution programme had been most complete — and where the assault on the church had most conspicuously failed.

The second episode is the one the state itself had paid for. The festivals it funded, staffed with its own compulsory repertoire, filled with a hundred thousand people in 1988. That is Module 10's material and this module will not run ahead of it. It records only what belongs here: the vessel the order built was the vessel that filled.

Reading formation against the framework

Four things, of which the first two are contributions and the others compound them.

A substitution programme's achievement is a function of the deficit it finds. The corpus should stop treating the Soviet formation record as a single magnitude. The same doctrine, the same ministries and the same conviction produced, in Central Asia, a transformation with almost no European colonial parallel, and in the Baltic a marginal improvement on a base already among Europe's highest — and the order described both in the same words, because its doctrine specified the policy and not the ground. Any later accounting of what this order built has to be run against a baseline, and where the baseline is high the claim shrinks toward the difference between two good school systems.

Attacking a formation makes a flag of it only where it was already the nation's own. This is the finding the case is uniquely placed to establish, because it contains a three-country control: one apparatus, one policy, one half-century, three adjacent populations — and outcomes at the opposite ends of the European range. Where the institution attacked had itself been an earlier conquest's instrument and the nation's own intellectuals had already begun to detach from it, the assault finished the detachment and the order got what it

wanted. Where the institution was the nation's own vehicle, the assault welded belief to nationality and produced eighty-one issues of a clandestine journal, seventeen arrests and no betrayals. The conqueror cannot distinguish the two from outside, and this one did not try.

A formation can be funded in form and hollowed by catchment. The Baltic schools kept their languages throughout and the budget lines rose; what changed was who was in the classrooms, and that was altered by industrial planning rather than by education policy. Where the corpus looks for the suppression of a language it should also look for the arithmetic of the intake, because the second leaves no trace in the education file at all.

And a manufactured formation leaves a paper trail that a captured one does not. This is a methodological note worth keeping. An order that redirects an existing channel of trust — gets behind a church or a chief and points the earned trust at itself — leaves very little, because the ceremonies already existed and nobody had to write them down. An order that has to *build* the ceremonies convenes a commission, prints a brochure, and has its model name-giving rite written up in Moscow twenty-six years later. Where a study finds an unusually complete record of a society's rituals, it should ask whether the completeness is evidence of a deep tradition or of a recent invention that required minutes.

The strongest objection to all of it should be put at full strength. The substitution was real; the careers were real; a farm labourer's daughter did become a physician, and she was not deceived about it. The men who ran the republics' cultural institutions used the money and produced real scholarship, real music and real books, and calling them collaborators explains nothing. And the secularisation of Estonia would have proceeded some distance without any help, on the same curve as its Nordic neighbours. None of that is in dispute here.

What is established is narrower. The order offered a formation on a terrain that already had one, and the offer's value was therefore small and its claim large. It attacked another formation without replacing it, and got two opposite results for reasons that lay in the terrain rather than in the policy. It funded the national vessel and reserved the contents, and altered the catchment when the contents could not be reserved. And when its own natives took the funding for a delegation, it removed them, under a charge it had drafted in advance for precisely that misunderstanding.

What would break the second finding: evidence that Estonian and Latvian religious practice had already collapsed to near its present level before 1940, or that Lithuanian practice was sustained by something other than the church's national position — rural isolation, say, or the simple fact that the countryside was less industrialised. The interwar census material on confession exists in all three countries and this study has read it only at reference level. Until it is worked properly the finding should be held as strongly indicated and not as demonstrated.

A note on sources. Two short quotations carry weight and both are given as the sources reproduce them in English. The Komsomol's statement of what it wanted from the Summer Days of Youth — a ceremonial form that would give the young people a good time and leave lasting memories while being a real school of communism — is quoted from a Soviet source (Gerodnik) as reproduced in the survey of anti-religious rites in Estonia published in *Religion in Communist Lands*, and should be checked against the Russian original before further use. Romas Kalanta's note, that only the regime was to blame for his death, is given as the standard accounts render it; its contents became public only in 1990.

The interwar formation baseline follows the material established earlier in this study and the education-history literature. The 1958–59 education reform and the Baltic republics' resistance to it, the Latvian language regulation of 1956, and the differing postures of the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian leaderships follow Michael Loader's work on the reform and Soviet Latvia, Jeremy Smith's chapter in Mertelsmann's volume on the Sovietisation of the Baltic states, and the *Slavic Review* article on the battle for language, paraphrased from their published abstracts, summaries and the secondary literature rather than from the monographs themselves — a limitation that should be corrected before the elite module leans on them. The Estonian schooling and demographic figures — over half the urban school-age population in Russian-language schooling by 1959, on David Smith's account, and the fall in the Estonian share of the population from 88 per cent in 1934 to 62 per cent in 1989 — are as those sources give them.

The secular-rites apparatus — the Commission for the Preparation of New Family Rites founded at Tartu in 1959, its brochure of suggestions for secular traditional events, the deliberate revival of folk marriage customs, the recruitment of workplace choirs, the first state funeral at Tartu in 1960, the Summer Days of Youth in Estonia and the Coming-of-age Day in Latvia, and

the name-giving ceremony — is from the survey of anti-religious rites in Estonia cited above and from the Estonian and Latvian ethnographic literature on baptism and name-giving, including the note that the Lithuanian name-giving ceremony was treated as an all-union model and given prominence in Tul'tseva's 1985 Moscow volume on modern festivals and rituals. The holiday material — the prohibition of the interwar national days and the purging of references to interwar independence, and the sequence by which Jāņi was made a public holiday in 1941, revoked in 1949, reinstated in 1954 and denounced in 1960 as a harmful relic — follows the reference accounts of Latvian public holidays; the observation that jaanipäev was never seriously suppressed in Estonia is from the Estonian cultural literature.

The religious outcome figures are reference-level and are given as ranges with their sources named: the Estonian Lutheran share falling from a pre-war majority commonly given at around four-fifths to about a tenth by the 2011 census; Estonian professions of belief in God at sixteen to eighteen per cent against a European average near half, on WIN/Gallup and the survey literature; the Latvian Lutheran share falling to about a fifth and recovering to around a third. The statement that about a quarter of the Lutheran clergy remained in Estonia after the war, and the account of why the Soviet anti-church campaign found the Lutheran church an easy target — the violent Christianisation, the German pastorate representing the manor owners, and the failure of the interwar decades to complete Estonian ownership of the church — are from the Estonian Evangelical Lutheran Church's own published historical material, used here as the institution's own retrospective judgement on itself. The countervailing evidence — interwar anticlericalism among the Estonian cultural elite, the pastors among the awakening's leaders, the 1917 free people's church, and the seizure of the theology faculties and church hierarchies by Estonians and Latvians after 1918 — is from the church-history literature, including Talonen's work on national Lutheran theology in the Baltics 1918–1940 and the Estonian biblical-studies survey, paraphrased.

The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania — 19 March 1972 to 19 March 1989, eighty-one issues, Sigitas Tamkevičius as founder and first editor until his arrest in 1983, Jonas Boruta thereafter, seventeen arrests between 1973 and 1983 including two priests and four nuns, the typing conditions and the courier system, and the account that nobody broke under interrogation — follows the reference accounts and the published fiftieth-anniversary reporting,

including the recollections of participants; the last item is testimony from those involved and is reported as such.

The party purges follow the reference and scholarly accounts: the eighth plenum of the Estonian party's central committee in March 1950, Karotamm's replacement by Käbin and the filling of leading positions with Estonians from the Soviet Union and cadres sent from elsewhere, Käbin's tenure to 1978; and the purge of the Latvian national communists from July 1959 to 1962, following Loader's and Prigge's work as summarised in their published abstracts and in the survey literature. The Kalanta episode and the Kaunas demonstrations of 18–19 May 1972, the charge figures, and the thirteen further self-immolations that year are from the reference accounts and from Anušauskas's article on the KGB reaction; the counter-reading of the demonstrations as youth counterculture rather than nationalism is Amanda Swain's, taken from the published abstract of her doctoral work and reported here as a live scholarly dissent that this study has not adjudicated.

Two limitations declared. Much of the specialist literature in this module has been read through abstracts, reviews and the secondary record rather than in the monographs, and the points where that matters most are flagged above. And the interwar confessional census material that would properly test this module's second finding has not been worked; the finding is offered as strongly indicated rather than demonstrated.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE FIVE

A NOTATION IN THE PASSPORT

Module 5 · The cost column — why the ledger came out for compliance for thirty-five years after the last partisan died; a door that stood open for three weeks in 1944 and was legislated shut within two; a threat demonstrated twice at scale and then held for four decades at almost no running cost; a line to the West operated by the service it was meant to escape; and a benefit column that was, by the only comparison available, real

The three weeks the door stood open

Between the middle of September and early October 1944, something between seventy-five and eighty thousand people left Estonia. More than six hundred small boats went from the Estonian coast alone — fishing boats, sailing boats, converted barges — most of them from the western bays and the islands, and others out of the Courland beaches in Latvia by night. The last convoy left Tallinn harbour on the evening of 21 September as the city burned behind it. The following day the German hospital ship *Moero*, carrying refugees out of Tallinn, was torpedoed by Soviet aircraft with the loss of something like two thousand people; the *Nordstern* went the same way off Saaremaa a week later. About twenty-seven thousand of those who got out reached Sweden and at least forty thousand were in Germany by the end of the war.

Two things about that fortnight matter more than the numbers.

The first is what they were pricing. These were people who had lived through June 1940 to June 1941 and had watched the wagons in the week before the German invasion. The phrase the refugee accounts return again and again is that they would rather die where they were than somewhere in Siberia. They were not fleeing an unknown. They were comparing a known cost with a known cost, on excellent information, and choosing the sea.

The second is what they expected. Most of them believed the arrangement was temporary and that the Western allies would not leave the Baltic states to

the Soviet Union. That belief is a term in the ledger and it will have to be tracked, because when it died the arithmetic changed for everybody who had stayed.

So at the one moment in fifty years when both of the dials that set a subject's calculation were loose — when the force was momentarily elsewhere and a door stood open — a tenth of the Estonian population went through it inside three weeks. Everything that follows has to be read against that. The compliance of the next four decades was not a disposition of the population. It was the same arithmetic run on different numbers.

The coast made into a wall

The proposition this collection takes from Robert Carneiro is that populations become capturable where they cannot disperse — where mountains, desert, sea or hostile neighbours pen them in, so that the cost of submitting to an extractor is lower than the cost of leaving. It is normally a statement about terrain: a fact the state finds and exploits.

Here it is a statement about a filing cabinet, and it can be dated.

The Baltic is not a barrier. It is about a hundred kilometres of open water between the Estonian islands and Sweden, and in September 1944 several hundred families crossed it in boats built for herring. So the arrangement that followed had to be built. On 29 November 1944, formulated at Border Guard Forces headquarters in coordination with the Baltic Fleet and implemented on 12 December, the Estonian republic's council of people's commissars adopted a decision on the border security regime along the coast of the Gulf of Finland and on navigation and fishing in the republic's territorial waters. All of Estonia's islands were designated prohibited zones, along with coastal stretches west of Tallinn. Citizens required a permit from the militia to enter, and visitors had to register.

In 1946 the republic's council of ministers issued secret regulation No. 058, on the restricted border coastal belt in the Estonian SSR and the regime within it. The belt took in, with few exceptions, most of the coast of northern and north-western Estonia, every one of the sea islands, and the town of Paldiski. Movement and work inside the zone required a special permit — demanded even of the men who worked there, in the fishing collectives. Residents had to

carry a corresponding notation in the passport. Permits to visit the islands were not readily granted.

The regime lasted, in substance, until the late 1980s. Along the whole Baltic shore the beaches were raked at night so that a footprint would show, and a chain of watchtowers stood behind them, and the coastlines of three maritime nations were military exclusion zones from which their own populations were generally barred.

Two things follow. The first is the plain one: the exit dial was not found shut, it was shut, deliberately, by an administration that had watched the alternative in 1944 and drew the correct conclusion. The second is methodological and worth keeping. **Where an order lacks natural circumscription it will manufacture it, and the manufacture leaves a legal record** — zones, permits, notations, towers, and a raked strip of sand — which is a better index of that order's private estimate of its own popularity than anything it publishes. A government that does not need to rake the beach does not rake the beach.

The cost demonstrated, and then not needed again

The other dial is the credibility of the punishment, and the framework's rule is Schelling's: a threat restrains only where the person believes he will actually be made to pay. Nothing in this case required inference on that point. It had been demonstrated twice, at scale, in operations that took households rather than individuals and left the neighbours standing in the road watching the carts.

The consequence is the module's central finding and it runs against the intuition that a police state must be continuously expensive.

After March 1949 the apparatus scarcely had to do it again. The armed resistance was finished by 1953. The mass operations stopped. Deportees began returning from 1956. And a population of about six million was then held for thirty-five years without another event of that kind — because the threat had been made credible in the most literal manner available to a state, and credibility established that way does not depreciate inside a generation. Every family had a member, or a neighbour, or an empty farmhouse down the road. The exhibit was permanent and cost nothing to maintain.

What the security apparatus did afterwards was different work. The Latvian card index recovered in 1991 records something over twenty-four thousand agents recruited in that republic between 1953 and 1991, in a population of

about two and a half million; roughly three-fifths of them were ethnic Latvians, and the surviving cards — four to five thousand of them — are a fraction of the whole, the rest having gone to Moscow or up the chimney of the Riga headquarters in the days before the building was taken. That is a substantial network. It is not a saturating one, and its shape tells you what it was for: it was pointed at the people who might do something — writers, clergy, returned deportees, scientists with foreign correspondence, the coast — and not at the man catching the tram to the shipyard.

So the corpus's rule needs a sequence attached to it. *Surveillance is the tell of a belief that never took* remains correct here: the belief never took, and the apparatus was large. But the apparatus is not what held the floor up. **A removal demonstrated once at scale holds the middle of a population; the apparatus polices the margin.** The middle required nothing, because it had already been shown, and showing is a capital expenditure rather than a running one.

The line that ran the other way

Now the other half of the subject's ledger, which is not the cost of defecting but the benefit of it — and this is where the arithmetic actually turned.

Neither the men in the forests nor the families feeding them believed they could defeat the Soviet Union. What they believed was that the war would resume, or that the Atlantic Charter would be enforced, or that the West would not in the end permit what had happened. The refugees of 1944 believed the same thing and packed accordingly.

What became of that expectation is documented and it is worth setting out precisely.

From 1948 or 1949 to 1955 the British Secret Intelligence Service ran a programme for inserting agents into the Baltic republics, using former German fast boats crewed by ex-Kriegsmarine personnel under Hans-Helmut Klose, operating under the cover of a British Baltic Fishery Protection Service. The agents were Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian exiles trained in Britain and Sweden. In the Soviet counter-operation the state security service captured very nearly every one of the forty-two Baltic agents inserted, and turned many of them.

The consequence for the calculation of everybody still in the forests is exact. For several years the resistance's channel to the West was operated by the service

it was resisting. Men waited in bunkers for a signal that was drafted in Riga. Partisan leaders were drawn to meetings by contacts whose Swedish connections were run by the KGB, and the identities of the men they brought were on a desk before the boat sailed.

Precision is owed on the attribution, because the popular version has hardened. Kim Philby's responsibility for the Baltic operations specifically is contested: some accounts lay the compromise directly at his door, while others, having gone through the record, conclude that he had no knowledge of the Lithuanian missions at the relevant date and point instead to the wider penetration of British and American agencies and to genuinely poor security among the partisan networks themselves. The dispute should be reported and the finding does not depend on it, because whoever supplied the information, the channel was controlled.

Behind the operations stood a political fact that a subject could read without any secret intelligence at all. The United States refused to recognise the annexation and maintained the Baltic legations in Washington for fifty-one years, at real diplomatic cost to Moscow. And at Yalta and at Potsdam the Allies did not contest the Baltic states remaining in the Soviet Union. The doctrine said the occupation was unlawful; the policy said that nothing would be done. Any farmer in Žemaitija could hold both of those facts in his head at once, and by about 1952 most of them did.

This yields a general finding the corpus should carry. **The benefit column of resistance is set by an expectation about the world outside the order — and an outside power can therefore hold somebody else's floor up without spending anything, by declining, precisely and repeatedly, to act.** Non-recognition without enforcement is the exact configuration that keeps a moral claim alive and an operational hope dead. For half a century it was a load-bearing member of the Soviet cost column in the Baltic, and it was supplied, free of charge, by the Soviet Union's own adversaries.

The residual is a line on a form

The framework asks what the ordinary subject has left at the bottom — the last thing he holds, the thing that makes compliance rational because there is still something to lose.

In most orders it is a possession: a plot, a trade, a house, a legal disability he has learned to read as a protection. Here it was his record. What a man held was the entry against his name: his social origin, his conduct under the German occupation, whether he had relatives abroad, whether an uncle had gone east in 1949.

That entry governed the things that constituted a life. Whether he could enter higher education. What work he could be given. Where he stood in the housing queue. Whether he could get the permit to visit the island his grandmother came from. And it followed him: after 1956 many deportees were allowed to leave the settlements, but a great many were not allowed home. Of the Lithuanians, some sixty thousand returned and about thirty thousand were prohibited from settling in their own country again.

A classification has a property no possession has. It can be revoked administratively, applied retroactively, and inherited by descent. A man could not improve it by working and could lose it because of something that happened to somebody else before he was born. So the residual at the bottom of this order was uniquely fragile — and, at the same time, uniquely cheap for the order to hold, because maintaining it required no garrison, only a filing system.

There is a corollary that connects to the settlement. Because the arrangement had given nobody a title, nobody had a stake to defend; but by the same arithmetic nobody had a loss a court could restore. The residual was a permission. Permissions cannot be pleaded.

What the benefit column actually held

Here is the half that most accounts on both sides leave out, and without it the compliance of 1955 to 1988 is not legible at all — it looks like either cowardice or contentment, and it was neither.

By the 1960s the Baltic republics were the best-off corner of the Soviet Union and were known throughout it as such. The nicknames are the evidence: *our abroad*, the *Soviet West*, the *Baltic facades*. What Soviet citizens elsewhere meant by them was higher living standards, Latin alphabets, architecture and clothes that did not look Soviet, and a reputation as the union's testing ground for economic and cultural experiment, with Estonia in front. Russians and Ukrainians moved *to* these republics for work in numbers large enough to change their demography.

Concretely, for a man in Tallinn or Kaunas in 1975: an apartment in one of the new estates, though the migrants had better access to those than he did; work in an industry that was expanding; his children taught in his own language from the first year to the doctorate; a theatre, an opera, an academy and a song festival; a garden plot; and, if he lived in northern Estonia, a television aerial that could reach Helsinki.

And the comparison he could actually make was not with Sweden. It was with Pskov, two hundred kilometres east, and by that comparison he was doing well, and he knew it, and so did the men who moved in from Pskov.

This is where the corpus's account of the subsistence equilibrium has to be adjusted rather than applied. That account holds that the extractor drives the subject's share downward until it meets the revolt threshold, and that where the force is credible and the exit is shut the floor sinks toward the biological bone. Both dials here were set as hard as they are set anywhere in this collection — a demonstrated deportation and a raked coast — and the floor did not sink. Extraction was real and will be measured next, but the Baltic base was not held at subsistence; it was held above the union average.

The reason is not mercy and it is not the productivity of the terrain. It is a third consideration the model does not yet contain. **The order required the condition of these subjects to be visible to an audience whose opinion it needed** — its own population, for whom the Baltic was the demonstration that socialism produced European living standards, and the West, which was being told that three prosperous nations had joined freely. A showcase cannot be held at subsistence, because the entire function of a showcase is to be looked at.

So the model gains a term. The two dials set the floor from below, by fixing what the subject can bear and where he can go. A third thing can lift it from above: **where the extractor needs the subject's condition to be seen by a third party, the floor rises to whatever that third party has to be shown** — and it rises for reasons that have nothing whatever to do with the subject's capacity to make trouble. This also predicts the inverse, and the inverse is the more useful half: the worst-treated populations in this collection are the ones nobody was going to look at.

Why he went to work

Assemble the ledger for an ordinary man in 1975 and it is not close.

The cost of defection had been demonstrated twice within living memory, applied to households rather than to actors, and it still governed his children through an entry he could not amend. There was no exit: the frontier was shut, the coast was a permitted zone with a notation in his passport, and the last time a door had stood open was before he was born.

The benefit of compliance was an apartment, a job, his language in his children's school, a standard of living above every other republic in the union, and a fortnight at a Baltic sanatorium.

And the benefit of revolt was nothing that anyone could name. The armed resistance had been destroyed and its survivors shot or exiled; the channel by which it had communicated with the West had been operated by the KGB; and the West itself had spent three decades saying that the annexation was unlawful and doing nothing about it.

He was not a dupe. He did not believe. He was, on the information available, correct. What his compliance was — the prudent performance James Scott describes, run alongside a private account kept out of the state's hearing — is established by what happened the moment the price changed in 1988, and that belongs to a later module. What belongs here is only that the performance was rational, and that a study which treats forty years of quiet as consent has not done the arithmetic the subject did.

Reading the cost column against the framework

Four findings, of which the first and last are contributions to the model rather than applications of it.

Circumscription can be manufactured, and the manufacture is dated. Carneiro's mechanism enters this framework as a fact about terrain — populations get captured where the sea or the desert or the neighbours pen them in. This case shows a state building the condition where the geography did not supply it: a hundred kilometres of open water that several hundred families had crossed in fishing boats in 1944 was converted, by a decision of December 1944 and a secret regulation of 1946, into a permitted zone with a notation in the passport, and then held for forty years with towers and a raked strip of sand. The corpus should carry the general form: **where an order needs circumscription and does not have it, it legislates it, and the legislation is**

the most honest document that order will ever produce about its own standing with its people.

A demonstrated removal holds the middle; the apparatus polices the margin. The surveillance was real and the belief never took, so the standing rule survives. What the case adds is the sequencing and the economics. The floor was set by two operations eight years apart and then maintained for thirty-five years at a running cost that a police state would consider modest, because a threat carried out against families in front of their neighbours is a capital expenditure that does not depreciate for a generation. Where a study finds an apparatus that looks too small for the quiet it is producing, it should look backwards for the demonstration rather than concluding that the belief took.

An outside power can hold somebody else's floor up by declining to act. The benefit side of a subject's resistance calculation is set almost entirely by an expectation about the world beyond his order, and that expectation can be extinguished from outside without any assistance from the order at all. Here the extinction was double: the operational channel to the West was captured and run, and the political guarantee was withheld in the same years it was rhetorically affirmed. Non-recognition without enforcement kept the claim alive for the successor states in 1991, which mattered enormously then; and for the forty years before that it was one of the cheapest and most effective components of the Soviet cost column, paid for by Washington and London.

And a showcase cannot be held at subsistence. This is the adjustment the case forces on the just-enough equilibrium. Both dials were shut hard and the floor still stood above the union average, and the reason lies outside the two-party model: a third party had to be shown. Add the term, and the model predicts both directions — a population the extractor needs seen is held above the threshold for reasons unrelated to its own leverage, and a population nobody is going to look at is held below what its leverage alone would have secured. That second half is where the corpus's harshest cases live.

The strongest counter-position should be stated in the form its holders actually use, because it is being made now and not only about the past. The Russian scholarly account — Simonyan is representative — holds that the Soviet decades were productive for Latvia and Estonia; that the republics had few resources of their own and were preferentially invested in for their ports and transit position; that plants, power stations, harbours, airfields and roads were built and a skilled cadre trained; and that the leading position these countries

now occupy among the post-socialist states owes a real debt to that inheritance. Most of the factual content of that account is not in dispute here, and this study does not dispute it.

What this module establishes runs beside it rather than against it. Being the best-treated province of an order one did not choose is a fact about that order's requirements, not about one's consent to it; and the mechanism by which those two things come apart has just been set out. The investment was real. So was the raked beach.

What would break the reading: evidence that Baltic living standards were not in fact materially above the union average once the terms of trade are properly accounted for — which is next module's problem and where the dispute is genuinely live — or evidence that the coastal regime was a straightforward military measure whose effect on the movement of the population was incidental. The second is testable against the permit records and this study has read them only through the published summaries.

A note on sources. Instrument titles are given as the published Estonian research renders them in English: the decision of the Estonian SSR Council of People's Commissars of 29 November 1944, implemented 12 December, on the border security regime along the Gulf of Finland coast and on navigation and fishing in territorial waters, designating the islands and specified coastal areas as prohibited zones; and secret regulation No. 058 of 1946 of the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers, on the restricted border coastal belt in the Estonian SSR and the regime within it, with its requirement of special permits for movement and work inside the belt and of a corresponding notation in residents' passports. Both are cited from the published coastal-zone research and from the Estonian documentation project's account of the border regime, paraphrased; the Russian and Estonian originals have not been consulted and should be before any clause is quoted.

The 1944 flight follows the Estonian foreign ministry's published account, the Estonian archival exhibitions and the reference literature: seventy-five to eighty thousand leaving Estonia, upwards of six hundred small boats from the Estonian coast, roughly twenty-seven thousand reaching Sweden and at least forty thousand in Germany by the end of the war, the last Tallinn convoy on the evening of 21 September 1944, and the sinkings of the *Moero* on 22 September with an estimated two thousand dead and of the *Nordstern* a week later. The refugees' expectation that the Western allies would not leave the Baltic states to the Soviet Union, and the reported preference for dying at home over Siberia, are from the collected refugee testimony reproduced in those sources and are

testimony rather than statistics. The raked beaches, watchtowers and the general exclusion of Balts from their own coastlines to the late 1980s are from the Baltic Worlds survey of the region's isolation, paraphrased.

Operation Jungle follows the reference accounts and the specialist compilations: British Secret Intelligence Service insertions from 1948–49 to 1955 using former German fast boats under Hans-Helmut Klose under cover of a British Baltic Fishery Protection Service; agents recruited among Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian exiles trained in Britain and Sweden; and the Soviet counter-operation Lursen-S, in which very nearly all of the forty-two Baltic agents inserted were captured and many turned. The dispute over Kim Philby's specific responsibility for the Baltic missions is reported as it stands in the literature, with the Lithuanian-American review of Grose and Macintyre concluding against direct Philby responsibility for the Lukša episode and pointing to wider penetration and local security failures, and other accounts attributing the compromise to him. Mart Männik's posthumously published memoir is noted as a participant account that has been translated and would repay direct reading.

The Latvian security-service figures are from the reporting on the 2018–19 publication of the recovered card index: something over twenty-four thousand agents recruited between 1953 and 1991, of which roughly four to four and a half thousand cards survive, with the remainder removed to Moscow or destroyed; the ethnic breakdown showing about three-fifths Latvian is from the University of Florida project's tabulation of the published index. The figure should be treated as the archive's own and not as a census of collaboration, for the reason the Latvian historians themselves stress: the surviving index is a fraction, and it is weighted toward the late 1980s.

The deportee return figures for Lithuania — about sixty thousand returning and about thirty thousand prohibited from settling in Lithuania again — are as the reference accounts give them. The characterisation of the Baltic republics as the *Soviet West* and *our abroad*, with higher living standards, distinct architecture and a reputation as the union's reform testing ground, follows Misiunas and Taagepera, Brüggemann, Gorsuch, Purs and the recent *Journal of Baltic Studies* survey of the trope, paraphrased. The counter-account of the Soviet period as economically productive for Latvia and Estonia is Renald Simonyan's, summarised from his published abstract and reported here as the

position it is; the addendum's instruction to report the readings as each side states them applies with full force to this module and to the next.

Two limitations. This module has read the specialist literature on the border regime, the intelligence operations and the security apparatus through published research, reporting and reference accounts rather than through the archives themselves, and the points where that matters most are flagged in the text. And the claim that Baltic living standards stood materially above the union average is stated here on the strength of the qualitative literature and of the migration evidence; it is quantified, contested and adjudicated, so far as it can be, in the extraction module that follows, and if it fails there this module's fourth finding fails with it.

MODULE SIX

A POST OFFICE BOX IN NARVA

Module 6 · Extraction — an order with no tax schedule, whose instruments were the plan, the administered price and the jurisdiction of the enterprise; two ledgers of the same forty-four years that disagree by sixteen billion roubles; what is taken when what a place has is not a crop but a position, and in what currency that bill is presented; and the mine that was never dug, where the whole arrangement began to come apart

No schedule to find

The instruction this study carries is that in a Soviet acquisition there is no tax schedule to look for, and that the instrument is the plan and the procurement price: a state monopsony sets a compulsory delivery and the price it will pay, and where that price sits below the cost of production the difference is the extraction.

That is the right place to start and it is not quite where this case lives, because the Baltic was not an agricultural periphery for most of the period under examination. It was an industrialised region of a planned economy, and by the 1960s the interesting flows were not grain deliveries but electricity, oil products, transit, machinery and chemicals.

So the module has to identify the instrument before it can measure anything, and the instrument is visible in one structural fact. Something like ninety per cent of Baltic cross-border merchandise flows were with other Soviet republics; those inter-republic flows amounted to roughly half of Baltic gross domestic product; and all of it moved inside a single rouble area at administered prices, with the money supply outside the republics' governments' control.

Read that plainly. About half of what these economies produced crossed a border at a price that nobody in the republic had set, denominated in a currency whose quantity was decided elsewhere, on quantities fixed in a plan drafted in Moscow.

That is the extraction instrument, and its defining property is that it has no rate. A tariff can be read off a schedule. A tithe can be counted in sacks. A hut tax has a figure and a due date and somebody's signature. A transfer price has none of those things: it is detectable only by asking what the same good would have fetched somewhere the price was formed by something other than a ministry — and that question, inside the Soviet Union, had no answer that anyone could compute at the time or has been able to compute since without choosing a set of shadow prices, which is to say without choosing the answer.

Everything in the rest of this module follows from that, including the fact that the two most serious attempts to settle the account arrive at opposite conclusions.

The two ledgers

The instruction here is to report the dispute, set out what each side counts, and decline to adjudicate. That instruction is right and this module obeys it, but it is worth saying why it is right rather than treating it as good manners.

The Russian account, of which Renald Simonyan's is a representative scholarly statement, holds that the Soviet decades were productive for Latvia and Estonia; that the republics possessed few of the resources their economies required and were dependent on supply from outside; that they were nevertheless preferentially invested in because of their geography and their ports; that industrial plants, power stations, harbours, airfields and highways were built; that a skilled technical cadre was trained both locally and in the leading institutes of Moscow and Leningrad; and that the position these countries now occupy among the post-socialist states owes a substantial debt to that inheritance. In its cruder political form the same account has occasionally produced the suggestion that the Baltic states should reimburse Russia for the infrastructure.

The Baltic account is now archival. The Latvian economic historian Gatis Krūmiņš, working from Soviet state bank documents left behind in the Bank of Latvia and the Latvian state archive after 1991 — and subsequently from comparable documents located in Estonia and Lithuania — has published a balance of the flows between the Latvian republic and the union budget for 1946 to 1990. On his figures, 24.684 billion roubles were spent in Latvia from the USSR budget over those years, and 40.645 billion roubles went from Latvia

into it: a net movement of 15.961 billion roubles toward the centre. He also finds substantial parts of the republic's own budget allocated to the Soviet military stationed on its territory.

Both accounts should be held with their caveats attached, and the caveats are not symmetrical but they are real on both sides.

Against the Russian account: it is an argument about gross investment which does not attempt a balance, and it treats the construction of capacity as a transfer to the republic without asking whose capacity it was, who worked it, where the product went, or at what price it was accounted for.

Against the archival account: a great many of the relevant records remain in Russia and are not accessible; rouble sums summed across forty-four years of a non-convertible currency and repeated price reforms are not straightforwardly comparable; and the deepest problem is the one already stated — that any balance struck in administered prices is a balance struck in the extractor's own units. Krūmiņš's figures are the best archival work available and they are a serious contribution. They are also, unavoidably, denominated in roubles whose meaning was set by the party that the balance is being struck against.

So the module records the finding that matters more than either total. **In a planned economy the direction of extraction is not readable from the accounts, because the accounts are written by the extractor in units he set.** This is not a limitation of the historian; it is a property of the instrument, and it is one of the instrument's advantages to whoever operates it. A colonial customs schedule can be audited by anybody with a copy of it. A transfer price cannot be audited at all, and thirty-five years after the fact two competent scholarly traditions working the same decades reach conclusions that differ in sign.

Which means the corpus's usual move — follow the surplus — needs a substitute here, and there is one.

The comparator

Where prices are not formed, the instrument to reach for is not the ledger but the comparator: not what the accounts say the province was worth, but how the province fared against the nearest country it was *not* taken from.

Two comparisons are available and they point in opposite directions. Both are true and neither cancels the other, and any account that reports only one is doing politics rather than arithmetic.

Against the union, the Baltic republics stood above the mean throughout, and this settles a question left open in the previous module. On the estimates published by Zenonas Norkus, Lithuanian output per head in 1938 stood about 6 per cent above the Soviet mean, Estonian about 19 per cent, Latvian about 39 per cent; and in 1989 the Lithuanian figure was about 30 per cent above the mean, the Latvian about 38 and the Estonian about 36.5. So the showcase was a showcase: these were the best-off republics of the union at the beginning and at the end, and Lithuania converged upward toward its neighbours across the period.

Against the country they had started level with, the picture inverts. Estonia and Finland were at broadly comparable levels of income in the 1930s. The estimates of Estonian income measured against Finnish across 1960 to 1988 show a marked relative decline, and the caution the source itself attaches should be attached here too: the calculation rests on nominal income converted at annualised markka–rouble rates and is an approximation rather than a measurement.

Set the two side by side and stop. Better than every other republic in the union; worse than the neighbour across the gulf whose language its people could hear on the radio and, in the north, watch on television.

What was actually taken

Aggregates conceal, so name the flows.

Energy. Estonia sits on the largest commercially exploited oil shale deposit in the world, and the Soviet Union built accordingly. The Baltic and Eesti power stations near Narva — on the order of 1,390 and 1,610 megawatts, largely operational by the late 1960s — were among the largest oil-shale-fired plants ever constructed, and Soviet Estonia became a net exporter of energy, ranking on one specialist account third in the world in energy production per head. Shale gas went to Leningrad. What stayed behind was the spent shale: artificial mountains of processing debris across Ida-Virumaa, and air and water loads that outlast every plant that produced them.

Transit. Latvia was the region's main transit country and was, on the standard accounts, held more tightly than its neighbours precisely because of it: the largest Soviet military installations in the region, the best ports, and the industrial enterprises at Riga that made the union's telephones and minibuses.

Agriculture. The compulsory-delivery mechanism the addendum describes did operate, and hardest in the Stalin years, when quotas and procurement prices squeezed the newly collectivised farms. In the later decades the flow reversed: Baltic agriculture became productive and heavily subsidised, and by the 1980s the transfer on that account ran inward. Both halves belong in the record.

And uranium.

A post office box in Narva

In 1946 the Soviet state took a ruined oil shale plant on the Estonian coast between Narva and Tallinn — built by a Swedish company in the 1920s, worked by the Germans with camp labour, and sabotaged by them on their retreat — and rebuilt it as Kombinat No. 7, under the direct authority of Lavrentiy Beria's First Chief Directorate, the body charged with delivering Stalin an atomic bomb.

The object was uranium from the local dictyonema shale. Construction was done by prisoners of war, convicts and forced labourers, among them many Balts; by late 1946 something like eighteen thousand builders were on the site. By 1952 the plant had separated several tens of tons of Estonian uranium. Local tradition holds that some of it went into the device tested at Semipalatinsk on 29 August 1949, and that tradition is repeated in the literature by people who also say plainly that they have not seen the documentation; it is reported here on that basis and should not be relied on.

The town that grew around it was closed. Its residents were forbidden to disclose where they lived and used a post office box in Narva as their official address. It did not appear on maps and remained classified until 1991. It was populated almost entirely by Russian-speaking workers — engineers, chemists, technicians, administrators — recruited from across the union, and Estonians were a negligible minority in it throughout the Soviet period.

Then the decisive fact, which is easy to read past. **The local ore was poor, the extraction from dictyonema shale proved extremely difficult, and the mine was given up.** The plant did not close. It ran for four decades on richer ore shipped in from Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and what it left on the Estonian shoreline is a tailings repository holding on the order of twelve million tonnes of radioactive and chemically toxic waste — with the earliest waste, on

the accounts of those who later worked on the problem, having gone straight into the sea. The remediation, funded by the European Union and states around the Baltic with some American assistance, was completed in 2009.

Read the sequence and the module's central finding is already visible. The resource under the site turned out not to be worth having and was abandoned within a few years. The installation stayed for forty more. What the site was actually worth was never the shale. It was a deep-water coast, a railway, a hundred and seventy kilometres from Leningrad, and an empty patch of ground on which a town could be built from nothing and filled with people brought in for the purpose.

The ore was a pretext. The position was the asset.

Extraction as position

The framework offers a fork at this point in every case: extraction as a *rate*, drawn off a flow, which needs the native alive and producing and therefore settles toward an equilibrium; or extraction as *dispossession*, which wants the land itself, has no setting below the revolt threshold, and tends toward removal of the people on it.

The Baltic sits on neither prong, and the reason is that what was extracted was neither the produce of the ground nor the ground itself. It was the **position**: an ice-free frontage on the Baltic, the ports through which a continental empire reached the sea, a shale bed that could power Leningrad, a coast for a fleet, and a hundred and seventy kilometres of rail to the second city of the union.

A position is realised in only one way. You build capacity on it — plants, harbours, power stations, closed towns — and capacity requires workers.

And here the mechanism closes, because these republics had no workers to spare. They had low birth rates and had, within a decade, lost several hundred thousand people to war, to the flight of 1944, to the deportations of 1941 and 1949 and to the forests. The demographic literature on the period says it without embarrassment: high labour demand generated by Soviet development strategy, combined with slow population growth in the receiving republics, produced sustained in-migration across the whole postwar period, and the migrants — who had privileged access to the new housing — reshaped the urban populations.

So the finding, and it is the module's contribution: **where a conquest extracts position rather than product, the bill is presented in demography.** The native is not taxed to the bone, because that is not what the position requires; he is not cleared off the land, because settlement is not the object; he is *diluted*, as a by-product of an industrial programme he was not needed for and was not consulted about.

The arithmetic of that bill is in the censuses. Russians in Latvia rose from about 10.6 per cent before the war to 26.6 per cent by the census of 1959; in Estonia from about 8 per cent to 20.1; in Lithuania from about 2 per cent to 8.5. By 1989, Estonia was about 62 per cent Estonian and Latvia barely more than half Latvian, with far lower shares in the principal cities; Lithuania, less urbanised, with a higher birth rate and — crucially — less of the coastline and less of the energy geology, remained about four-fifths Lithuanian.

That last comparison deserves to be stated as a finding rather than left as a coincidence, because it is the case's own internal control. Three countries, one apparatus, one doctrine, one half-century — and the demographic outcome tracks not the intensity of the repression, which fell hardest on Lithuania, but the *industrial siting decisions*. The republic that was hit hardest by deportation and insurgency is the one that kept its population, and the two that were quietest are the two whose ports, shale and coast the union needed. Whatever else the Soviet demographic transformation of the Baltic was, on this evidence it was not primarily a policy of national dilution. It was the labour requirement of an extraction of position, and the national consequence followed from it.

This also lets the corpus close out an item the field manual has been holding open. The manual has been carrying, pending confirmation, the idea of a *buffer or positional colony* — a holding kept for where it sits rather than what it yields, with the extraction term negative and returns arriving as a contingent payout rather than an income stream. The Baltic confirms the family and requires it to be split, because this is a positional holding that was *worked*. The position was not merely held against a rival; it was built on, monetised and drawn from continuously. So the family has two members: **the buffer, which is only held and where the extraction term genuinely is negative; and the worked position, where the extraction term is disputed rather than negative, and where the characteristic cost to the native is neither a rate nor a dispossession but a share of his own population.**

The mine that was never dug

The order extracted for forty years without ever having to argue about it in public. The first argument it had to have, it lost — and the subject of the argument was extraction.

Moscow's interest in the phosphorite of Lääne-Viru County dates from the early 1970s. Proposals for the Toolse deposit north of Rakvere gave way in the early 1980s to plans for the Rakvere deposit itself. The plans were not published. Scientists inside the Estonian Academy of Sciences — Endel Lippmaa among them — knew about them and opposed them from an early stage, and had done so since the 1970s.

On 25 February 1987 a deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Fertiliser Industries announced the decision to proceed, on Estonian television, on a popular programme, and in direct contradiction of what the republic's own party leaders had been saying. That date is generally taken as the start of what Estonians call the Phosphorite War.

The public objection was environmental, and it was not confected: the deposits lay in the Pandivere uplands, on the watershed where a large share of Estonia's rivers rise, and the estimates in circulation held that up to forty per cent of the country's water supply was at risk from the excavation of radioactive-bearing rock.

The private objection, which everyone understood and which the sources describe as the more covert of the two, was that the mines would require a workforce the republic did not have, and would therefore bring tens of thousands of workers from elsewhere. A residential district at Rakvere had already been designed to accommodate them.

The campaign ran through the cultural press — the writers' weekly *Sirp ja Vasar* — through student assemblies at Tartu, through marches, banners and petitions, exploiting the narrow opening that glasnost had made for criticism. It was the first broad, open, non-violent challenge to Moscow's authority in Estonia since the war. In September 1987 the plans were cancelled.

And in the same month Edgar Savisaar, Siim Kallas, Tiit Made and Mikk Titma published the proposal for *Isemajandav Eesti* — a self-managing Estonia, an economically autonomous republic that would hold and account for its own product.

That sequence is the module's last finding and it should be left exactly as it stands. For thirty-five years the ledger came out for compliance and nothing moved. What moved was not the flag, not the language, not the memory of the deportations — all of which had been there the whole time. It was a mining decision taken in Moscow, announced on Estonian television by a deputy minister, which threatened the water and would have imported a town. Within seven months of the announcement the plan was dead, and within the same month four economists had published a demand to control the accounts.

The national movement did not begin with a flag. It began with a mine that was never dug and a proposal about bookkeeping.

Reading extraction against the framework

Four things, of which the second is the contribution.

The instrument has no rate, and that is what it is for. Where extraction runs through administered prices inside a closed currency area, there is nothing to audit — no schedule, no tariff, no assessment, no due date. The corpus should record this as a distinct extractive technology and note its defining advantage: it does not merely conceal the take, it makes the take *undecidable*, so that the argument about it can be conducted indefinitely by honest people on both sides. Two scholarly traditions working the same forty-four years reach conclusions that differ in sign, and neither is lying.

Extraction as position — the third prong of the fork, with the bill payable in population. Rate-extraction needs the native producing; dispossession-extraction needs him gone; position-extraction needs neither, because what it wants is the ground's location rather than its yield or its soil. It realises the position by building on it, building requires labour, and where the native population cannot supply the labour it is imported. The characteristic harm is therefore neither immiseration nor removal but demographic dilution, arriving as an industrial by-product rather than as a policy — which is exactly why it is so hard to argue about, and why the argument, when it finally came in 1987, had to be conducted in the language of groundwater.

Where prices are not formed, use the comparator rather than the ledger. *Follow the surplus* presupposes prices that mean something. Where they do not, the honest instrument is the counterfactual neighbour: how did the territory fare against the nearest comparable country it was not taken from? For the

Baltic the answer is double and both halves must be stated — materially above every other republic of the union throughout, and materially behind the Finland it had started level with. A study that reports only the first is writing the order's brief; a study that reports only the second is writing its opponents'.

And an order that has extracted quietly for decades becomes audible at the moment the extraction requires a new decision. The floor here was set long before; the settlement had bought nobody; the formation had been funded and hollowed. None of that produced a public argument. A proposal to open a mine did — because a new extraction, unlike a running one, has to be announced, costed and sited, and announcing it created for the first time a specific, local, deniable-by-nobody question on which a population could take a position without taking a position on the union.

The strongest counter-position, stated as its holders state it: that the Soviet Union built in the Baltic on a scale the three republics could never have financed themselves; that the power stations, ports, plants and technical institutes were real and are still standing and still earning; that the republics ended the period as the wealthiest part of the union rather than the poorest; and that a balance struck only on what left, and not on what was put in, is not a balance.

The answer this module offers is not a denial of any of that. It is that the two ledgers cannot be reconciled in roubles, that the comparator is the only instrument that survives the price problem, and that on the comparator both propositions hold at once — the investment was real and the divergence from Finland was real. And that the cost which does not appear in either ledger, because neither side denominates in it, was paid in the composition of three populations, by people who were not asked and who were told, when they finally asked about it in 1987, that the subject was fertiliser.

What would break this reading: if the Gosbank figures turn out to record gross budgetary flows rather than a true balance, or if the investment made through the all-union ministries — which is most of the capital that was put in — sits outside the republican budget lines Krūmiņš is working from, in which case his net figure would be measuring something narrower than it appears to. That is a real possibility and this study has read the work through its published reporting rather than in the original. It should be checked before the accounting module relies on the number.

A note on sources. No primary instrument is quoted in this module; where figures are given they are attributed and given as their sources give them.

The structural description of Baltic trade — roughly ninety per cent of cross-border merchandise flows with other Soviet republics, inter-republic flows at about half of Baltic GDP, and the republics inside a rouble area with money supply outside their governments' control — is from Philip Hanson's 1992 analysis of the Baltic economies' adjustment problem, paraphrased from its published abstract.

The two ledgers: the Russian scholarly account is Renald Simonyan's, summarised from the published abstract of his article on the Soviet period of Latvian and Estonian economic development, and reported here as the position it is. The archival balance is Gatis Krūmiņš's, taken from the Latvian public broadcaster's reporting of his research and from his published interview: USSR Gosbank documents held in the Latvian state archive and the Bank of Latvia, with comparable material later located in Estonia and Lithuania; 24.684 billion roubles spent in Latvia from the USSR budget between 1946 and 1990 against 40.645 billion going to the union budget, a net 15.961 billion; and substantial republican budget allocations to the Soviet military stationed in Latvia. This study has read that work through the reporting and not in the original, and the caveat entered in the text about all-union ministry investment should be treated as an open question rather than a criticism.

The comparative output figures are Zenonas Norkus's, as given in his published work on Baltic economic growth under foreign occupations: 1938 GDP per capita above the USSR mean by about 6 per cent (Lithuania), 19 per cent (Estonia) and 39 per cent (Latvia); 1989 figures of about 30, 36.5 and 38 per cent respectively, with the author's own reservation that differences in living standards were greater than the output figures suggest because of the larger share of capital formation and military spending in the Soviet economy. The Estonia–Finland comparison is from the ECIPE review of Baltic economic policy, with that source's own warning retained: the series rests on nominal income data converted at annualised markka–rouble rates and should be read cautiously.

The energy material — the Baltic and Eesti power stations at about 1,390 and 1,610 megawatts, largely operational by the late 1960s; Soviet Estonia as a

net energy exporter ranking third in the world in energy production per head; shale gas to Leningrad; and the spent-shale landscape of Ida-Virumaa — is from the *Environment and History* article on energy and water planning in Soviet Estonia and from the reference and journalistic literature on the oil shale industry. Latvia's position as the region's main transit country and the tighter control that followed from it is from the Peterson Institute account of Latvia's post-Soviet transition.

Sillamäe: the rebuilding of the ruined Swedish-built oil shale plant as Kombinat No. 7 between 1946 and 1948 under Beria's First Chief Directorate; the object of extracting uranium from local dictyonema shale; construction by prisoners of war, convicts and forced labourers including many Balts, with about eighteen thousand builders by late 1946; several tens of tons of Estonian uranium separated by 1952; the abandonment of the local mine because the shale proved too difficult and the plant's subsequent four decades of operation on ore imported from Czechoslovakia and East Germany; the closed status of the town, the prohibition on residents disclosing their location, the Narva post box address and the classification until 1991; the almost entirely Russian-speaking recruited workforce; the tailings repository of approximately twelve million tonnes on the Baltic shoreline, the early dumping into the sea, and the remediation completed in 2009 with European Union and other assistance — are drawn from the reference accounts, the Deep Baltic and *New Eastern Europe* reporting, and the participant account of the international remediation effort. The claim that Sillamäe uranium went into the device tested at Semipalatinsk on 29 August 1949 is reported in the literature explicitly as local tradition by a writer who states that she has not seen documentation for it, and is carried here on the same terms.

The demographic figures are from the reference literature: Russians in Latvia rising from about 10.6 per cent before the war to 26.6 per cent in 1959, in Estonia from about 8 to 20.1 per cent, and in Lithuania from about 2 to 8.5 per cent, on the 1966 *Foreign Affairs* survey of the republics under Soviet rule; and the end-of-period shares of about 62 per cent Estonian in Estonia, slightly over half Latvian in Latvia and about four-fifths Lithuanian in Lithuania, with lower titular shares in the major cities, from the standard reference accounts. The link between Soviet development strategy's labour demand, slow local population growth and sustained in-migration, and the migrants' privileged access to new housing, is from the published survey of Baltic housing estates, paraphrased.

The Phosphorite War follows the reference accounts, the Estonian oil shale industry's own published history of the episode, and the nonviolent-action database entry: Moscow's interest from the early 1970s, the shift from the Toolse to the Rakvere deposit, the unpublished plans and the opposition inside the Estonian Academy of Sciences including Endel Lippmaa, the announcement by a deputy minister of the USSR Ministry of Fertiliser Industries on Estonian television on 25 February 1987 contradicting the republic's own party leaders, the Pandivere watershed and the estimate that up to forty per cent of Estonia's water supply was at risk, the covert demographic objection and the Rakvere district designed for incoming workers, the campaign through *Sirp ja Vasar* and the Tartu student assemblies, and the cancellation in September 1987. The *Isemajandav Eesti* proposal of September 1987 by Edgar Savisaar, Siim Kallas, Tiit Made and Mikk Titma is given as the Estonian sources give it, including their own characterisation of it as a direct consequence of the phosphorite campaign.

Two limitations. The archival balance at the centre of this module has been read through reporting rather than in the original, and the specific question raised in the text about all-union ministry investment has not been resolved. And the agricultural side of the extraction — the procurement quotas and prices of the Stalin years, and the scale of the later subsidy — is treated here in outline only; it deserves the quantification the addendum asks for and does not get it in this module.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE SEVEN

AS IF IT DID NOT EXIST AT ALL

Module 7 · Information and suppression — where this collection's standing finding about colonial censorship fails in every particular; the difference between forbidding a fact to circulate and ruling that it was never a fact; a whole literature classified top secret so that it could be said not to exist; a television mast at Espoo that no apparatus could switch off; and a fifty-year argument over one sheet of paper, which the state lost

The finding that does not survive

This module has to begin by discarding a result, and it is better to do that at the top than to arrive at it apologetically at the bottom.

Across nine European colonial cases the collection looked for a censorship apparatus facing homeward and did not find one. What it found was an apparatus facing inward, at the conquered, and toward the metropole almost nothing at all — because nothing needed hiding. The facts travelled. They were printed in official reports, laid before parliaments, argued in newspapers, and they moved nothing. The dominant register at the metropolitan end was inattention. Lugard published what he might have concealed, at one shilling and threepence, and there was no question in the House.

None of that is true here, in any particular.

The censorship establishment in these three republics was large, permanent, expensive, and pointed in both directions at once. It reached the printing house, the library, the antiquarian dealer, the market bookstall and the private shelf. It ran for fifty years, was still hiring in the 1980s, and was dismantled only when the state that operated it was months from dissolution. And the single most important fact in the case — the instrument by which the territory had been assigned — was denied for half a century, across three general secretaries, in the face of a published text, and conceded only under pressure from two million people holding hands.

The rule that produced the earlier finding, however, survives intact, and it explains the reversal. *What a regime bothers to hide is a map of what its audience would actually punish.* In the European colonies, the audience whose belief funded the enterprise would punish nothing, so nothing was hidden and the censor's absence measured the public's threshold. Here the audience was not a public. It was a doctrine — and a doctrine punishes contradiction absolutely, because unlike a public it cannot ventilate a scandal and move on. It has no threshold. Any single contradicting fact, admitted, is fatal to the whole.

So the corpus should carry the finding in the sharper form this case forces: **the size of a censorship apparatus measures the revisability of the order's governing claim, not the severity of its conduct.** An order whose legitimacy rests on a public's indifference needs no censor however badly it behaves. An order whose legitimacy rests on a proposition that cannot be qualified needs one permanently, however well.

Glavlit, and what an establishment looks like when it is needed

The Estonian branch was created by decree of the republic's council of people's commissars on 23 October 1940 — before the annexation was three months old, and before the first deportation. Its task, as the departmental record sets it out, was to prevent the appearance in print and in the media of military, state and economic secrets, and beyond that to prevent the publication of any idea or information unacceptable to the regime, and to keep such material out of the libraries. It operated both halves of the trade: pre-publication censorship, reviewing control copies before a work appeared, and post-publication censorship, physically destroying or locking away works that had turned out to be unsuitable.

The apparatus produced its own histories. On 20 October 1948 Leonida Päll, head of the Estonian Glavlit, submitted to Nikolai Karotamm, then the republic's party secretary, a departmental account of the office's first eight years — its fields of activity, its principal officers, its concrete achievements, and a record of the more important works and authors that had passed through its gears.

The establishments were not enormous in headcount and did not need to be, because the work was chokepoint work. At the turn of the 1940s and 1950s,

twenty-one censors were appointed in Latvia and twenty-one in Lithuania; of the Lithuanian twenty-one, eleven were of Lithuanian origin, eight Jewish, and the remaining two Russian and Polish.

Where the scale shows is in the libraries.

In Latvia, on the published accounts, something like five hundred thousand Latvian publications were removed from the collections in the early years and replaced with Soviet and Russian material; around 2.6 million publications were destroyed between 1944 and 1954; and 359,000 items were transferred into restricted special funds established in 1946. The reach extended past the institutions: Glavlit employees took part in arrests carried out by the ministry of state security and confiscated private libraries, and the antiquarian trade and the book stalls at the markets were worked over alongside them. The confidential confiscation lists survive — printed with the notes *for official use* and *distributed by list*, and naming Latvian, German and Russian titles, including a large part of the Latvian avant-garde and the books of Russian émigrés published in Riga.

Access to what had been locked away was rationed by a triad: the republic's Glavlit, the party's central committee departments, and the state security committee. Permission to consult the most restricted material had to come from the head of the external relations department or of the propaganda and agitation department of the party central committee; only security personnel were exempt from asking.

And the traffic figures are the sentence that ought to be read twice. Visits to the National Library of Latvia's restricted holdings numbered 409 in the year 1974, rising to 1,023 by 1985.

Half a million volumes of a national literature, and four hundred and nine admissions a year to look at it.

As if it did not exist at all

Now the distinction this study is instructed to make, because the two instruments are not the same and the second is the one the framework did not previously have.

Censorship concedes that a fact is a fact and forbids its circulation. It is ordinary, universal, and present here in industrial quantity.

Annulment rules that the fact was not a fact.

The Latvian libraries supply the cleanest small instance in the collection. From 1972 the all-union censorship classified Baltic exile publications as **top secret**. The librarians' own retrospective description of what that produced is the exact formulation the framework needs: officially, Latvian exile literature was classified top secret, *as if it did not exist at all* — while in private the liberal exile magazines and various books circulated discreetly from hand to hand, exile radio was listened to, and recordings of exile music were bought.

Consider what the reclassification did that a ban would not have done.

A banned book is a book the state admits exists and objects to. There is a list, and a reason, and an argument implied. A book classified as a state secret has been removed from the category of things about which an argument is possible: there is nothing to object to, because officially there is nothing there. And the classification does a second thing. It changes the nature of the offence. Reading a forbidden book is a sin against orthodoxy; possessing a state secret is a crime against security. The penalty and the investigating organ both change, and the subject knows it.

The paradox the Latvian librarians record — that the material circulated freely in private throughout — is not evidence that the instrument failed. It is evidence of what the instrument was for. **Annulment does not aim at knowledge. It aims at sayability.** Everybody may know; nobody may say; and the fact is removed not from the population's mind but from the set of propositions that can be uttered in public without the utterance itself constituting the offence.

Which yields a function the corpus should record, because it is not obvious and it is not incidental. An annulled fact identifies its own dissidents. If a proposition is merely forbidden, a person may believe it privately and never be detected. If a proposition has been ruled not to exist, then anyone who states it aloud has, by the single act of stating it, declared himself — not as someone who disagrees, but as someone who is in possession of something he should not have. **Annulment is a detection instrument as well as a suppression instrument**, and it works better as the first than the second.

The document

The largest annulment in this collection is a single sheet of paper, and by the 1980s the entire information war of the case was being fought over whether it existed.

The Soviet prosecutor at Nuremberg described the secret protocol as a forgery. The United States published the captured German copy in 1948. Andrei Gromyko, foreign minister for twenty-eight years, called its existence a lie. It was conceded by a commission under Alexander Yakovlev and by the Congress of People's Deputies on 24 December 1989, in a resolution which still recorded that the original had not been found; the document itself was declassified in 1992.

The structural point is easy to miss and it is the whole of the module. **The Soviet state was not concealing a text from a population that did not know it.** The text had been in print in the West for forty years, was read on foreign radio, and circulated in samizdat. What was being maintained was not secrecy. It was the impossibility of saying the thing inside the order — annulment operating at the scale of a state's foundational claim about itself.

And the opponents worked out exactly what that meant, and aimed there.

On 23 August 1979, the fortieth anniversary of the pact, forty-five citizens of the three republics addressed a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the governments of the Soviet Union and of both German states, and to the signatories of the Atlantic Charter. The great majority of the signatories were Lithuanian — the counts in the sources differ between thirty-seven and thirty-eight — with four Estonians and, on the differing accounts, four or seven Latvians; five Moscow dissidents then added their names, among them Andrei Sakharov, Viktor Nekipelov, Tatyana Velikanova, Malva Landa and Arina Ginzburg, bringing the total to about fifty.

The demand was precisely calibrated. Not independence first, and not an accounting for the deportations. It asked that the pact and its secret protocols be **disclosed**; that they be declared **null and void from the moment of signing**; and that the independence of the Baltic states be restored. It attacked the annulment with an annulment, and it asked the state to concede a document rather than a wrong.

The Estonian sources note the feature that made it different from everything before it: it was the first non-anonymous political request that people signed with their own names.

What that cost is on the record. Everyone connected with the document or its distribution was punished; those not arrested lost their work. Mart Niklus, who had already served eight years in the Mordovian camps between 1958 and 1966, was arrested in 1980, sentenced to ten years, served eight, and was released in 1988. Jüri Kukk, arrested in the same year, died in 1981 in the prison hospital at Vologda after a hunger strike. Enn Tarto, imprisoned from 1956 to 1960 and again from 1962 to 1967, went back in 1983 and came out in 1988.

What it achieved is also on the record, and it went out through the one channel the apparatus could not close. By the evening of 23 August the appeal was being discussed on the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe. The *New York Times* printed it on 25 August. And on 13 January 1983 the European Parliament adopted a resolution in support of its demands — the first official position taken in support of the Baltic states by any international organisation.

The rest of the sequence is dates. On 23 August 1987 a group formed for the public disclosure of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact held a demonstration in the Hirvepark in Tallinn, demanding in the open air what the appeal had demanded in a smuggled letter. On 23 August 1989 about two million people formed a chain from Tallinn through Riga to Vilnius. On 24 December 1989 the Congress of People's Deputies conceded.

Set that beside the colonial cases, where every fact circulated freely and nothing happened. **This order's information war was fought over the existence of one document, for fifty years, and the order lost it.**

The mast at Espoo

In 1971 the Finnish Broadcasting Company put up a new television mast at Espoo, outside Helsinki. It was not built for Estonia and nobody in Finland intended it to reach Estonia. It reached Estonia.

What followed is one of the more human passages in this study. Since the signal could only be taken cleanly on the northern coast, technical men became locally valuable: every kolkhoz workshop had somebody who could build a *Finnish block* — a converter for the incompatible broadcast standard — for a consideration, along with the outdoor aerial to go with it, and one of those

aerials was still standing on a roof at Türi, a hundred kilometres inland, decades later. Where the signal could not be had at home, families practised what Estonians called television tourism and travelled north to watch.

The audience figures, on Hagi Šein's estimates, are the sort of number that decides an argument. Between 1974 and 1979, average weekly consumption of Finnish television among Estonian residents ran close to thirteen per cent, against five per cent for Moscow's central television.

The authorities made repeated efforts to restrict access to broadcasts they described as ideologically and morally harmful. There is a persistent account that Moscow pressed Finland to move the transmitter and that the Finns replied that it was technically impossible; that story is journalistic and is reported here as such, and would repay checking. What is not in doubt is the outcome the Estonian historiography draws: this window gave Estonians more information about current world affairs, and more access to contemporary Western culture, than any other group in the Soviet Union.

The framework reading is worth stating carefully, because it identifies a limit on the seam that the corpus has not previously met.

The interpreter's position works two valves — feeding the authorised reading and starving the rival one — and the outflow valve has always been, in every case in this collection, a matter of cost. Books can be seized, presses licensed, typewriters registered, borders raked; each of those costs something, and the order pays it or does not. **The Espoo signal is the first channel in the corpus for which there was no price at which it could be closed**, because closing it would have required an act inside a country the order did not govern and could not afford to coerce. The valve was not expensive. It was broken.

And the second feature is the one that made it corrosive, and it inverts the intuition. The signal carried no propaganda. It carried a Finnish news bulletin, advertisements, and *Dallas*. What crossed the gulf was therefore not an argument about the Soviet Union — which the apparatus was extremely well equipped to answer, having answered arguments for fifty years — but an unarguable demonstration of an ordinary Nordic standard of living and an ordinary civic register, delivered by people who were not addressing Estonians at all. **A hostile broadcast can be refuted. A game show cannot.**

One temptation should be refused. Estonia had the window; Estonia also led the reform movement in the late 1980s. It is very inviting to run a line between those two facts and this study will not run it, because Estonia also had the

earliest party purge and therefore the most practised leadership, the highest output per head, the phosphorite deposit and the most articulate scientific establishment. What the case contains is one republic with an unclosable foreign channel and two without, which is a variable worth carrying into the collapse module rather than a conclusion to be announced here.

What could not be said

The inventory of foreclosed descriptions is short and it is the same list the doctrine generated: occupation; annexation; colony; the deportations as events with dates and numbers; the interwar republics as states rather than as bourgeois-fascist regimes; and the pact.

The mechanism behind the list is the one this study takes as given rather than re-arguing. Where a governing claim cannot be revised, a result that contradicts it cannot be an error in the claim, so it must be an error in a person — which converts an epistemic problem into a personnel problem and generates an unbounded demand for investigators. The Baltic case supplies the personnel side without difficulty: the historian dismissed and arrested in 1950, the song festival's conductors taken the same year, the national communists purged in 1959, and by the 1980s the signatories of a letter.

One debt from earlier in this study should be settled honestly rather than quietly discharged. The instruction this study carries includes a claim that in Soviet cases the internal documents generally show the same language as the public ones, and that this is itself a finding. This module cannot establish that, because it has not read the party correspondence. What it can report is consistent with the claim and falls short of demonstrating it: the Estonian Glavlit's internal report of 1948 — written by a censor to his own party secretary, with no external audience whatever — is composed in the same vocabulary as the material the office released; and the Latvian classification of exile literature was an internal instrument that treated the non-existence of that literature as an operative administrative fact rather than as a line for public consumption. Both point the same way. Neither proves it, and the claim should stay open until somebody works the files.

Reading information against the framework

Four things.

The empty column was a finding about audiences, not about colonies. The rule beneath it survives and is confirmed here by inversion. What a regime hides maps what its audience would punish; and where the audience is a public that will not punish, the regime hides nothing and publishes its own atrocities at one and threepence. Where the audience is a doctrine, it must hide everything that contradicts, because a doctrine has no threshold below which a fact can be absorbed. The corpus should therefore restate the finding: **the presence and size of a censor measure the revisability of the governing claim, not the severity of the conduct** — which explains both the European colonies' empty column and this order's enormous one without needing two theories.

Annulment aims at sayability, not at knowledge — and it doubles as a detection instrument. The Latvian exile literature was classified top secret and circulated hand to hand throughout; the protocol was denied for fifty years and had been in print in the West for forty of them. In neither case was the state trying to stop people knowing, because in neither case could it. What it was doing was ensuring that stating the fact in public was itself the offence — which achieves two things at once: it keeps the proposition out of the order's own official language, and it guarantees that anyone who utters it has identified himself. The corpus should carry both functions. The second explains why annulment survives the obvious objection that everybody knew: everybody knowing was never the problem.

A channel that cannot be closed at any price is a different object from one that is not worth closing. Seam management has been treated throughout this collection as a cost calculation, and correctly. Espoo is the exception that names the limit: an unaimed foreign signal arriving from a sovereign neighbour that the order needed to keep on good terms. And the general form of what made it effective should be recorded, because it is counter-intuitive and it recurs: **the most corrosive foreign broadcast is the one that is not addressed to you.** Propaganda invites and receives an answer. An advertisement for a washing machine does not.

And a sealed doctrine loses its information war on the narrowest available ground. This order was not brought down by an argument about the

deportations, or living standards, or the language, all of which were available for decades and none of which produced a constitutional crisis. It was brought down, or at least broken open, by a demand that a two-page annex to a 1939 treaty be acknowledged to exist. That is what a claim which cannot be qualified does to the party defending it: because it could not concede the smallest contradicting fact, the smallest contradicting fact was sufficient — and its opponents worked that out by 1979 and aimed there for ten years, at a cost of eight years in a camp apiece and, for one of them, a death at Vologda.

The counter-position deserves stating in its strongest form. Every state classifies; the Soviet Union was neither the first nor the only government to keep diplomatic annexes secret, and Western states have kept comparable material closed for comparable periods. The Baltic exile press was not a neutral literature but the product of an organised political emigration with foreign sponsorship. Western broadcasting into the Soviet Union was a funded instrument of a rival state's policy and not a disinterested window. All of that is true and none of it is disputed here.

The answer is that the distinction which matters is not between classification and openness. It is between an order that can survive the publication of a fact about its own founding and an order that cannot. Britain published its own returned slaves and remained Britain. This order spent fifty years, three general secretaries and the careers of a good many honest officials demonstrating which of the two kinds it was, and then conceded the document fourteen months before it ceased to exist.

What would break this reading: evidence that the classification of exile literature in 1972 was a routine security reclassification applied across many categories of foreign publication rather than a distinct operation, or that the traffic figures for the restricted collections reflect a narrow definition of "visit" and understate access. Both are checkable and this study has not checked them.

A note on sources. One phrase is quoted because the argument turns on its precision: the Latvian library historians' characterisation of the effect of the 1972 reclassification — that Latvian exile literature was officially classified top secret, *as if it did not exist at all* — is taken from the published survey of Latvian research libraries from the 1980s to the present, and is that article's own formulation rather than a document's.

The Estonian Glavlit material — its establishment by decree of the Estonian SSR Council of People's Commissars on 23 October 1940, its combination of

pre- and post-publication censorship, the report of 20 October 1948 from Leonida Päll to Nikolai Karotamm, the recession of Glavlit's functions under Gorbachev, the abolition of state censorship in the Soviet Union on 12 June 1990 and the disbanding of Glavlit in Estonia on 1 October 1990 — is from the documentary publication and commentary in *Ajalooline Ajakiri*, paraphrased from its published abstract. The censor establishment figures for Latvia and Lithuania at the turn of the 1940s and 1950s, including the ethnic composition of the Lithuanian office, are from the comparative study of political censorship in the Soviet west published in *Cahiers du Monde russe*, paraphrased.

The Latvian library figures — approximately 500,000 Latvian publications removed, about 2.6 million publications destroyed between 1944 and 1954, 359,000 items transferred to restricted special funds established in 1946, and restricted-collection visits of 409 in 1974 rising to 1,023 in 1985 — are reference-level and are given as their sources give them; they should be checked against the Latvian library-history literature before being relied on in the accounting. The participation of Glavlit staff in state security arrests, the confiscation of private libraries and the pursuit of the antiquarian trade follow James Fraser's account as quoted by the Hoover Institution in describing its acquisition of the confidential confiscation lists, which are described as bearing the notes *for official use* and *distributed by list*. The access regime for the restricted funds — permission from the external relations or propaganda and agitation departments of the party central committee, with security personnel exempt — is from the same Latvian research-libraries survey.

The secret protocol chronology is as established earlier in this study and is not re-sourced here. The Baltic Appeal of 23 August 1979 follows the Estonian official and documentary accounts and the reference literature: the addressees, the three demands, the composition of the signatories with the divergence in the counts reported rather than resolved, the addition of the five Moscow signatories bringing the total to about fifty, the characterisation of it as the first non-anonymous political request signed with names, the punishment of everyone connected with it, the reporting on the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe on the evening of 23 August and in the *New York Times* on 25 August, and the European Parliament resolution of 13 January 1983 as the first official position in support of the Baltic states by an international organisation. The individual fates — Niklus's earlier imprisonment in Mordovia 1958–1966, his arrest in 1980, ten-year sentence, eight years served and release in 1988; Jüri

Kukk's death in 1981 at the Vologda prison hospital following a hunger strike; Tarto's terms of 1956–1960, 1962–1967 and 1983–1988 — are from the reference accounts and the Estonian documentation project. The Hirvepark demonstration of 23 August 1987 organised by the group for public disclosure of the pact is from the same chronology.

The Finnish television material is from Annika Lepp and Mervi Pantti's study in the *Journal of European Television History and Culture*, paraphrased, together with the audience estimates it cites from Hagi Šein — average weekly consumption of Finnish television among Estonian residents close to thirteen per cent between 1974 and 1979 against five per cent for Moscow's central television. The Espoo mast of 1971, the *Finnish blocks* built in kolkhoz workshops, the aerial at Türi and the practice of television tourism are from the same study, which draws them from interview testimony and reports them as memory. The account that Moscow pressed Finland to relocate the transmitter and was told it was technically impossible is journalistic and is flagged in the text as unverified. The judgement that this gave Estonians more access to world affairs and Western culture than any other group in the Soviet Union is the Estonian reference historiography's own and is reported as such.

Three limitations. The library and censorship figures are reference-level rather than archival. The claim about the identity of internal and public language is reported as consistent with, and not established by, the evidence assembled here. And the natural experiment implicit in the Finnish signal — one republic with an unclosable channel and two without — is entered as a variable for the collapse module and has not been tested.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE EIGHT

GOVERNOR-GENERAL

Module 8 · Elite coordination and the default — an elite that owned nothing, inherited nothing and could be removed by a telephone call, and was for exactly that reason more reliable than any landed aristocracy in this collection; four chains of command laid deliberately across one another, one of which the Baltic invented for the rest of the union; what was done to the men who acquired a base of their own; and the test in 1991, which returns a number

The question above the line

Everything below a certain line in this order has already been settled. The ordinary subject was priced: a cost demonstrated twice against households, a coast made into a wall, a file entry governing his children, and a benefit column that by the only comparison available to him came out in favour of getting up and going to work. That arithmetic held for thirty-five years and it required almost nothing to maintain.

This module asks the harder question, which is about the people above that line — the ones who could have defected at a fraction of the cost, who had cars and telephones and access to information, whose signatures were on the instruments, and who did not defect. Not because they were persuaded; the previous modules have shown how thin the persuasion was even among the men running the cultural institutions. The question is what held the arrangement together for the people inside it, and the framework's answer is that a durable order does not need anyone to hold it together at all: it needs only that each beneficiary, in defending his own position, thereby defends the whole, so that the arrangement reproduces itself without a conspiracy and among people who need not like one another.

That mechanism is unusually visible here, because in this order the thing each man was defending had been stripped down to a single component.

What the elite was given

A nomenklatura position was a post on a list maintained by the level above. That is the whole of it, and the negative facts are the important ones.

The holder owned no land. He owned no capital and no share in any enterprise. He held nothing heritable: his son might be advantaged in getting a place at an institute, but no position and no asset passed to him, and a father's disgrace was an active disability rather than a neutral inheritance. What he had was a salary, an apartment better than the queue would otherwise have produced, in the higher ranks a car and a driver, access to a closed distribution shop, a place at a sanatorium, and the standing that came with the post — every single one of which arrived with the appointment and left with it.

Set that against the other settlements in this collection. An Ottoman *timar*-holder's grant reverted to the state on his death, but it was real income while he held it. A Buganda county chief received eight square miles in something the Agreement called freehold. A Transjordanian sheikh was made the largest landowner in the country. A Sokoto emir kept his court, his religion and his revenues, and lost only the right to be irremovable. Every one of those settlements answered the coordination problem by *giving the potential rival something he would lose if the arrangement fell*.

This one gave its elite nothing at all except the position, and that is not a failure of generosity. It is the mechanism.

The scale is worth recording. Across the union the full-time officialdom covered by the appointment lists ran to something over two hundred thousand people on the standard account. In Estonia the party itself was almost nonexistent at the reconquest — 2,409 members on the list at 1 January 1945 — and was then built: 22,320 by 1 January 1953, and 30,516 by 1 January 1959, at which date 47.8 per cent of the membership was Estonian, and how many of those were Estonians from elsewhere in the Soviet Union rather than from Estonia is not established in the record.

Four chains

The coordination here was engineered rather than emergent, and the architecture repays being set out in full, because no single person in any of these republics held more than one of the three monopolies.

The first chain was the republic's own party, headed by a native first secretary: Johannes Käbin in Estonia from 1950 to 1978, Antanas Sniečkus in Lithuania for three decades, Jānis Kalnbērziņš and then Arvīds Pelše in Latvia. This was the public face of the arrangement, with a national name, a national language, genuine local authority and a constituency to manage.

The second chain is the module's title, and here the Baltic case has a claim on the corpus that ought to be recorded. Beside every first secretary stood a second secretary, and on Saulius Grybkauskas's work — he is the historian of the institution — the arrangement was **first introduced in the Baltic republics under Stalin and only became universal across the non-Slavic republics in the course of the 1950s**. The Soviet Union's principal instrument for governing a national republic was designed here before it was exported to the rest of the union.

What the second secretary was, in Lithuania, is stated plainly in the specialist literature: with the exception of a brief interval from 1953 to 1956, he was not a local but a Russian sent from Moscow. He supervised directly the departments that mattered — Organisational Party Work, which controlled appointments, and Administrative Organs, which oversaw the judiciary and the state security committee. His function was to supervise the local nomenklatura and to report regularly to the sector for Belorussia and the Baltic republics of the central committee apparatus in Moscow.

And behind their backs, the Lithuanian party elite called every one of them by a single word, which is the most useful document in this module. They called him the **governor-general**.

The vocabulary is exact and it was not chosen by an enemy. It was the private word used by the ruling class of Soviet Lithuania, about the man who supervised them, and it is the tsarist term for the imperial official set over a subject province — the precise institution the doctrine had spent half a century declaring abolished. The men who administered the claim that this was not an

empire had, among themselves, one word for the person who proved it was, and it was a word from the vocabulary of the empire they had replaced.

Grybkauskas's own characterisation of what the institution actually was is the default described from inside by the person who has read the files: a **contract between the central and the local nomenklatura**, which he judges to have been extremely effective at managing a relationship that would otherwise have been very difficult. Neither party to that contract had to like the other, and on the evidence a good many of them did not. It held because each was better off inside it.

The third chain was economic and it ran past the republic entirely. Enterprises of all-union subordination reported to ministries in Moscow, took their inputs, prices, investment and output targets from them, and were frequently staffed with labour brought in from outside. A director at Narva or in the Riga electrical works answered to a ministry a thousand miles away and not to the government of the republic he stood in — which is why the phosphorite decision in 1987 was announced to Estonia by a deputy minister of a union ministry contradicting Estonia's own party leadership.

The fourth chain was the security committee and the armed forces, with their own reporting lines, their own housing, their own shops and, in the Baltic, their own very large presence.

Read the four together and the design is unmistakable. It is divide-and-balance, installed deliberately in a periphery. The first secretary had authority and no force. The second secretary had the appointments and the security organs and no constituency. The ministries had the capital and no jurisdiction. The security committee had the information and no economy. Nobody inside the republic held violence, wealth and trusted information together, and every one of the four lines terminated in the same city.

Why it held, link by link

The framework asks for the audit to be run as an explicit chain, asking at every link whether this man, in defending his own position, thereby defends the whole arrangement. Run it downward.

The collective farm chairman held his position from the district committee and from nothing else. He had no title to the land, no capital in the farm, and

no trade. If the arrangement ended he was a man with an agricultural qualification and no farm.

The factory director's authority was entirely a function of a chain of supply and instruction that arrived from Moscow. He did not own the plant; he could not sell its product; he had no customers he had found himself. His standing existed because the ministry existed.

The republican minister's ministry existed because the union constitution had created it and could uncreate it.

The censor, the security officer, the newspaper editor, the academician, the theatre director and the conductor of the song festival each held an appointment, and each had watched, in 1950 or in 1959, what happened to a predecessor who had held the same appointment and misjudged the boundary.

And the native first secretary — the man at the top of the visible pyramid — held a position whose entire local value consisted in his being the person Moscow dealt with. That was worth an enormous amount inside the republic and precisely nothing if Moscow stopped dealing.

So the default ran, at every link, and the finding is the inversion of what the corpus has assumed. **Every other settlement in this collection binds a potential rival by giving him something to lose. This one bound its elite by ensuring it had nothing else.** A Buganda chief with eight square miles could in principle have financed an opposition. A Transjordanian sheikh with the largest estate in the country could have withheld his men. A first secretary with a flat, a car and a place on a list cannot finance anything, because the only thing he possesses is the position, and the position is precisely what he would be spending.

The addendum's counter-intuitive claim is therefore confirmed and can be stated as a mechanism rather than a paradox: an elite with no independent base is **more** reliable than a landed one, not less, because there is no base from which a dissent could be funded, and therefore no dissent is funded.

What was done to the men who acquired a base

The proof of that mechanism is what the order did whenever somebody began, however modestly, to accumulate a second source of standing. It did the same thing three times and the offence was always the same offence.

In March 1950, at the eighth plenum of the Estonian party's central committee, Nikolai Karotamm was removed and most of the leading positions went to Estonians from the Soviet Union and to cadres sent in from elsewhere. In the same year the president of the republic's own academy of sciences was dismissed and arrested and three of the song festival's artistic directors were repressed.

From July 1959 to 1962 the Latvian national communists were purged. The men around Eduards Berklavs had fought in the war, had lived in the interwar republic, and had reached the top of the republic's party by 1958. What they had done was to issue a regulation requiring officials to learn Latvian, to resist the education reform, and to try to limit in-migration — which is to say they had begun to hold a *local* base: a policy, a following, a constituency of their own. They were removed, the purge ran three years, and Latvian communism with local roots ended with it.

The instructive case, though, is the one where nobody was purged. Käbin's party had been broken in 1950, nine years before Latvia's, and Käbin held the Estonian first secretaryship for twenty-eight years afterwards. What he did with them was to obtain room for Estonian institutions and Estonian schooling while never once giving Moscow an occasion to name what he was doing. Estonia consequently kept more of its language and its cultural apparatus than Latvia did — and the reason is that Estonia's elite had been taught where the line ran a decade earlier and had drawn the correct conclusion, which was not to stop but to stop announcing.

So the order's answer to the open problem was not to prevent capable men from existing; it needed them and it produced them in quantity. It was to prevent any of them from acquiring a second source of standing, and where one did, to remove him under a charge — bourgeois nationalism — that the doctrine had drafted in advance for exactly that misunderstanding.

The crack, and where it came from

The framework holds that structural change comes from inside the hierarchy: fracture, exhaustion, conquest, or a surplus of claimants the order never seated. It does not come from the rising of the ruled. This case delivers that prediction in unusually clean form, and the crack ran through the party.

Lithuania is the sharpest instance in the collection. In October 1988, with the approval of both Moscow and the Sąjūdis reform movement, Algirdas Brazauskas — a construction and planning specialist, on the republic's central committee since 1976 and in its bureau since 1977 — became first secretary. For the following year he held the highest political power in the republic while holding no post in its government at all, which is a fair description of what a party first secretary was. In December 1989 the Lithuanian parliament ended the party's supraconstitutional authority in the republic. The Lithuanian party then split: Brazauskas led the larger part out of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Mykolas Burokevičius headed the loyalist remnant on the CPSU platform from March 1990 until August 1991.

One republic; two communist parties; and the argument between them was about whether to be Lithuanian.

Estonia followed the same pattern through a different office. Arnold Rüütel had been chairman of the presidium of the republic's supreme soviet since 8 April 1983 — the senior communist officeholder in Estonia — and was a principal figure in drafting and carrying the declaration of sovereignty of 16 November 1988.

In Latvia, Anatolijs Gorbunovs had held positions in the republic's party from 1974 to 1988, rising to secretary of its central committee, and he supported the independence movement when most of his colleagues did not; he became chairman of the supreme soviet and then of the supreme council of independent Latvia.

The people did not crack this floor. The men who cracked it were the men holding it up, and they did it from the offices the order had installed them in. That is the framework's prediction firing precisely — and it fires *because* of the mechanism set out above, which is this module's second finding and the more important of the two.

Why an appointed elite defects instantly

Here is the mechanism stated generally, because it explains something about 1989 to 1991 across the whole Soviet periphery and not only here.

A landed elite defends an old order because the old order is what makes its title good. Same ground, same neighbours, different source — and the source is the tie. Remove the order that issued the deed and the deed becomes a question.

That is why colonial settlements hold for generations under men whose private papers show them resenting the whole business: the default requires alignment, not agreement.

An appointed elite has no title. Its entire endowment is an entry on a register, and an entry on a register can simply be re-registered. When a second source of appointment appears — a sovereign parliament, a popular front, a restored republic — the same man occupies an equivalent position in the new structure at no cost whatever, because there was never anything that had to be transferred, revalidated or defended in a court.

So: **an elite bound by having nothing is maximally loyal while the centre is solvent and maximally disposable the instant it is not.** Its loyalty was never to the order. It was to whoever was currently issuing appointments — which is exactly what it means to say that the default was a structure of positions rather than a set of beliefs, and it is why the Soviet periphery changed flags in eighteen months with almost no fighting except in the few places where the security organs themselves were the incumbents.

This is a distinct answer to the open problem and it should be added to the Menu, because the six documented families all answer one question and this one answers a different one. Export, Prevent, Rotate, Divide-and-balance, Co-opt and Assume-the-chair all address *what do I give him, or where do I send him, so that he will not replace me*. This family addresses *what do I withhold so that he cannot*: recruit into revocable office, grant no property, permit no heredity, allow no local base, and keep the appointment on a list held one level up. Call it what it is — **appointment** — and note the two findings as a single property rather than a paradox: it is the most reliable arrangement on the list while the centre functions, and the least durable the moment it stops, and it is the same feature that produces both.

The test in 1991

The addendum promised a test here that no other case in this collection offers so cleanly: look at 1991 and after, and see whether the same men held power under a new flag, in the same buildings, with a new legitimating claim. If they did, the default was a structure of positions and not a set of beliefs — and the ideology's evaporation without a corresponding change in who held what is the strongest evidence the framework will ever get for that proposition.

It returns a number.

On the comparative research into post-Soviet elites, something close to half of the Baltic elite of the 1990s was drawn from people who can be counted as former members of the nomenklatura broadly defined. Pure continuity dominated over change in the two northern republics: about 53 per cent of Estonia's new leadership and about 55 per cent of Latvia's had a communist and senior-cadre past, with Lithuania's share about 44 per cent.

And the reverse figure is the one that settles the argument. Pure upward mobility — people with no party card and no prior senior position reaching the top — accounted for about **1 per cent** of the new elite in Estonia, about 4 per cent in Lithuania and about 8 per cent in Latvia.

At the apex the continuity is a matter of names. Brazauskas, the last effective first secretary of Soviet Lithuania, became acting president in November 1992, won the presidency with over 60 per cent of the vote in February 1993, served until 1998, and was prime minister from 2001 to 2006. Rüütel, the senior communist officeholder in Soviet Estonia from 1983 to 1990, was President of Estonia from 2001 to 2006. Gorbunovs, a party central committee secretary until 1988, was effectively Latvia's head of state until 1993 and Speaker of the Saeima until 1995.

The same men, in the same buildings, under a different flag, elected by their own peoples in free elections. The framework's proposition about the default has never had better evidence anywhere in this collection, and here it is quantified.

Two qualifications have to be stated at equal weight, and the second is the sharper.

The first is that nothing of the doctrine survived at all. The men carried over; not one proposition they had professed did. That is precisely the point rather than an embarrassment to it — an appointed elite's loyalty was to the appointing power, and when the appointing power changed, the profession changed with it and nobody's position was disturbed by the change.

The second is nationality, and it is the instrument that made this a *partial* reload rather than a complete one. Estonia and Latvia restored citizenship to the pre-1940 body of citizens and their descendants and required naturalisation of the Soviet-era settler population, with language and loyalty requirements, leaving initially something up to around 30 per cent of residents without citizenship; Lithuania, with a much smaller settler population, extended

citizenship to all permanent residents. So the native segment of the appointed elite re-sourced its positions to the new republics and continued; and the imported segment — the men of the third and fourth chains, the all-union directors and the security and military establishment — was cut out of the political nation altogether.

The default held for the part of the elite that could be re-nationalised and was severed for the part that could not, and the instrument that drew the line was a citizenship law. That is what distinguishes this case from Central Asia, where the whole apparatus carried over intact and the first secretaries became presidents for life. Here the same test returns the same men, minus a nationality.

And the further question — whether the appointed elite converted its positions into property, which is the test of whether a hierarchy of office becomes a hierarchy of ownership — is answered by the record, differently in each republic, and the variable is the privatisation instrument. Estonia sold state enterprises by tender, to foreigners and residents on the same terms, and conducted a de facto lustration of the administration immediately, with a lustration law following in 1995. Lithuania ran voucher privatisation giving employees priority to buy out their own enterprises, and was governed through the decisive years from 1992 to 1996 by an ex-communist party under which, in the assessment of the comparative literature, old cadres could keep their positions — which was possible, that literature notes, precisely because Lithuanian communism had not been identified with Russian or Russified agents. Latvia's reform effort was fragmentary and slow, its political elite an amalgam of young careerists, returning émigrés and old nomenklatura, and the literature on the following decade speaks of the power of oligarchs.

So: **the appointed elite became an owning elite exactly to the extent that the privatisation instrument was drafted by insiders** — which is the settlement module's finding run backwards. The Soviet settlement had converted things into relations so that nothing could be defended; the post-Soviet settlement converted relations back into things, and whoever was holding the relation at the moment of conversion had a claim.

Reading the default against the framework

Four findings, of which the first two are the contributions.

A seventh Menu family: appointment. The six documented families answer the question of what to give a capable man so that he will not replace you. This one answers the opposite question — what to withhold so that he cannot — and it does so by constructing an elite whose entire endowment is a revocable post on a register held one level up: no property, no heredity, no local base, no retinue, and a family exposed to the consequences of a dismissal. It is the most reliable answer on the Menu while the centre is solvent, and it is the least durable the moment the centre stops issuing appointments. Those are not two findings. They are the same structural fact seen from either side of a collapse, and any future case that shows an elite changing flags overnight without a fight should be checked first for this family.

The bind can be negative. The corpus has assumed throughout that a coordinating class is bound by having something to lose, and has done its most careful work on the *consideration* — what was demanded in return for the grant. This case has no grant and therefore no consideration, and it produced a tighter default than any of the granting cases. The general form: **a settlement can bind by conferring, or by ensuring that nothing else exists to confer.** The second is cheaper, tighter and more brittle, and it is the specifically modern form, because it requires an administrative apparatus capable of maintaining a register and abolishing private property, which no pre-modern order had.

The 1991 test returns over half, and the qualification is an instrument. Between 44 and 55 per cent of the new Baltic elites had senior communist pasts and genuine outsiders accounted for between one and eight per cent, and three of the men who had run these republics for the Soviet Union subsequently ran them for themselves. The reload was nevertheless partial in two respects that the corpus should keep together: the doctrine vanished entirely, and the non-native part of the apparatus was excluded by legislation. **A reload can be selective, and where it is, look for the statute that selected.**

And the Baltic was the laboratory rather than the exception. The corpus is inclined to treat these three republics as the Soviet Union's most European and therefore least representative periphery. On the specialist account of the institution, the second secretaryship — the union's principal device for governing a national republic, the office the local elite privately called the governor-general — was introduced in the Baltic republics under Stalin and only afterwards extended across the non-Slavic union in the 1950s. The most atypical periphery designed the typical instrument. That claim rests on one

scholar's monograph and this study has read it through its published table of contents, abstracts and articles rather than in full; it should be verified before the corpus builds on it.

The strongest counter-position is a serious one and should be given its full weight. To read the elite continuity of the 1990s as a reload, the objection runs, is to miss the largest political fact of the period. The men who carried over were not survivors of the arrangement; they were the men who broke it, at real personal risk, from inside, and were then chosen in free elections by the peoples they had governed unelected. Brazauskas took sixty per cent of a free vote against a candidate endorsed by the independence movement. Rüütel helped draft the declaration of sovereignty and was elected president eleven years after the flag came down. These countries became parliamentary democracies, restored property, joined the European Union and NATO, and did it without a civil war. A framework that counts surnames and reports continuity will have measured the one thing that stayed the same and missed everything that did not.

None of that is disputed here, and the module's finding does not require it to be. The finding is narrower and it is about mechanism rather than merit: that the men who held the positions in 1989 were holding equivalent positions in 1993, and that the reason they could is the same reason they had been reliable for forty years before. A position on a register transfers. A title has to be defended. This elite had never been given a title, and so when the register changed hands there was nothing to defend and nothing to lose — which made them, in the same structural instant, the order's most dependable servants and the agents of its dissolution.

What would break this reading: if the elite-continuity figures rest on a definition of nomenklatura broad enough to include ordinary party membership, in which case they would be measuring the size of the party rather than the persistence of the apparatus. The published figures distinguish party membership from senior cadre position and the low upward-mobility numbers suggest the distinction is being maintained, but this study has read them through a secondary summary and the underlying survey should be checked.

A note on sources. One word carries weight and is quoted as the specialist literature reports it: that the second secretaries of the Lithuanian party's central committee were known behind their backs as *governors-general*. That is Saulius Grybkauskas's reporting of a term in Lithuanian collective memory, taken from his article on the second party secretary and his

personal networks in Soviet Lithuania after 1964, and it is testimony about usage rather than a documentary quotation.

The institution of the second secretary follows Grybkauskas throughout: its introduction in the Baltic republics under Stalin and its extension across the non-Slavic republics in the course of the 1950s; the second secretary's status in Lithuania as a Russian sent from Moscow, with a brief exception between 1953 and 1956; his direct supervision of the departments of Organisational Party Work and of Administrative Organs, the latter overseeing the judicial system and the state security committee; his function of supervising the local nomenklatura and reporting to the sector for Belorussia and the Baltic republics; and his characterisation of the institution as a contract between the central and the local nomenklatura which proved extremely effective at managing centre–periphery relations. This is drawn from his published articles, his monograph's table of contents and publisher's description, and the secondary literature, and not from the monograph itself; the claim about Baltic priority in particular should be verified before it is carried into the corpus. The general description of the second secretaryship as the post controlling appointments at every level, and the figure of something over two hundred thousand full-time officials covered by the appointment lists across the union, are from the standard reference account.

Estonian party membership figures — 2,409 on the list at 1 January 1945, 22,320 at 1 January 1953, 30,516 at 1 January 1959, and 47.8 per cent of the membership Estonian in 1959, with the caveat that it is not known how many of those were Estonians from elsewhere in the Soviet Union — are from the Estonian documentation project's account of the party, which itself notes that uncertainty.

The 1950 Estonian purge and the 1959–62 Latvian purge are as established earlier in this study. Brazauskas's career follows the reference accounts and the published scholarly biography summary: central committee member from 1976 and bureau member from 1977; first secretary from 20 October 1988 with the approval of both Moscow and Sąjūdis; holding the highest power in the republic while holding no government post; the ending of the party's supraconstitutional authority by the Lithuanian parliament in December 1989; the split of the party with Brazauskas leading the larger part out of the CPSU and Mykolas Burokevičius heading the loyalist remnant from March 1990 to August 1991; deputy prime minister 1990–91; chairman of the presidium of

the supreme soviet January–March 1990; acting president from 25 November 1992; president from 25 February 1993 to 25 February 1998 on over 60 per cent of the vote against Stasys Lozoraitis; and prime minister from 2001 to 2006. Rüütel's chairmanship of the presidium of the Estonian supreme soviet from 8 April 1983, his role in the declaration of sovereignty of 16 November 1988, his chairmanship of the supreme council from 1990 to 1992 and his presidency from 2001 to 2006 are from the Estonian presidential office's own account and the reference literature. Gorbunovs's party positions from 1974 to 1988 rising to central committee secretary, his support for the independence movement, and his chairmanship of the supreme soviet and then the supreme council to 1993 and speakership to 1995 are from the reference accounts.

The elite-continuity figures — around 53 per cent in Estonia, 55 per cent in Latvia and 44 per cent in Lithuania with a communist and senior-cadre past, against pure upward mobility of about 1 per cent in Estonia, 4 per cent in Lithuania and 8 per cent in Latvia — are Irmina Matonytė's, reported in her published comparative essay on elites in Soviet and post-Soviet societies, drawing in part on Steen; the essay's own uncertainty about the Latvian figures is noted in the text and should be respected. The privatisation and lustration comparisons — Estonian sale by tender to foreigners and residents on equal terms with de facto lustration and a lustration law in 1995; Lithuanian voucher privatisation with employee buy-out priority and government by an ex-communist party from 1992 to 1996 under which old cadres retained positions, which the source attributes to Lithuanian communism not having been identified with Russian or Russified agents; and the Latvian pattern of fragmentary reform, an amalgamated elite and subsequent oligarch influence — follow the comparative studies of varieties of capitalism in the Baltic states and of divergent corruption paths, paraphrased from their published texts.

The citizenship provisions — restoration of citizenship in Estonia and Latvia to pre-occupation inhabitants and their descendants with naturalisation requirements including language proficiency for Soviet-era settlers, leaving initially up to around 30 per cent of residents without citizenship, against Lithuania's extension of citizenship to all permanent residents — are from the reference literature on Russians in the Baltic states and the academic work on Baltic citizenship policy; the figures are contested in the political argument surrounding them and are given as the sources give them.

Three limitations. The Grybkauskas material, which carries the module's architectural claim and its fourth finding, has been read through articles, abstracts and publisher's descriptions rather than in the monograph. The elite-continuity figures have been read through a secondary summary rather than the underlying survey, and the definitional question raised in the text is unresolved. And this module has not attempted the internal-correspondence work that would show how the contract between the central and local nomenklatura was actually negotiated in practice, which is the single largest gap in this study's treatment of the open problem.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERESTS OF THE PEOPLE

Module 9 · Plurality or foreclosure — a constitution that guaranteed freedom of speech and named the purpose in the same sentence; three monopolies held in one hand for fifty years, and the single design that made the elite reliable and a counterweight impossible; the one institution in three countries with a base the state did not own, and what grew on it; a base borrowed from abroad; and a right of secession invoked at last, answered within three weeks by a forum that could not be used, because using it would have conceded the case

The clause

Article 50 of the Soviet constitution of 1977 reads: *In accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system, citizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press, and of assembly, meetings, street processions and demonstrations.*

Article 49 provides that every citizen may submit proposals to state bodies and criticise shortcomings in their work, that officials must reply within time limits, and that *persecution for criticism is prohibited. Persons guilty of such persecution shall be called to account.*

Article 6 provides that *the leading and guiding force of Soviet society and the nucleus of its political system, of all state organisations and public organisations, is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.*

Read the grammar of the first of those, because everything in this module follows from it. Article 50 is not a limit placed on the state. It is a grant made for a stated purpose, and the purpose is named inside the same sentence as the grant. Speech that strengthens and develops the socialist system is guaranteed. Speech that does not is not prohibited by some later article; it simply falls outside the description of what was guaranteed, and no tribunal is required to weigh the question because the clause has already answered it. The qualification

does not sit in a proviso where a court might have to construe it. It comes first, before the word *guaranteed*, so that the guarantee is born already conditioned.

This study's test of liberty, however, is not a test of wording. It is structural. A right exists where somebody with an independent base can make it stick against somebody who would prefer to ignore it. Rights are not deduced from doctrines and they are very rarely conceded; they are the residue of factions that could not destroy one another and settled for procedure instead. So the question this module has to answer is not what the constitution said. It is whether any such base existed anywhere in these three countries.

Three monopolies, one hand

Run the test directly.

Violence. The armed forces, the state security committee, the interior ministry troops, the border guards and the locally recruited destruction battalions were four or five instruments in a single chain that terminated in Moscow. No republic controlled any of them. No institution in any of the three countries commanded a single armed man.

Wealth. After the declarations of July 1940 there was no private property in land, no private enterprise above the household plot, no independent capital, no bank not owned by the state, no endowment, no foundation, no trade union with funds of its own, no church with an estate, and no lawful way for a man to be paid by anybody other than the state. The point is not that this was poor; it was, by union standards, the richest corner of the country. The point is that there was no second paymaster.

Trusted information. Glavlit at the printing house, the restricted collections in the libraries, a single party press, a single broadcaster, and — as the previous module established — a security service whose networks were pointed precisely at the people who might have originated an alternative account.

Three monopolies, one hand, fifty years. On the framework's proposition that is the whole answer, and no rhetoric can move it. But this case makes the point sharper than any other in the collection, because of what the elite module found.

The order had built its coordinating class deliberately without property, without heredity and without any local base — four chains of command laid across one another, none holding more than one monopoly, and every position

an entry on a register held one level up. That arrangement produced the tightest default in this collection. It also, in the same act, made a counterweight impossible.

An elite that cannot fund a dissent cannot fund a right either. This is the module's first finding and it is the one to carry: the instrument that solves the coordination problem is the instrument that forecloses liberty, and they are not two policies but one. A faction extracts a procedural guarantee when it is dangerous enough that destroying it would cost too much and weak enough that it cannot simply win. Being dangerous requires a base — land, money, armed retainers, a foreign patron, a body of clients who depend on you rather than on the state. This order abolished bases as a matter of design, and it did so for reasons that had nothing to do with liberty and everything to do with making its own servants reliable.

Where you find an unusually docile elite, therefore, do not look for liberties. Look for what was withheld in order to produce the docility.

The exception, and what grew on it

There was one institution in these three countries with a base the state did not own, and the framework's prediction can be tested against it directly.

The Catholic Church in Lithuania had parishes it had not been given, a clergy formed in a tradition the state had not written, a doctrine the party could not amend, and a headquarters in another country. Every other organised body in the Baltic republics — the writers' union, the academy, the choirs, the trade unions, the Lutheran consistories after the deportation of three-quarters of their clergy — existed because the state maintained it.

What grew on that base is exactly what the mechanism predicts, up to a point.

The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania ran from 19 March 1972 to 19 March 1989 — eighty-one issues, typed at night, passed by hand, smuggled west and broadcast back, with seventeen people arrested in connection with it between 1973 and 1983 and, on the accounts of those involved, nobody naming anybody else. And on 25 November 1976 the Lithuanian Helsinki Group was founded by five people whose composition is itself the signature of the thing this module is looking for: the Jesuit priest Karolis Garuckas, the poet Tomas Venclova, the physicist Eitanas Finkelšteinas,

the former political prisoner Ona Lukauskaitė-Poškienė, and Viktoras Petkus. A Catholic, a Jew, a poet and a survivor of the camps, in a coalition none of them would have formed for any other purpose. The group issued more than thirty documents on religious repression, restrictions on movement, the psychiatric confinement of dissenters, discrimination against minorities and the persecution of activists — and it stated the constitutional position plainly, that the contemporary status of Lithuania had been established by the entry of Soviet troops onto its territory on 15 June 1940.

Now be exact about what that was, because the temptation to call it liberty must be refused.

It restrained nobody. The state imprisoned very nearly everyone involved. Petkus was arrested; the Chronicle's editors were arrested; across the Soviet Helsinki movement the arrest rate approached totality, with all but one of the thirty-eight members of the Ukrainian group imprisoned at some point and three dying in the camps.

What it was is the thing that comes *before* liberty and without which liberty never appears: an organised body, drawing on resources the state did not supply, making a claim in public, and continuing to exist as a body after its members were removed. That is the minimum unit of the mechanism — and this case shows the minimum unit operating for seventeen years and producing no right at all, which is a useful negative result.

So the framework's proposition needs a condition it has not previously carried. **A base is necessary and not sufficient. What is additionally required is that the state be unable to destroy the faction's members as well as its institution.** Here it could not destroy the Church and could always destroy the men, and the men were replaced faster than they could accumulate anything. This is why, historically, the residue-generating factions have been landed nobles, chartered towns, guilds and armed churches rather than priests and poets: not because the latter want it less, but because a man with an estate and two hundred tenants cannot be removed on a Tuesday afternoon.

The borrowed base

There is a second mechanism visible here that the corpus should record, and it is the one available to people who have no base at all.

In 1975 the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Final Act, obtaining the recognition of the postwar European borders it had wanted for thirty years and accepting, in exchange, a set of human-rights undertakings. Within a year its own citizens had begun to hold it to its signature. The Moscow group was announced in May 1976; the Ukrainian on 9 November 1976; the Lithuanian on 25 November 1976; the Armenian in April 1977; the Georgian in November 1977. In Latvia, Helsinki-86 was founded on 10 July 1986 in the port of Liepāja by three workers — Linards Grantiņš, Raimonds Bitenieks and Mārtiņš Bariss — and became the first openly anti-communist organisation in the Soviet Union; on 14 June 1987 it laid flowers at the Freedom Monument in Riga, and that act is generally taken as the beginning of the Latvian national revival.

The method has been given a name in the recent literature that is exactly right: *radical civil obedience*. Not defiance, and not a demand for new rights, but an insistence that the state comply with commitments it had already given — its own constitution and its own international signature.

Why this worked at all, to the extent that it did, connects directly to what this study established about the robe. An order whose entire legitimating claim was that its peoples had joined it freely and lived in it as equals could not simply repudiate a human-rights undertaking, because the repudiation would have attacked the claim rather than the critics. **The doctrine that made the conquered indispensable also made the external commitment unusable to disown** — and therefore usable, by the conquered, as a base they did not otherwise possess.

The price of the borrowed base was paid in full and in person. The Baltic Appeal's signatories went to the camps. Petkus was imprisoned. Niklus served eight years. Kukk died at Vologda. A borrowed base does not protect the borrower; it only gives him something to stand on while he is being removed.

Inside and outside

The colonial cases in this collection produce a characteristic shape: liberties for one group and none for another, written into different statutes, with a settler franchise on one side and a native code on the other. That is not the shape here, and the difference is instructive.

There was no group in these three republics that possessed liberties the others lacked. Party members had *privileges* — the closed shop, the better apartment, the sanatorium place, the foreign travel permit, the good institute for a son — and a privilege is the opposite of a liberty in the only respect that matters: it is held at the pleasure of the grantor and can be withdrawn without any process at all. That is precisely how the order disciplined its own elite, and the previous module showed it doing so three times.

The Russian-speaking industrial population of Narva, Daugavpils and Sillamäe had no more legal protection against the state than the Estonian farmer did. What it had was better access — to the new housing, to certain careers, to promotion in the all-union enterprises, and to a working language that was the union's. Access is a distribution, not a right. It restrains nobody, it cannot be pleaded anywhere, and it is withdrawn by an administrative decision rather than by a repeal.

The one genuine legal caste line ran the other way. The special settler, the returned deportee barred from his own republic, the man with a bad entry for social origin or wartime conduct — these were *disabilities*, and a disability imposed on some is not a liberty conferred on the rest. It is a graduated exposure to the same unlimited authority.

So the module's answer to the inside/outside question is that **an order which has foreclosed plurality has no inside group with liberties, because there are none in the system to have.** What it distributes instead is access, and access is a different object that does the same social work of stratification while doing none of the legal work of restraint.

The inside and outside line did arrive, sharply — in 1991, drawn by citizenship legislation, and pointing in the opposite direction from the one the Soviet decades had established. That belongs to what comes after.

The formula, and the forum that could not be used

Every Soviet constitution from 1924 onward carried a right of secession for the union republics; the 1977 text carried it at Article 72. In sixty-seven years no republic invoked it, and there was no institution anywhere obliged to receive an invocation if one had been made. This collection has recorded that shape before and named it: a formula with no forum, which is the most economical way of holding a promise open indefinitely without ever having to keep it.

Then somebody invoked it.

On 11 March 1990 the Supreme Council of Lithuania — elected the previous month in the republic's first competitive elections, and chaired by the musicologist Vytautas Landsbergis — adopted the Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania, and every member of the council signed it.

Attend to the title, because it is the hinge of the module. It is not an act of secession. Its argument is that the annexation of 1940 was never lawful; that the state which existed from 1918 to 1940 had never validly ceased to exist; and that what was being done was restoration rather than departure. The Baltic Appeal of 1979 had asked for exactly this, in exactly this form, and had been answered with camp sentences: disclose the protocol, void it from the moment of signature, restore the states.

Gorbachev declared the act illegal. On 3 April 1990 — twenty-three days later — the Supreme Soviet adopted a law on the procedure for resolving questions connected with the secession of a union republic.

Its terms are worth setting out, because they are the answer the framework predicts and then something more.

Secession would require a referendum carried by two-thirds of the citizens permanently resident on the republic's territory and entitled to vote — which in Latvia and Estonia meant the entire settler population, and in Latvia by then something close to half the residents. On the contemporary reading of the law, it was to be a referendum in which no campaigning would be permitted. Separate referendums might be held in autonomous formations and in areas of compact minority settlement. If the vote succeeded, the Congress of People's Deputies would fix a transitional period of up to five years, during which the constitution and laws of the USSR would remain in force throughout the seceding republic, and during which a call by ten per cent of the population could force a fresh referendum. At the end of it the Congress would decide whether the process was complete. If the vote failed, no new referendum could be held for ten years.

The corpus's standing finding is that a written formula without a forum is empty. This case supplies the sequel, and the sequel is not what one would have predicted.

The forum was built — and entering it would have conceded the case.

To use the secession procedure was to accept that Lithuania was a Soviet republic lawfully within the union and seeking to leave it. That was precisely

the proposition which the whole Baltic argument, from the Appeal of 1979 through the Hirvepark demonstration of 1987 to the Act of 11 March, had been constructed to deny — and which the Congress of People's Deputies had itself conceded on 24 December 1989 when it declared the secret protocol void from the moment of signature. Lithuania therefore refused the forum, and the refusal was not obstinacy. It was the only position consistent with eleven years of argument, and with the Soviet Union's own resolution of the previous December.

So the corpus gains a second instrument to set beside the empty formula. **A forum supplied late by the order itself is not a remedy but a final defence, because crossing its threshold validates the premise it was built to protect.** The two are the same device at different stages of a crisis: first there is no door, and then, when a door becomes unavoidable, there is a door whose threshold is a signature on the very thing you came to contest. The procedural conditions — two-thirds of all residents, no campaigning, minority referendums, five years under Soviet law, a ten-year bar — were belt and braces. The premise alone was sufficient.

What came instead of the forum is the plainest thing in this module. From 18 April to 2 July 1990 the Soviet Union blockaded Lithuania: centralised energy supply restricted or cut, foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals restricted, the borders sealed, the republic's bank accounts blocked. And on 13 January 1991 Soviet troops stormed the television centre and the television tower in Vilnius, killing fourteen people and injuring a number given between about a hundred and fifty and seven hundred on the differing counts, while Gorbachev denied having ordered it or having known in advance. Riga followed within days.

An invocation of the constitution's own guarantee was answered first with an energy cut-off and then with tanks at a broadcasting tower. The seam and the floor arrived in the same fortnight, at the same address.

Reading liberty against the framework

Four findings.

The instrument that produces a reliable elite is the instrument that forecloses liberty, and it is one instrument and not two. This is the module's contribution and the collection's clearest demonstration of the proposition it has been testing since the beginning. Rights are residue: what a faction extracts

when it is too dangerous to crush and too weak to win. A faction requires a base — land, money, arms, clients, a foreign patron. This order abolished bases by design, for reasons entirely internal to its own coordination problem, and thereby produced both the most dependable coordinating class in this collection and the most complete absence of any counterweight in it. The corollary is a working diagnostic: **an unusually docile elite is not evidence of consent; it is evidence that something was withheld, and what was withheld is the same thing a right would have had to be built on.**

A base is necessary and not sufficient. The Lithuanian Church possessed a genuine independent base for fifty years and produced seventeen years of clandestine publication, thirty-odd human rights documents, a coalition of priests and poets and Jews — and not one enforceable right. The additional condition the corpus should record is that the faction's *members* must be individually secure enough to keep pressing, and not merely its institution durable enough to survive them. Where the state can remove any given person on any given Tuesday, the institution persists and the pressure never accumulates. That is why the mechanism appears historically among nobles, chartered towns, guilds and armed churches, and not among the brave.

Where no domestic faction exists, a base can be borrowed from outside — but only in an order that needs somebody's recognition. Helsinki is the instance: the Soviet Union got the borders it had wanted for thirty years and gave, in exchange, a text that its own citizens then held it to. The method was insistence on compliance rather than defiance, which is the only method available to people with nothing of their own to stand on. And it was available at all only because of what this study established about the robe — an order claiming consent and equality cannot repudiate a human-rights undertaking without attacking its own claim. **A doctrine that requires the world's recognition supplies its opponents with the one asset it has otherwise denied them.**

A late forum is a defence, not a remedy. The empty formula and the unusable forum are the same instrument at two stages of a crisis, and both should be read as evidence about the same thing: whether the order intends the promise to be capable of being kept. Lithuania's refusal to enter the procedure of 3 April 1990 is the single clearest demonstration available anywhere in this collection of what a written right without an independent adjudicator actually is.

The strongest counter-position has to be stated properly, because it is a serious argument and it is not made only by apologists. It runs: the liberal conception of liberty measured here is a narrow one, concerned with procedures for restraining a state and indifferent to whether a person is free of hunger, illiteracy, unemployment, medical ruin or a landlord. The Soviet constitution guaranteed work, education, medical care, housing and a pension, and in the Baltic republics it delivered them at a standard above the union's average and above what those countries' own governments had achieved in twenty years. A right to publish a newspaper is worth very little to a man who cannot read and has no bread, and a system that provides the second while denying the first is not obviously worse than one that reverses the arrangement.

The answer does not require denying any of the goods. It is that they were **distributions, held at the pleasure of the distributor**, and that the difference between a distribution and a right is not philosophical but operational — it is the difference between something that can be withdrawn to punish you and something that cannot.

And this order demonstrated the difference itself, in public, in April 1990, when the distributor cut off the energy, the food and the medicines of three million people, and blocked their bank accounts, in order to punish a vote taken in their parliament. A benefit that can be switched off to answer a political act was never on the rights side of the ledger. It was an instrument of the cost column all along, and everybody in Lithuania found out which it was within five weeks of the vote.

What would break this reading: evidence of any institutional constraint that actually bound — a court that overturned a party decision and made it stick, a trade union that won against a ministry, a republican supreme soviet that refused an all-union instruction and was not reversed, before 1988. This study has not found one and has not conducted the search that would settle it; the finding rests on the structural argument and on the absence of counter-instances in the general literature, which is weaker evidence than a completed search would be.

A note on sources. Three constitutional texts are quoted exactly, from the 1977 Constitution of the USSR as reproduced in the standard English editions: Article 50 in full so far as the guarantee runs, Article 49's provision on persecution for criticism, and Article 6 on the

leading and guiding role of the party. The translations are the standard Novosti-derived English versions in general circulation and have not been checked against the Russian.

The law of 3 April 1990 on the procedure for resolving questions connected with the secession of a union republic is paraphrased from the English translation reproduced in the *Seventeen Moments in Soviet History* collection, which carries Articles 9, 10 and 20 among others; the summary of its practical effect — a two-thirds referendum of permanently resident citizens, no campaigning permitted, separate referendums in autonomous formations and minority enclaves, a transitional period of up to five years under Soviet law, a ten per cent trigger for a fresh referendum during that period, final ratification by the Congress of People's Deputies, and a ten-year bar after a failed vote — follows the contemporary analysis published in *Foreign Affairs* in June 1990 together with the text. The characterisation of the referendum as one in which no campaigning would be allowed is that contemporary analysis's reading and should be checked against the statute before it is quoted as a provision.

The Act of the Re-Establishment of the State of Lithuania of 11 March 1990, its signature by every member of the Supreme Council, and its legal theory — that the annexation of 1940 was never lawful and that the pre-war state had never validly ceased — are from the Lithuanian official accounts. The blockade of 18 April to 2 July 1990, with restriction of centralised energy supply, foodstuffs and pharmaceuticals, the sealing of borders and the blocking of the republic's bank accounts, follows the reference accounts. The events of 13 January 1991 — the storming of the television centre and tower in Vilnius, fourteen killed, injury figures given variously at more than 150 and at seven hundred, and Gorbachev's denial of having ordered or foreknown the operation — are given as the sources give them, with the divergence in the injury figures reported rather than resolved.

The Helsinki monitoring groups follow the reference and documentary accounts: the Moscow group announced in May 1976 at a press conference organised by Sakharov with Yuri Orlov announcing the formation; the Ukrainian group on 9 November 1976; the Lithuanian on 25 November 1976 (the founding date is given as 27 November in some sources and the divergence is noted); the Armenian in April 1977 and the Georgian in November 1977. The Lithuanian group's founders — Viktoras Petkus, Tomas Venclova, Karolis Garuckas, Eitanas Finkelšteinas and Ona Lukauskaitė-Poškienė — its total membership of forty-one over its life, and its publication of more than thirty

documents on religious repression, restrictions on freedom of movement, political abuse of psychiatry, discrimination against minorities and persecution of activists are from the reference accounts. Its statement on the origin of Lithuania's status in the entry of Soviet troops on 15 June 1940 is quoted in substance from a contemporary English translation of the group's own documents published in *Lituanus* in 1977. The imprisonment figures for the Ukrainian group — all but one of thirty-eight members imprisoned at some point, and three deaths in the camps since May 1984 — are from the United States Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe's published compilation. Helsinki-86's foundation on 10 July 1986 in Liepāja by Linards Grantiņš, Raimonds Bitenieks and Mārtiņš Bariss, its status as the first openly anti-communist organisation in the Soviet Union, and the flower-laying at the Freedom Monument on 14 June 1987 are from the reference accounts. The term *radical civil obedience* is taken from a recent doctoral thesis on the Helsinki Final Act and is that author's formulation, reported rather than reproduced as a source's own coinage.

The Chronicle of the Catholic Church in Lithuania is as established earlier in this study and is not re-sourced here.

Two limitations. The negative finding at the centre of this module — that no institutional constraint actually bound anywhere in these republics before 1988 — rests on a structural argument and on the absence of counter-instances in the literature consulted, and not on a completed search of the republican court and arbitration records, which would be the proper test. And the constitutional and statutory texts have been read in English translation throughout.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE TEN

MÕTLEME VEEL

Module 10 · Change and collapse — the largest mass movement in Baltic history, proposed on a state television talk show by the head of a department of the state planning committee; a quarter of a million people singing on grounds the order had built and paid for; force used three times in the union and de-escalating each time; and the arithmetic that shows which of the two variables was doing the work

The prediction, and what would break it

The framework's claim about structural change is unsentimental and it is the claim this module exists to test. Orders of this kind do not fall because the ruled rise. A peasant, a factory hand or a collective farm worker does not overthrow a functioning state apparatus, and in the whole of this collection none has. Change comes from inside the hierarchy: a fracture between elite factions, exhaustion that makes the arrangement cost more than it returns, conquest by a rival, or a surplus of qualified claimants the order manufactured and never seated. And in an acquisition held from a distance, the place to look is the metropolitan elite, and the question to ask is when it repriced what holding the thing was worth.

This is the hardest test that proposition will get anywhere in this collection, because the Baltic case is the one that looks most like its refutation. Two million people formed a chain across three countries. A quarter of a million sang at a stadium. The whole episode is called the Singing Revolution, and the name asserts the opposite of everything in the paragraph above.

So the honest procedure is to say in advance what would break the finding, and then to test all three conditions rather than the convenient one.

The finding fails if the mass movements arose outside the apparatus. It fails if they extracted concessions the centre had not already decided it was unwilling to refuse by force. And it fails if comparable mobilisations elsewhere in the same union produced comparable outcomes, irrespective of the centre's condition —

because if the same instrument works everywhere it is applied, then the instrument is the cause.

Mõtleme veel

On 13 April 1988 a live programme went out on Estonian Television called *Mõtleme veel* — let us think some more. On it, Edgar Savisaar, head of a department of the state planning committee of the Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic, proposed the creation of a popular front in support of perestroika: a legal, democratic opposition to the ruling party. A founding committee was constituted in the television studio that same night and the movement's declaration was drafted there. A parallel group formed at Tartu within days. The Popular Front held its founding congress on 1 and 2 October 1988.

The first breaking condition therefore fails, and it fails in the most literal way the record could have arranged. The largest mass movement in Estonian history was proposed by a state planning official, on the state's own television, in support of the general secretary's own programme, and organised in the studio before the broadcast lights went down.

The pattern repeats across the three republics. Sąjūdis was constituted in June 1988 at the Academy of Sciences in Vilnius. The Popular Front of Latvia was founded on 9 October 1988 under a journalist, Dainis Īvāns.

And the step before it was the same. The proposal for a self-managing Estonia — the IME of September 1987 — was published in the newspaper *Edasi* by Savisaar together with Siim Kallas, Tiit Made and Mikk Titma: an economist and three planners and sociologists. It came directly out of the phosphorite campaign, which had been led from inside the Estonian Academy of Sciences by men including Endel Lippmaa.

The step after it is the most revealing of all. In early April 1988, days before the television programme, Estonia's creative unions met jointly and publicly demanded democratic change and the resignation of Karl Vaino — the Russian-born, Russian-speaking first secretary who had rejected Gorbachev's reforms — along with that of Bruno Saul, who nominally headed the republic's government. On 16 June 1988 Vaino resigned and was replaced by Vaino Väljas.

Read that sequence as a whole. A republic's cultural establishment publicly demanded the removal of its first secretary; the metropole removed him; and the mass movement that had made the demand had been founded eight weeks

earlier by a planning official on the state's own airwaves in support of the metropole's own reform programme.

That is not a rising. It is an intra-elite fight conducted in the open, with a crowd in attendance.

What the crowd was actually for

The crowd should not be condescended to, and the way to avoid condescending to it is to say precisely what it did.

On 17 June 1988 more than a hundred and fifty thousand people gathered at the Tallinn song festival grounds, sang the anthem of the pre-war republic and flew the blue, black and white tricolour. On 11 September 1988 the gathering called *Eestimaa laul* — song of Estonia — brought something in the range of a quarter to three hundred thousand people to the same grounds. On 23 August 1989, the fiftieth anniversary of the pact, about two million people formed a chain from Tallinn through Riga to Vilnius.

The venue closes an argument this study opened four modules ago. The order had built that stage. It had funded the choirs, printed the songbooks, trained the conductors, subsidised the tickets and required the anthems of the union and the republic, the Internationale and songs glorifying the party in every programme from 1947 to 1985. What filled the grounds in 1988 was the instrument the order had paid for across thirty-eight years, used for the purpose it had been built for in 1869 and had never stopped being built for.

What the crowd supplied was not authorship. It supplied two things that an elite faction cannot manufacture for itself.

The first is **scale**, which removed a characterisation. A demand made by four economists in a newspaper can be described as the work of a handful of nationalists; the same demand made by a quarter of a million people singing cannot. The second is **visibility**, which changed the price of the alternative. Any repression of a movement of that size would necessarily be a large, filmed, internationally reported act.

So the framework's formulation — that the people are the fuel and not the authors — is correct in mechanism and can be stated more exactly on this evidence. **A mass movement inside a foreclosed order cannot legislate, cannot govern and cannot defeat an army; what it can do is select among elite factions, by making one of them unbeatable and the other**

unemployable. Väljas rather than Vaino. Brazauskas rather than Burokevičius. Rüütel and Gorbunovs rather than the men who were sending appeals to Moscow. That is real causal work, and it is not the same thing as authorship.

The metropole reprices

The second variable is the decisive one, and it has two halves that are genuinely disputed against each other.

The fiscal half is stark. Brent crude fell from around thirty dollars a barrel in 1985 to around fifteen in 1986. Soviet hard-currency export earnings fell from about thirty-two billion dollars in 1983–84 to $25.1 billion in 1986, with oil earnings alone collapsing from an average above fifteen billion to roughly seven billion by the end of 1986. Gross hard-currency debt nearly doubled, from about twenty-two billion in 1984 to $41.2 billion by the end of 1987. The budget deficit, traditionally two or three per cent of national product, moved to something around ten. Chernobyl came in April 1986 and the Armenian earthquake in December 1988. By the middle of 1991 foreign trade was down by about a third, a budget deficit planned at twenty-six billion roubles was being estimated at a hundred and twenty-five, and national product in the first quarter was down about a tenth.

The dissenting half has to be reported at equal weight, because it is held by serious people. On that reading the economics were not decisive at all: growth averaged 1.9 per cent between 1981 and 1985 and rose later in the decade; a deficit reaching nine per cent by 1989 is bad but not fatal; and on the assessment of leading specialists in the late Soviet economy the financial crisis did not become acute until 1988 and could have been averted as late as the summer of 1990. On that view the collapse was a political choice and not a fiscal necessity.

The framework does not have to adjudicate between them, because its claim is about **repricing** and not about insolvency. What it asserts is that the men at the top revised their estimate of what the arrangement was worth against what holding it cost — and both readings agree that they did, and differ only about why.

And the repricing is directly documented, by a hostile observer, in the framework's own vocabulary. An assessment produced by the Central Intelligence Agency in the period recorded that Gorbachev was gambling that a

flexible and constructive approach to demands for autonomy would eventually erode secessionist sentiment, rather than a show of force that would cripple his reform programme and cost him international goodwill; and that Moscow was unlikely to abandon support for reform in the Baltic within the bounds of perestroika. That is a cost–benefit calculation set out by an analyst with no interest in flattering anybody, in 1989 or 1990, in the terms this study uses.

The other component was visible to everyone. In October 1989 the Soviet Union let Eastern Europe go without force. Once the outer empire had been released, every calculation in the inner one changed, and the Baltic elites could read that as well as anyone in Moscow.

The control: the same instrument, three times

Now the third breaking condition, and here the union obligingly supplies its own control group.

Tbilisi, 9 April 1989. A peaceful pro-independence demonstration on Rustaveli Avenue, thousands strong, some of them on hunger strike. Interior ministry troops cleared it with gas and sapper spades. Twenty-one people died, sixteen or seventeen of them women, one of them a schoolgirl of sixteen; a hundred and eighty-three were hospitalised in the first hours; and some four thousand people sought medical attention within the month.

Baku, 19–20 January 1990. After special forces demolished the central television station and cut the telephone and radio lines, twenty-six thousand troops entered the city through the barricades. Deaths are given between a hundred and thirty-one and a hundred and seventy, with an Azerbaijani official figure of a hundred and forty-seven; injuries at seven to eight hundred.

Vilnius, 13 January 1991. Troops stormed the television centre and the television tower. Fourteen people were killed, and the injured are given at more than a hundred and fifty and at seven hundred on the differing counts.

The instrument on the demonstrators' side was identical in all three: unarmed, mass, non-violent mobilisation, by populations with equivalent grievances and equivalent courage. The outcomes were not determined by the crowds. And the sequence is the finding: the death toll falls sharply across the three, while the political cost to the centre rises each time.

Embedded in that sequence is the sharpest mechanism in this module, and it was named at the time by the people it happened to.

After Tbilisi, the Soviet leadership refused to take responsibility for the order to clear the square. A commission of the Congress of People's Deputies reported in December 1989 blaming the military for the civilian deaths; the defence ministry conducted its own investigation blaming the demonstrators; Shevardnadze criticised the military publicly. What followed was called the **Tbilisi syndrome**: a reluctance among officers and soldiers to take tactical decisions, or to obey orders at all, without a clear trail of responsibility running to a superior who could be made to own them. It spread after Baku and after Vilnius. And it is credited with contributing, in August 1991, to the refusal of soldiers to move against demonstrators during the coup.

A floor requires men willing to be the ones who did it. That is the whole of it. The instrument of force is not a machine; it is a set of individual people each of whom is calculating, exactly as the framework says every position-holder calculates, what obedience will cost him. When the centre demonstrated — once, publicly, over twenty-one Georgian bodies — that it would disown the man who carried out the order, the order stopped being reliably executable everywhere in the union, in advance of any further decision, and invisibly until somebody tried.

That is the framework's proposition in its purest available form. The floor cracked inside the hierarchy; and it cracked, in the end, at the level of the men holding the spades, in a republic that is not the subject of this study, two years before the tower at Vilnius.

August

The end came as the framework would predict and not as the narrative requires.

On 19 August 1991 eight men in Moscow attempted to remove the general secretary. Estonia declared its independence on 20 August and Latvia on 21 August — during the attempt, not after it, because from Tallinn and Riga it was possible to see that it was failing. It failed in part because the instrument would not act. The Soviet Union recognised the independence of the three states on 6 September 1991.

The decisive event in the restoration of Baltic independence was a putsch in Moscow, by members of the Soviet government, against another member of the Soviet government, over an argument about the terms of a union treaty. Nobody in Tallinn, Riga or Vilnius had any part in it.

Reading collapse against the framework

Four findings.

The prediction holds, and all three breaking conditions fail against the evidence. The movements were founded inside the apparatus, by the apparatus's own officials, on the apparatus's own television, in support of the metropole's own programme. The concessions followed a repricing at the centre that was under way before the crowds assembled and that a foreign intelligence service was describing in cost-benefit terms at the time. And the identical instrument, applied by equally determined populations, met lethal force in Georgia in 1989 and Azerbaijan in 1990 and bought nothing except graves — because the variable that differed was not the crowd.

"The people are fuel" is right and can be stated more precisely, and the case supplies the precise version. A mass movement in a foreclosed order cannot form a government, pass a law or defeat an army; every one of those requires institutions it has been prevented from building. What it can do is two things that matter enormously and are not authorship. It can **select among elite factions**, making one unbeatable and another unemployable, which is how Väljas replaced Vaino and how Brazauskas rather than Burokevičius ended up leading Lithuania. And it can **reprice repression**, by making any use of force large, filmed and internationally reported at precisely the moment the centre requires standing abroad. The crowd is not the author of the change. It is the price mechanism through which the fight inside the hierarchy gets settled.

A floor fails at the level of the men who must carry it out, and it fails when the centre declines to own the order. This is the module's genuine addition to the framework and it generalises well beyond this case. Every apparatus of force runs on an implicit assurance: the man who fires will be covered by the man who told him to. That assurance is not written anywhere and is never tested until it is needed. Withdraw it publicly on a single occasion — as the Soviet leadership did after Tbilisi, by letting a parliamentary commission and a foreign minister blame the troops — and the instrument degrades throughout the system, in advance of any further decision, with no visible sign until somebody gives an order and it is not carried out. **Look for the moment the centre first disowned its own executioners; that is the date the floor became unenforceable, and it will precede the collapse by years.**

And the claimant surplus was real, and it was Baltic. The men who wrote the self-managing Estonia proposal, who fought the phosphorite decision, who founded the fronts and who signed the declarations were planners, economists, sociologists, chemists, journalists and a musicologist — a credentialled professional class produced in quantity by the order's own formation programme, and structurally barred from the top of every chain by an architecture that reserved the summit for Moscow's appointees and removed anyone who acquired a base of his own. The order spent forty years manufacturing exactly the class its own design guaranteed could never arrive anywhere. **A formation programme that produces more qualified claimants than the hierarchy has seats is a slow fracture with a long fuse**, and it is the one form of exhaustion that a successful order generates by succeeding.

The counter-position deserves to be put at its full strength, because it is not merely sentimental and it is the objection most readers of this module will feel.

It runs: this analysis is a machine for making courage disappear. People stood in front of armoured vehicles at the Vilnius tower on a January night and fourteen of them were killed there. Two million people stood in a line across three countries in the rain. Men and women who had watched their families go east in cattle wagons put their names to a letter in 1979 and went to camps for eight years. A framework that reports that the decisive variable was a hard-currency position and a general secretary's estimate of his international standing has described a mechanism and missed the event.

The answer is not to soften the finding, and it is not to deny anything in the objection.

The framework is a claim about what makes structures change. It is not a claim about what is admirable, and it is not a claim about what was true for the people inside it. The fourteen at the tower died, and their dying is precisely what made a second Vilnius unavailable to the men who ordered the first. The two million in the chain are why the pact could not go on being denied. The signatories of 1979 are why there was a demand ready and formulated when the price fell.

And the honest version of the finding is that the courage was necessary and was not sufficient — which is exactly what the control group establishes, and which is a verdict on the variable that differed and not on the Georgians and Azerbaijanis, whose courage was identical and who buried twenty-one and a hundred and fifty of their own and waited two more years.

What would break this reading: archival evidence that Moscow's decisions in 1990 and 1991 responded to Baltic street mobilisation independently of the fiscal position and the international one — that is, minutes in which the size of a demonstration, rather than its consequences abroad, changed a decision. This study has read the Soviet decision-making through published assessments and secondary accounts and has not been into the Politburo material, and the finding should be held with that limitation attached.

A note on sources. The title is the name of the Estonian Television programme on which the Popular Front was proposed; the translation given is the ordinary one and the programme's name is rendered in some English sources simply as *Let's Think*.

The founding sequence follows the Estonian public broadcaster's thirtieth-anniversary account, the Estonian émigré chronology, the Victoria and Albert Museum's catalogue note on the Popular Front's second congress poster, and the reference literature: Savisaar's position as head of a department of the state planning committee; his proposal on the live broadcast of 13 April 1988; the formation of the founding committee and the drafting of the declaration in the studio that night and of a parallel group at Tartu days later; the official founding congress of 1 and 2 October 1988; the joint meeting of the creative unions in early April 1988 demanding democratic change and the resignations of Karl Vaino and Bruno Saul; Vaino's resignation on 16 June 1988 and replacement by Vaino Väljas; the demonstration of more than 150,000 at the song festival grounds on 17 June 1988; and the *Eestimaa laul* gathering of 11 September 1988, whose attendance is given variously between a quarter and three hundred thousand and is reported here as a range. The IME proposal of September 1987 in *Edasi* by Savisaar, Kallas, Made and Titma is as established earlier in this study. The Popular Front of Latvia's founding on 9 October 1988 under Dainis Īvāns and the constitution of Sąjūdis in June 1988 are from the reference accounts. The Baltic Way figure of about two million is as established earlier.

The fiscal figures are given as their sources give them and the dispute between them is reported rather than resolved. The oil-price and hard-currency series — Brent from about thirty dollars a barrel in 1985 to about fifteen in 1986; hard-currency export earnings of thirty-two billion dollars in 1983–84 falling to $25.1 billion in 1986 with oil earnings falling from a 1982–84 average of $15.2 billion to roughly seven billion by the end of 1986; gross hard-currency debt

rising from about twenty-two billion in 1984 to $41.2 billion by the end of 1987; and a budget deficit moving from two or three per cent of national product to around ten — are from a recent analysis drawing on a 1988 CIA retrospective. The mid-1991 figures — foreign trade down about a third, a planned deficit of twenty-six billion roubles estimated at a hundred and twenty-five, national product down about ten per cent in the first quarter — are from a published survey of the collapse. The dissenting assessment — growth of 1.9 per cent from 1981 to 1985 rising later in the decade, a deficit of almost nine per cent by 1989 judged manageable, and the conclusion of leading specialists that the financial crisis did not become acute until 1988 and could have been averted as late as the summer of 1990 — is from Leon Aron's essay on the Soviet collapse and is reported here as the serious dissent it is.

The intelligence assessment paraphrased in the text — that Gorbachev was gambling on a flexible approach to demands for autonomy rather than a show of force that would cripple his reform programme and cost him international goodwill — is from a Central Intelligence Agency document released through its reading room; its exact date and classification level have not been established by this study and should be before the passage is relied on further.

The three crackdowns follow the reference and documentary accounts, with the divergent figures reported as ranges. Tbilisi, 9 April 1989: clearance of the Rustaveli Avenue demonstration by interior ministry troops using gas and sapper spades, twenty-one dead of whom sixteen or seventeen were women and one a girl of sixteen, a hundred and eighty-three hospitalised in the first hours, and some four thousand seeking medical help within the month; the parliamentary commission's report of December 1989 blaming the military, the defence ministry's counter-investigation, and Shevardnadze's public criticism. Baku, 19–20 January 1990: the demolition of the central television station and cutting of communications, the entry of twenty-six thousand troops, deaths given between 131 and 170 with an Azerbaijani official figure of 147, and seven to eight hundred injured. Vilnius, 13 January 1991, as established earlier in this study. The *Tbilisi syndrome* — the reluctance of officers and soldiers to take tactical decisions or obey orders without a clear trail of responsibility to a higher authority, arising from the leadership's refusal to own the order, spreading after Baku and Vilnius, and contributing in 1991 to the refusal of soldiers to act against demonstrators during the putsch — is named and described in the reference and analytical literature on the April 9 events, and is reported here as

that literature reports it; the causal claim about August 1991 is theirs and is a judgement rather than a documented finding.

The August 1991 sequence — the coup of 19 to 21 August, the Estonian declaration of 20 August and the Latvian of 21 August during the attempt, and Soviet recognition on 6 September 1991 — is from the standard chronologies.

Two limitations. This module has read Soviet central decision-making through published assessments, memoir-derived accounts and secondary literature, and not through the Politburo record; the repricing finding is therefore inferential in its detail even though both sides of the economic dispute agree on its existence. And the *Tbilisi syndrome*, which carries the module's third finding, is a characterisation made in the analytical literature rather than a documented military-sociological measurement, and should be tested against the operational record before the corpus builds on it.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE ELEVEN

SIXTY-FOUR POINT FOUR ONE

Module 11 · The grim accounting — what the sword cost, counted with ranges and without rhetoric; a metabolic note that was never called as famine because the conquest never broke the food system; the debt presented instead in a currency no body count records; an environmental balance left on three coastlines for somebody else to settle; and the column of real achievement, priced against the only comparator that means anything

What the sword cost

The direct ledger first, with ranges, and with the attribution problem stated rather than finessed.

Between 13 and 14 June 1941 the Soviet security apparatus removed between forty and forty-five thousand people from the three republics in a week — roughly ten thousand from Estonia, about fifteen thousand from Latvia including some 2,400 children under ten, and about seventeen and a half thousand deported from Lithuania with higher figures where arrests are counted alongside deportations.

After the reconquest the waves resumed: an estimated sixty thousand from Lithuania in August and September 1945, forty thousand more in February 1946, perhaps sixty thousand from Latvia across 1945 and 1946, and Operation *Vesna* in May 1948, which fell on Lithuania alone.

Operation *Priboi*, from 25 to 28 March 1949, moved something between ninety and ninety-five thousand people, with an archival count of 94,779; the published republic figures are 33,496 from Lithuania, 41,445 from Latvia and 20,660 from Estonia, and these do not match the quotas set in Moscow in January, which is itself worth noting rather than smoothing.

The insurgency of 1944 to 1953 cost, on the Soviet record-based counts, something over twenty thousand Lithuanian partisans killed with about the same number captured, against about 12,900 Soviet dead in Lithuania; the

national historiographies more commonly give twenty to thirty thousand Lithuanian dead including supporters, with Latvian and Estonian partisan deaths in the low thousands.

Aggregated, the standard reference estimate is that deportations and guerrilla deaths between 1946 and 1953 reached about ninety-five thousand in Estonia, a hundred and twenty-five thousand in Latvia and three hundred and ten thousand in Lithuania.

And for the whole period, the Estonian parliament's own published accounting states that between 1940 and 1991 nearly ninety thousand citizens of the Republic of Estonia perished, and about the same number left the country forever — a total, for the war and the repression that followed it, estimated at 17.5 per cent of the number of Estonians.

Two things have to be said about that ledger before it is used for anything.

The first is the attribution problem, and it is not a technicality. These countries were occupied three times in five years. The wartime population loss is given at around twenty-five per cent for Estonia, thirty for Latvia and fifteen for Lithuania, and those figures include the Soviet deportations of 1941, the German extermination of the Jewish populations, and the flight of 1944. Any single-authorship accounting of the 1940–45 losses is a political act, and this study will not perform one. What can be laid to this order's account specifically is the deportations of 1941 and 1949, the postwar waves, the counter-insurgency, the executions and the camp deaths — and that is a large enough figure to carry every argument in this study without borrowing a single body from anybody else's column.

The second is the demographic residue, which is the quietest sentence in the Estonian accounting and possibly the heaviest. Estonians and Latvians are the only independent nations in Europe whose numbers today are smaller than they were at the beginning of the twentieth century.

The note that was not called

Now the metabolic question, and the answer is a negative one, which is why it is worth the space.

The proposition this collection carries is that an advanced order lifts a population above the land's natural carrying capacity by coordination — irrigation, storage, transport, specialisation, the ability to move grain from a

good district to a bad one. The population thereafter is a function of the coordination rather than of the soil. Break the coordination and the note is called, and it is called in the only currency the land will accept. That is what happened to the Kazakh herd when collectivisation destroyed the pastoral system it depended on, and it is what has been found elsewhere in this collection where an intensive agrarian order was decapitated.

In the Baltic it did not happen, and the reasons are the finding.

There was no coordination system of that kind to break. Baltic agriculture in 1940 was mixed family farming — dairy, bacon, flax, rye, timber — on temperate maritime land with reliable rainfall, at a population density well inside what the ground would carry without any organisation at all. The interwar reforms had produced a countryside of smallholdings each of which fed its own household first. There was no hydraulic system, no transhumance route, no monoculture dependent on a single export channel. Destroying the coordination of that economy makes people poorer. It does not make them starve.

The extraction was positional rather than agrarian, which mattered enormously. The conqueror wanted the ports, the shale, the coastline and the transit. He did not require the grain, so he was never under the pressure that produces a procurement famine — the pressure to take the seed corn because the plan says the district must deliver.

The showcase term applied. These republics had to be visibly better off than the rest of the union, for the union's own population and for the West, and a showcase cannot be held at subsistence.

And the timing and the scale were different. The Baltic collectivisation catastrophe arrived in 1949 and 1950, not 1930 to 1933; the populations were small; and a continental supply system could cover a shortfall of that size without noticing.

One discrepancy has to be reported rather than resolved. A strand of the specialist literature states plainly that collectivisation in the Baltic states led to widespread famine, citing work by Feest, Girnius and Swain. The standard accounts of the Soviet famine of 1946–47 place its epicentre in southern Ukraine, the central black-earth regions of Russia, Moldavia and parts of the lower Volga, and do not list the Baltic republics among the affected zones. And the population series shows all three republics growing steadily from 1950 to 1990. This study has not resolved that discrepancy and does not build on either

side of it; what it records is only that no demographic signature of a mass-mortality famine appears in the Baltic series, which is the kind of event that cannot hide in one.

So the corpus gains a control case, and control cases are what make positive findings mean anything. **Metabolic debt is called in only where the coordination destroyed is the coordination the population's numbers actually depended on.** Where a conquest wrecks the organisation of an economy that was not carrying a surplus population, the result is impoverishment, resentment, shortage and a black market — not catastrophe. The Baltic is the negative case that gives the Kazakh and the Egyptian findings their edges.

The note in another currency

Something was nevertheless paid, and it is measurable, and no casualty figure anywhere records it. This is the module's contribution and it took looking in the wrong column to find.

The Estonian demographic series, reconstructed by E.-M. Tiit, shows life expectancy rising rapidly after the war, as it did everywhere. Then, in the early 1960s, the rise stopped — earlier for men than for women — and a stagnation began that lasted twenty years. By 1983/84 the life expectancy of Estonian men stood at **64.41 years, which was 1.19 years lower than it had been twenty years before.** Women's stood at 74.41, exceeding the level of 1963/64 by nine-tenths of a year.

Set that beside what was happening across the gulf. Over the same two decades Finland, Sweden and every Western European state were recording large and continuous gains in adult survival, driven by cardiovascular medicine, tobacco and alcohol policy, road safety, occupational health and the systematic pursuit of the diseases that were actually killing working-age men.

The mechanisms in the Baltic are identified in the epidemiological literature and they are not mysterious: cardiovascular disease, alcohol consumption including heavy episodic drinking, diet, industrial and environmental exposure, and a health system organised around universal coverage and hospital treatment rather than around prevention of the specific causes that were doing the killing.

Attend to what makes this finding sharp rather than merely sad. This was the *best-off* group of republics in the union. Its health system had genuinely

delivered: infant mortality down sharply from interwar levels, infectious disease suppressed, universal access, more physicians per head than most of Europe. Every achievement in the counter-column below is already fully credited in this number. And its men were dying earlier in 1984 than in 1964.

So the accounting gains a line it has not previously had. **Where a conquest does not break the food system, the metabolic note is not cancelled — it is presented in a different currency.** Not deaths from hunger, which are countable and photographable and appear in every ledger, but the arrest and reversal of the mortality decline that every comparable society was experiencing at the same time. It is a debt paid in years not lived rather than in bodies counted. It does not appear in any casualty figure, in any commission's report or in any of the competing totals argued over by the successor states and the Russian Federation. And it is the one column in which the order's own genuine achievements are already counted and the result is still negative.

Call it **forgone survival**, and note the methodological consequence: it can only be seen against a comparator, because measured against its own past it looks like success. Estonian life expectancy in 1984 was far above Estonian life expectancy in 1934. It was also falling.

The environmental note

A third kind of debt runs through this case, and its distinguishing feature is who ends up settling it.

At Sillamäe there is a repository on the Baltic shoreline holding on the order of twelve million tonnes of radioactive and chemically toxic tailings, with the earliest waste having gone directly into the sea. The remediation was completed in 2009 and was paid for by the European Union, the states around the Baltic and the three republics themselves, with American assistance.

Across Ida-Virumaa stand the artificial mountains of spent shale left by the Narva power stations, together with the air and water loads of forty years of oil shale combustion.

In Lithuania stood Ignalina, a reactor of the Chernobyl type, whose closure was made a condition of European Union accession and whose decommissioning is still running and still being funded.

And in the credit column, the phosphorite of the Rakvere deposit, which was never mined — the one extraction the population managed to stop, and the one environmental note that was never signed.

The characteristic of an environmental debt is that the payer is neither the beneficiary nor the debtor. The union that took the uranium, the electricity and the transit dissolved in December 1991. The bill arrived afterwards, addressed to three small states and to the taxpayers of a different political order altogether, and it is still being paid. No settlement between the parties to the original arrangement will ever include it, because by the time it falls due one of the parties has ceased to exist.

What was built

An accounting that omits this column is not an accounting, and the column is substantial.

Industry was built on a scale three small republics could never have financed: the Narva power stations, the ports, the chemical and electrical plants, the shipyards, the roads and the airfields. Higher and technical education expanded far beyond anything the interwar states had funded. Academies of sciences were established in all three republics, staffed by natives, publishing in the national languages. A technical and scientific cadre was trained, locally and in the leading institutes of Moscow and Leningrad. Health coverage became universal, infant mortality fell sharply, infectious disease was suppressed. Women entered full employment and the professions in numbers the interwar republics had not approached. And output per head stood above the union mean at the beginning and at the end, with Lithuania converging upward from about six per cent above the mean in 1938 to about thirty per cent above in 1989.

Every item on that list is real. The people who built them were not performing, and the daughter of a farm labourer who became a physician was not deceived about what had happened to her.

The comparator

The question is what that column was worth, and there is only one honest way to price it.

Not against 1940. Everything in Europe improved between 1940 and 1990 — every state on the continent had more doctors, more engineers, more electricity and lower infant mortality in 1990 than in 1940, including the ones that were conquered, the ones that did the conquering, and the ones that were left alone. An accounting that compares the end with the beginning will vindicate whoever happened to be holding the ground, every time, in every case in this collection.

The comparator is the nearest society that was not taken. On the available estimates Estonia and Finland stood at broadly comparable levels of income in the 1930s, and by 1988 Estonian income relative to Finland's had declined markedly — with the caution the source itself attaches, that the series rests on nominal figures converted at annualised rouble–markka rates. And Finnish male life expectancy rose steadily across the two decades in which Estonian male life expectancy fell by more than a year.

Finland was not a fortunate case. It fought a winter war and a continuation war, lost about eleven per cent of its territory and something over twenty-five thousand dead in the first of them, resettled four hundred thousand people, paid reparations, and spent the following forty-five years neutral, indebted, carefully polite to Moscow and trading with it heavily. It also kept its parliament, its property system, its churches, its newspapers, its choirs and its dead in its own ground.

The statement to make and then stop making is this. The achievements were real; the comparator achieved more of them, sooner, and kept its people alive longer; and it did so without a single deportation.

Reading the accounting against the framework

Four findings.

Metabolic debt requires a metabolic dependency, and this case is the control that establishes it. The proposition that conquest calls in a note run up by coordination is confirmed here by its absence: where there was no coordination-dependent surplus population, the destruction of the coordination produced poverty, shortage and a black market, and no mass mortality. The corpus should carry the conditional form — **the note falls due in proportion to how far the population's numbers exceeded what the**

ground would carry unaided — and should therefore, in any future case, establish the dependency before predicting the catastrophe.

Where the food system survives, the note is presented in a currency no body count records. Forgone survival is a real cost, it is large, and it is invisible to every method this collection has used. Estonian men in 1984 were dying more than a year earlier than Estonian men in 1964, in the richest republic of the union, with universal health coverage and more doctors per head than most of Europe. The methodological consequence is severe and general: **this cost can only be seen against a comparator**, because against its own past it reads as an achievement, and every order in this collection has reported it that way.

Environmental debt is the one class of cost whose payer is neither the beneficiary nor the debtor, and it therefore never appears in any settlement between them. It is the reason that a full accounting of an extractive order cannot be closed at the moment the order ends, and the reason that the argument about who owes whom — which this study declined to adjudicate in the extraction module — is not merely unresolved but unresolvable in the terms the parties are using.

And the counter-column must be priced against the comparator rather than against the starting point. This is the discipline that the strongest defence of every order in this collection depends on evading, and it is not a rhetorical move but an arithmetical one: measuring 1990 against 1940 measures the twentieth century, not the arrangement.

The counter-position has three parts and all three are serious.

The first is that the alternative on offer was worse. The Soviet Union defeated Nazi Germany; the German occupation of these three countries murdered their entire Jewish populations within months; and the plans held for the survivors were not compatible with the survivors' continued existence as nations. Any accounting which prices the Soviet decades without that in it is dishonest.

The second is that the industrial base, the educated population and the technical cadre that made the transitions of the 1990s possible were built in these decades, and that the Baltic states entered independence as the best-placed post-socialist economies in Europe substantially because of what had been put there.

The third is the hardest. It is that pricing everything against Finland smuggles in the conclusion: Finland fought and kept its state, the Baltic states did not fight and lost theirs, and to compare their outcomes is to compare the

consequences of a decision taken in June 1940 rather than the consequences of the arrangement that followed.

The first two are conceded, without qualification, and the second is quantified in the counter-column above. This study said in its first module that the alternative in 1941 was worse and it says so again here.

The third requires an answer rather than a concession, and the answer is about what the comparator is being used for. Finland is not offered here as a counterfactual — this study makes no claim that the Baltic states could have fought and won in 1940, and the geography, the population and the great-power position all argue that they could not. It is offered as a **price index**: a way of measuring what fifty years were worth in a comparable northern European society, so that the achievements of these decades can be valued in units other than the order's own. It does not establish that Estonia could have been Finland. It establishes what the period was worth, so that the column headed *what was built* can be read against something that is not the same order's own account of itself.

And the difference between the two columns, after everything real has been credited, is the cost.

What would break this reading: a demonstration that Baltic adult mortality in the 1960s and 1970s tracked a wider Northern and Eastern European pattern independent of the Soviet system — the Finnish male cardiovascular mortality of that period was itself among the worst in the world before the North Karelia intervention, and if the Estonian stagnation is largely the same regional phenomenon with a later remedy, the forgone-survival finding shrinks to a statement about the absence of public health policy rather than about the order. That is a real possibility, it is testable, and this study has not tested it.

A note on sources. No primary instrument is quoted in this module. Figures are given as their sources give them, with ranges where the sources differ, and the divergences are reported rather than reconciled.

The deportation figures are as established earlier in this study, with the addition of the published republic breakdown for March 1949 — 33,496 from Lithuania, 41,445 from Latvia and 20,660 from Estonia against an archival total of 94,779 — taken from a recent policy survey of Baltic depopulation; the discrepancy between those figures and the quotas fixed in Moscow in January

1949 is noted in the text and has not been resolved here. The postwar waves — an estimated 60,000 from Lithuania in August and September 1945, 40,000 in February 1946, perhaps 60,000 from Latvia across 1945–46, and Operation *Vesna* of May 1948 falling on Lithuania alone — are from the Gulag.online documentation project. The aggregate estimate that deportations and guerrilla deaths between 1946 and 1953 reached about 95,000 in Estonia, 125,000 in Latvia and 310,000 in Lithuania is from the standard reference account, as are the wartime population loss estimates of about 25 per cent for Estonia, 30 for Latvia and 15 for Lithuania, which that source states include the 1941 deportations, the German extermination of the Jewish populations and the flight of 1944.

The whole-period Estonian figures — nearly 90,000 citizens of the Republic of Estonia perishing between 1940 and 1991, about the same number leaving permanently, total losses of the war and subsequent repression estimated at 17.5 per cent of the number of Estonians, and the observation that Estonians and Latvians are the only independent nations in Europe whose numbers are smaller today than at the beginning of the twentieth century — are from the White Book published by the Riigikogu, the Estonian parliament, which is a state document with a declared position and is used here as such.

On the famine question: the claim that collectivisation in the Baltic states led to widespread famine appears in the introductory literature review of a recent article on family farming in the Baltic borderlands, citing Feest (2014), Girnius (1988) and Swain (2003), and is reported here as that literature states it. The standard accounts of the Soviet famine of 1946–47 — excess mortality of one to one and a half million, an epicentre in southern Ukraine, the central black-earth regions, Moldavia and parts of the lower Volga, and a drought described as the most severe since 1891 — do not list the Baltic republics among the affected zones. The population series showing steady growth in all three republics from 1950 to 1990 is from the standard statistical compilations. This study has not read Feest, Girnius or Swain in the original and the discrepancy is left open.

The Estonian life expectancy series is from E.-M. Tiit's study of changes in life expectancy in Estonia over the last seventy years, published in the University of Tartu's journal: rapid postwar increase; the stopping of the increase in the early 1960s, earlier for men than women; twenty years of stagnation; and male life expectancy in 1983/84 of 64.41 years, being 1.19 years less than twenty years earlier, against female life expectancy of 74.41, exceeding the 1963/64 level by

0.9 years. The characterisation of the mechanisms — cardiovascular disease, heavy and episodic alcohol consumption, diet, and the low-childhood-mortality/high-adult-mortality pattern distinctive of the former Soviet republics — follows the comparative epidemiological literature on Baltic mortality, paraphrased.

The Sillamäe tailings figure and remediation, the oil shale legacy, and the Estonia–Finland income comparison with its own attached caution are as established earlier in this study. The Ignalina closure as a condition of European Union accession is from the reference accounts. The Finnish wartime figures — approximately eleven per cent of territory ceded and something over twenty-five thousand dead in the Winter War, with about four hundred thousand people resettled — are from the standard accounts and are given in round terms.

Three limitations. The famine discrepancy is unresolved and the specialist works asserting Baltic famine have not been consulted directly. The forgone-survival finding rests on one national demographic series and on the general epidemiological literature, and the regional-pattern objection stated in the text has not been tested, though it is testable against the Finnish and Polish series. And the attribution problem in the 1940–45 figures is real: this study has confined its own accounting to what can be laid to the Soviet order specifically, and readers should treat any aggregate wartime figure quoted here as belonging to three occupations rather than to one.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.

MODULE TWELVE

POSSESSING EQUAL RIGHTS

Module 12 · Convergence and divergence — twelve instruments run over one acquisition, and what each returned; where this case reads identically to the European colonies and where it genuinely does not; what two Soviet cases on opposite terrain hold in common and what they do not; and the strongest arguments against everything in the preceding eleven modules, set out at full strength

The sentence being tested

On 3 August 1940 the Supreme Soviet of the USSR resolved to satisfy the request of the Seim of Lithuania and to admit the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics *as a constituent Soviet Socialist Republic possessing equal rights*. Latvia followed on 5 August and Estonia on 6 August.

Eleven modules have now run instruments across the fifty-one years that sentence opened. This one sets out what each returned, where the readings match the collection's other conquests and where they do not, and then puts the strongest cases against the whole exercise on the page in the terms their holders actually use.

What the instruments returned

The floor returned a reading unlike any other in the collection at the first count and a familiar one at the second. Three sovereign states with standing armies were taken in four days at a combat cost of about a dozen dead, because the credibility had been purchased in Finland the previous winter with other people's lives. The second count — removal by category, to numbers fixed in Moscow before anybody in the territory had been assessed — returned something between a hundred and thirty and a hundred and forty thousand people in two operations, and the associated arrests and lesser waves raise it substantially further.

The settlement ran the collection's standard conversion backwards. Where a colonial settlement turns relations between persons into transferable things so that the conqueror can grant, this one turned registered freeholds into revocable permissions, because it intended to hold the cultivator rather than to buy an elite. And where every other settlement in the corpus rests on a fiction about land, this one rested on a fiction about persons: the classification, which converts a decision about a man into a fact about him, and which — alone among the settlement fictions — can be revoked, backdated and inherited.

The robe faced the conquered rather than the metropole, which inverts the standing colonial finding, and the reason was neither generosity nor cynicism but a doctrinal disability: a power whose case against its rivals was that they held colonies had no vocabulary in which to hold one, and the only form of acquisition its creed would accept was accession by request. Somebody therefore had to make the request. And the payment — a city of a quarter of a million handed to Lithuania in October 1939, explicitly against the ethnographic argument and explicitly on the ground of Lithuanian national feeling — establishes the audience by the currency it was denominated in.

Formation was maximised rather than withheld, and its yield turned out to be a function of the deficit it found rather than of the effort expended: the same doctrine that transformed a terrain without literacy delivered, here, a marginal improvement on a base already among Europe's highest. The assault ran alongside it and produced two opposite results in three adjacent countries, because attacking a formation converts it into a flag only where it was already the nation's own.

The cost column was set by two demonstrations eight years apart and then held for thirty-five years at a running cost a police state would call modest, on a coast converted from an open door into a permitted zone by a secret regulation of 1946 — Carneiro's circumscription manufactured where the geography declined to supply it. And the floor did not sink to subsistence, because a showcase cannot be starved.

Extraction ran through an instrument with no rate, and left two competent scholarly traditions computing the same forty-four years and disagreeing in sign. What was taken was position rather than product — ports, shale, coastline, transit — and where a conquest extracts position, the bill is presented in demography.

Information produced the largest censorship establishment in the collection facing both ways at once, and an annulment held for fifty years over a single sheet of paper — because the audience was not a public that would forgive but a doctrine that could not absorb.

Elite coordination produced the tightest default in the collection by the opposite means to every other case: not by giving a potential rival something to lose, but by ensuring he had nothing else. And the 1991 test returned continuity of between forty-four and fifty-five per cent, with genuine outsiders reaching the new elites at rates between one and eight per cent.

Liberty returned the reading that follows from the one above, and it is the same instrument seen from the other side: an elite that cannot fund a dissent cannot fund a right.

Change came from inside the hierarchy, was proposed on state television by a state planning official, and was settled by a putsch in Moscow. The crowd was not the author; it was the price mechanism through which the fight inside the hierarchy was settled.

The accounting found no metabolic catastrophe, because there was no coordination-dependent surplus population to lose one — and found the note presented instead in a currency no casualty figure records, with male life expectancy in the richest republic of the union falling by more than a year across the two decades in which every comparable society's rose.

Where it converges

Group those readings and the invariants stand out, and what makes them worth stating is the terrain they held across.

There was a **floor**, and it was laid first, and everything else was built on top of it. There was a **legal fiction**, and its precise wording was the mechanism rather than the decoration — *to satisfy the request* is functionally the same object as a treaty of cession or a deed of protection, and it did the same work. There was a **seam**: what was said in one place and what was done in another, and an apparatus whose principal task was keeping the two ends apart. **Extraction was sorted by caste**, though the caste here was an administrative classification rather than a race or a religion. There was a **default**, and it held for four decades among people who did not much like one another and did not have to. **Change came from inside the hierarchy**, as it has in every case in this collection. And

the order that was conquered turned out itself to be an earlier conquest naturalised — a bishop's charter of 1201, a landholding caste that outlasted five sovereigns, and a peasantry whose word for a gentleman was the name of a nation.

Those seven held on terrain as unlike the Fergana valley as the Gulf of Finland is, under a doctrine explicitly constructed to abolish every one of them, administered by men a great many of whom sincerely believed it had.

Where it diverges, and in which direction

The precision rule requires the differences to be named at full strength rather than smoothed, because a reader who wants a handle will take the one left lying about.

They are real and there are nine of them. The robe faced the conquered. Formation was maximised rather than withheld. The settlement's conversion ran backwards. The elite was bound negatively, by a seventh Menu family this study has proposed calling *appointment*, and held no property at all. The censor was enormous and faced homeward as well as outward. Extraction was positional and the bill fell due in population rather than in produce. There was no metabolic catastrophe. The conquered were richer, more literate and more industrialised than the conqueror, which removes at a stroke every civilising claim the European cases relied on. And the conquest could not be named — not by its opponents inside the order, not by its authors, and not, in the end, by its own encyclopaedias.

Now set the nine side by side and observe what they have in common, which is the module's contribution and is not a verdict but an arithmetical property of the list.

Each of them made the arrangement **harder to leave**, not easier.

A robe addressed to the conquered has to be paid for in the conquered's own currency, which is expensive — and it makes the order's central claim depend on their visible consent, which is why the elections had to be held and the parliaments had to petition. Formation maximised produces a literate population that reads the constitution. A settlement that abolishes title leaves nobody with anything to defend — and nobody with anything to lose either, which is why collectivisation met no lawsuits and the elite changed flags in a fortnight. An elite bound negatively is more reliable than a landed one while the

centre is solvent and cannot generate a right at any point. A censor facing both ways means that a single contradicting document is fatal rather than embarrassing. Positional extraction produces a demographic transformation that no tax schedule would have produced and that no one voted for. And a conquest that cannot be named cannot be renegotiated, because there is no vocabulary in which to open the negotiation — which is precisely why the argument, when it finally came, had to be conducted about a two-page annex to a 1939 treaty and about the water table under Rakvere.

The features that distinguish this case from a colony are, one by one, the features that bound harder. That is an observation about the mechanisms and it is what the twelve instruments returned. What it amounts to is not this study's to say.

Two Soviet cases

The collection now holds two acquisitions by the same order on terrain about as different as the union contained, and the comparison sorts the findings into the ones that came from the doctrine and the ones that came from the ground.

Doctrine-driven, and present in both: two floors, with the second applied by category to numbers fixed before assessment; a robe addressed to the conquered; formation maximised; national institutions funded in form with their direction reserved; native cadres promoted and then decapitated under a charge drafted in advance; a written right of secession with no forum; and an elite holding office and nothing else.

Terrain-driven, and different in each: the yield of the substitution programme, spectacular where the deficit was large and marginal where it was not; the presence or absence of a metabolic catastrophe, which tracked whether the population's numbers depended on the coordination destroyed; the direction of the settlement's effect on national boundaries, which created nations in Central Asia and found them already made in the Baltic; and the shape of the 1991 reload, which returned first secretaries as presidents for life in one region and, in the other, the same men minus a nationality, with the line drawn by a citizenship law.

That sorting licenses a prediction for the next Soviet case, and predictions are how this collection keeps itself honest. Where the doctrine-driven list appears in full and the terrain-driven list does not, the framework is reading the order.

Where the doctrine-driven list fails, it is reading something else, and the study should say so rather than adjusting.

The counter-positions

Three serious arguments run against everything above. They come from three different directions and the last of them is the one this study is most likely to be accused of having swallowed.

The first is that the alternative was worse, and that the accounting has been run against the wrong baseline. The Soviet Union destroyed Nazi Germany. The German occupation of these three countries murdered their entire Jewish populations within months of arriving, using in every case local auxiliaries, and the plans held for the remaining populations were not compatible with those populations continuing to exist as nations. Any ledger of 1940 to 1991 that does not have that in it is not a ledger. And the counterfactual on offer in June 1940 was never Finland; it was a choice between two occupations, made by three cabinets who could see exactly that.

The second is that the analytic frame is doing work the evidence does not license. The Soviet Union did not extract for a metropolitan bourgeoisie; on the Russian scholarly account it invested in these republics preferentially, built their industry, trained their cadres and left them the wealthiest part of the union. It funded national academies, national-language universities to doctoral level and national encyclopaedias, which no European colonial power did anywhere. It wrote a right of secession into its constitution and, in the end, honoured it. Its founders were sincere and this collection's own control study establishes it. To run a colonial frame across that is to use a word whose meaning depends on features that are absent, and to obtain a result that was built into the instrument.

The third comes from the other side and this study is not exempt from it. A Russian-speaking reader will observe that when the fifty-one years ended, the restored republics adopted citizenship laws that excluded most of the people who had been moved there — that in Latvia something like 730,000 people, about twenty-nine per cent of the population, were non-citizens when naturalisation opened in 1995, and that around 169,000 remain so today; that in Estonia roughly a third of the population was left without citizenship in 1992 and something over sixty thousand hold an alien's passport still; that these

are people who were born there, whose parents were sent there by a state that no longer exists, who did not choose the industrial siting decisions of the 1950s and were not consulted about them; and that a study which describes the demographic transformation as a bill presented to the Baltic peoples has described half of a transaction in which somebody else was also moved.

The answer, and what it does not settle

The first is conceded without qualification. This study said in its first module that the alternative in 1941 was worse and it says so here at the end. It also holds that a comparison of two occupations is a comparison of two occupations, and that the sentence *the alternative was worse* is a complete answer to the question whether the Soviet Union should have been defeated in 1945 and not an answer to any question about what was done in Vilnius in 1949, or in the Rakvere water table in 1987, or to a male life expectancy that fell between 1964 and 1984.

The second is conceded in its factual content, which this study has counted at full length in every module where it arises: the industry, the academies, the languages taught to doctoral level, the coverage, the careers, the output per head above the union mean at the beginning and at the end. What it does not concede is the inference. The frame was not run to obtain a name. It was run as twelve instruments, and the instruments returned what they returned — including four readings that contradict the colonial pattern outright and are recorded above as contradicting it. If the exercise had been built to produce a verdict, the divergences would not be in it.

The third is not conceded and is not refused, because it is not a counter-argument to this study's findings but an additional entry in the same ledger, and the ledger is the study's whole object. The people counted in that paragraph are, in the most exact sense, the demographic bill of Module 6 — the labour that a positional extraction required, brought to build and man an industrial base that a planning ministry sited on somebody else's coast. They are the population that had no more legal protection under that order than anybody else did, that was distributed access rather than granted rights, and that discovered in 1992 what the difference between the two objects is. That the same instrument produced both a transformation the Baltic peoples did not consent to and a stateless population the settlers did not choose is not two stories. It is one

arrangement, read from two positions inside it, and the count belongs on the page whichever position the reader occupies.

Three things remain to be put down, and then the arithmetic is complete.

The three states were recognised by the Soviet Union on 6 September 1991, fifty-one years and one month after they had been admitted as constituent republics possessing equal rights.

Between forty-four and fifty-five per cent of the people who governed them afterwards had governed them before.

And of the men who signed the letter of 23 August 1979 asking that a document be disclosed and declared void from the moment of its signing, Mart Niklus served eight years in the camps and was released in 1988; Enn Tarto served from 1983 to 1988, having already served nine years earlier; Jüri Kukk died in the prison hospital at Vologda in 1981; and the Congress of People's Deputies conceded the document on 24 December 1989, in a resolution recording that the original had not been found.

Reading the case against the framework

Two things this study contributes beyond its individual modules.

The invariant–variable sort is now available and should be used. With two acquisitions by one order on radically unlike ground, the collection can distinguish what a doctrine does from what a terrain does, and the sort is clean enough to generate predictions. This is the first case in the collection where that separation has been possible, and it is worth more than either study alone — which is the argument for a comparative corpus stated as a result rather than as a hope.

And a study runs from a position too. This one was written by a system with hindsight no actor in the record possessed, a vantage none of them could have occupied, and no experience whatever of deciding anything under their constraints. It has read most of its specialist literature through abstracts and reporting rather than in monographs; it has read every constitutional and statutory text in translation; it has taken its most precise numbers from the apparatus that produced them, because the apparatus kept better records than the households it removed; and it has flagged those limitations module by module rather than at the end, so that they can be checked against the claims they weaken. The three national historiographies, the Russian Federation and

the Western scholarship each hold a present position on almost every figure quoted here, and where they differ this study has reported both readings and adjudicated neither.

The framework's central claim is that a position fixes what a person can see, what he counts as a benefit, and what it would cost him to think otherwise. That claim has to include the person writing, and it has to include the person reading. What has been attempted here is to put the count on the page in an order that cannot easily be misread, on every side, including the sides that are inconvenient to each of the positions available — and to stop there.

A note on sources. The admitting formula quoted at the head of this module is as reported by the American chargé in Moscow in his telegram of 4 August 1940, printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, and is as established in Module 3. Every other factual claim in this module is carried from the preceding eleven and is sourced there; nothing new is asserted except the citizenship figures below, and this module should be read as a summary whose evidence lies behind it.

The citizenship figures are as their sources give them and are contested in the political argument that surrounds them. For Latvia: approximately 730,000 non-citizens, about 29 per cent of the population, when the naturalisation process opened in 1995, falling to 282,876 or 13 per cent by January 2014 and to 169,276, about 9 per cent of a population of roughly 1.87 million, by 2024, with some 150,000 people naturalised by mid-2025 and the decline also reflecting emigration, mortality and the automatic acquisition of citizenship by children born after 2019 — from the Latvian foreign ministry's published material, the statelessness index and the reference literature. For Estonia: the re-adoption of the 1938 Citizenship Act in 1992 granting automatic citizenship almost exclusively to 1940 citizens and their descendants, leaving about a third of the population without citizenship, with roughly 125,000 becoming non-citizens and fewer than 69,000 alien's passport holders remaining in 2021 — from the GLOBALCIT country report on Estonian citizenship law and the reference accounts. Both governments dispute the characterisation of the resulting population as stateless and use their own official terms, *nepilsonis* in Latvia and *persons with undetermined citizenship* in Estonia; those terms are noted rather than adopted here, and the fact that the terminology is itself contested is part of what the paragraph records.

The dates and figures recapitulated in the closing passage — the Soviet recognition of the three states on 6 September 1991; the elite continuity range of 44 to 55 per cent; the sentences and death of the three Estonian signatories of the Baltic Appeal; and the resolution of the Congress of People's Deputies of 24 December 1989 with its note that the original had not been found — are all established and sourced in Modules 7, 8 and 9.

Part of the collection Patterns of Power. Tested, never revealed.